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ABSTRACT
This is a case study of the regulation of the artificial
sweeteners, cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame, by the Food
and Drug Administration. These substances have been consumed
daily by millions of people worldwide, but their consumption
is especially prevalent in the United States. Each sweetener
has been the focus of scientific controversy. In 1969 the FDA
banned cyclamate, alleging that it caused cancer in animal
studies. In 1977 the agency proposed restrictions on
saccharin's use on the grounds that it too was an animal
carcinogen. Public outcry and industry pressure prompted
Congress to delay the saccharin decision; today it is still on
the market. In 1981 the FDA approved the new sugar
substitute, aspartame, for limited uses and in 1983 as an
additive in soft drinks.
Participation of non-government groups in the regulatory
process was most intense and widespread with saccharin;
relatively mild by comparison with cyclamate, and prior to its
marketing, almost nonexistent with aspartame. The thesis
examines the role of science in the regulatory process. The
study focuses especially on government and corporate
strategies to influence the outcome during the various stages
of each controversy.
Three findings offer some explanation for the divergence in
the regulatory status of the sweeteners. First, because the
science was uncertain in each case, it became subject to
multiple interpretations by interest groups participating in
the regulatory process. Second, the availability of a
substitute for a threatened, but popular product, will provide
one important indication of the likelihood that government
restrictions on its use will be effective. Finally, the cases
suggest that the strategies of participants in the process to
secure their own organizational goals may ultimately outweigh
protection of the public's health, the avowed goal of health
and safety regulations.
Thesis Supervisor: Harvey 1. Sapolsky
Professor of Public Policy and Organization
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
We look to government to protect us from innumerable
hazards encountered in daily life. We rely on various federal
agencies to monitor business practices by setting guidelines
for consumer products, establishing workplace standards,
restricting air and water pollution, etc. For the individual
the reliance on government simplifies the overwhelming task of
risk assessment, but events sometimes indicate that regulatory
policies may not provide the assurances that are often taken
for granted. Health and safety regulations, designed to guide
business behavior, often have protection of the public as
their chief intention, but in implementation they sometimes
fail to be equal to the task.
This study assesses the degree of conformity between
intent and outcome in the area of health and safety policy by
examining the regulation of the artificial sweeteners,
cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame. In 1969 the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) banned cyclamate, alleging that it
caused cancer in animal studies. In 1977 the agency proposed
restrictions that would have led to virtually a total ban on
saccharin's use on the grounds that it too was an animal
carcinogen. In 1981 the FDA approved the new sugar
7substitute, aspartame, for limited uses. Two years later the
FDA granted aspartame's manufacturer permission to sell it as
an additive for soft drinks.
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1958 includes
provisions specifically prohibiting the marketing of additives
that are unsafe or that are shown to cause cancer in
laboratory tests. The FDA's decisions on the three sweeteners
used the laws requirements as guidelines. The regulation of
cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame was intended to ensure
that the millions of Americans who regularly used a sugar
substitute were protected from consuming a hazardous
substance.
Each sweetener case was scientifically controversial and
generated varying degrees of public and interest group
involvement. Participation of non-government groups in the
regulatory process was most intense and widespread with
saccharin; relatively mild by comparison in response to the
cyclamate ban, and, prior to its marketing, almost nonexistent
with aspartame.
In these cases the question is raised whether the current
artificial sweeteners policy has realized the regulatory
intent. The status of each sweetener today suggests that
protection of the consumer may not have been well-served.
Studies have virtually exonerated cyclamate of the charge that
it was a carcinogen, while additional research has
corroborated the evidence against saccharin. Public outcry
8and industry pressure prompted Congress to delay the saccharin
decision; today it is still on the market while cyclamate is
not. Aspartame was approved although the recommendations of a
board of three prominent scientists recommended that marketing
be delayed until further tests could be conducted.
This study is an attempt to understand the discontinuity
between regulatory intent and policy outcome in the artificial
sweetener cases. It focuses especially on government and
corporate strategies to influence the outcome during the
various stages of each controversy. 1 More generally, the
three cases suggest some limits on what government, regardless
of worthy intentions, can actually accomplish by regulations
that propose to change behavior or deprive consumers of a
popular product for which there is no substitute. In these
situations the opportunity is ripe for groups opposed to the
regulation to mobilize the public and alter the policy
outcome.
Background
After World War II an industry developed in the United
States based on the manufacturing of sugar substitutes and
artificially sweetened foods. The popularity of diet foods
and beverages remains largely an American phenomenon with
sales today totalling $4 billion a year. Eighty percent of
the world's diet soft drink sales occur in the United States.
9A major factor limiting the popularity of artificial
sweeteners abroad is that the "figure maintenance concept" on
which they depend is often absent for cultural or economic
reasons. In some affluent countries like Japan, there is
little interest in calorie counting, and dieting is seen as an
unfashionable, private matter. The popularity of sugar
substitutes also depends on economic prosperity. Slimness and
weight reduction are irrelevant in countries where subsistence
is a major concern. 2
In many countries the label "diet" denotes illness, an
association that was originally true in the United States but
that the early manufacturers of artificially sweetened foods
worked assiduously to eliminate. In Europe government
regulations often restrict the use of "diet" to identify
products intended for medical uses. Other countries may also
limit the amount of artificial sweetener permitted in foods to
levels far below those permitted in the United States. For
instance, in Japan the government's restrictions on saccharin
have meant that diet soft drinks have only half the calories
of sugared brands. In the United States diet drinks commonly
contain only one calorie. 3
The three sweeteners examined here serve an identical
purpose: to provide a low or zero calorie alternative to sugar
for dieters and diabetics. Cyclamate and saccharin are
non-nutritive, non-caloric sweeteners. Aspartame is
considered a nutritive sweetener because it is metabolized by
10
the body as a protein and has a slight caloric value. The
term, artificial sweeteners, is generally used to distinguish
manufactured sugar substitutes from sweeteners derived from
corn, honey, or other natural food sources. Aspartame is
being marketed as a "natural" sweetener on the grounds that
its constituents are aspartic acid and phenylalanine, two
amino acids contained in food proteins. Nevertheless,
aspartame is synthesized in industry laboratories, so the
distinction is largely a semantic one. 4 (See Table I-A)
In each of the cases policy development occurred in
similar stages. First, there was identification of a health
concern through scientific study. Cyclamate and saccharin
were brought to the attention of government by research
findings prompted by the growth in their consumption during
the 1960s. (See Table I-B) Aspartame's manufacturer,
petitioning the FDA for marketing approval, placed it on
government's agenda. In the second stage, interest groups
challenged the safety of the sweeteners thereby increasing the
pressure on the FDA to reach a decision.
In the third stage the FDA proposed a ruling on each
sweetener that provoked a response from the manufacturer.
Finally, in the last stage, the manufacturer and the diet food
industry adopted a public or private approach to resolving the
controversy. If public, the company attempted to enlist the
involvement of other firms in the diet industry and extended
appeals to the public to resist the proposed government
TABLE I-A
ARTIFICIAL
SWEETENER
SACCHARIN
CYCLAMATE
T c4.UV R., 1 J
1897
1937
SWEETENING
E1 "11AT IVAL T*
300x
300x
200x
COST/LB
$4.00
$1.93
$85.00
IU .SES
Baking
Beverages
Food mixes
Tabletop
Baking
Beverages
Food mixes
Tabletop
Beverages
Food mixes
Tabletop
HEALTH CONCERNS**
Bladder cancer
Bladder cancer
Embryotoxic effects
Testicular atrophy
Brain lesions
Prohibited for
phenylketonurics
Alterations in brain
chemicals
U. S.
REGULATORY STATUS
FDA restrictions
on use delayed by
Congress; availabl
for all uses
e
Banned
Approved
*Compared to sugar
**Health concerns raised in animal studies
Sources: Beverage Industry Annual Manual 1982
Gene Bylinsky,"The Battle for America's Sweet Tooth," Fortune, 26 July 1982
Calorie Control Council, Sweetener Fact Sheet
I 1I I
I--------
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TABLE I-B
U.S. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF NON-CALORIC SWEETENERS
(IN SUGAR EQUIVALENTS)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar Population Cyclamate Saccharin Aspartame Total
Year non-
cal &
low-
cal
sweet-
eners
- - - - - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
million ............. pounds...................
1960 180.671 0.3 1.9 2.2
1961 183.691 0.4 2.1 2.5
1962 186.538 0.4 2.5 2.9
1963 189.242 0.7 3.0 3.7
1964 191.889 1.3 3.5 4.8
1965 194.303 1.7 4.0 5.7
1966 196.560 1.9 4.5 6.4
1967 198.712 2.1 4.8 6.9
1968 200.706 2.2 5.0 7.2
1969 202.677 1.6 5.3 6.9
1970 205.052 5.8 5.8
1971 207.661 5.1 5.1
1972 209.896 5.1 5.1
1973 211.909 5.1 5.1
1974 213.854 5.9 5.9
1975 215.973 6.2 6.2
1976 218.035 6.1 6.1
1977 220.239 6.6 6.6
1978 222.585 6.9 6.9
1979 225.055 7.0 7.0
1980 227.704 7.1 7.1
1981 229.849 7.2 0.2 7.4
1982 232.057 7.3 1.0 8.3
1983 234.249 7.2 2.0 9.2
Source: Robert D. Barry, National Economics Division, USDA.
Source: Robert D. Barry, National Economics Division, USDA.
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action. If private, the company worked to minimize public
attention by handling any controversy within the regulatory
process.
Influencing the process
The public, convinced by years of advertising that
artificial sweeteners were effective aids to dieting, was
committed to their availability. When the FDA proposed to
restrict saccharin, the public was mobilized to protest
because it was the only sweetener left. The restrictions
would have sharply curtailed artificial sweetener use, leaving
most consumers without sugarless products.
The sweetener manufacturers and the soft drink companies
were key participants in the three cases. Other diet food
producers, the diabetes associations, and several scientific
organizations also supported the availability of artificial
sweeteners. The opponents of cyclamate, saccharin, and
aspartame included the sugar industry, several consumer
advocacy groups, and individual scientists.
The FDA, although responsible for deciding the status of
each sweetener, was also a participant in the controversies.
Roger Cobb and Charles Elder describe how government's
conflict management function does not preclude it from
frequently being part of group conflicts. 5 The FDA was not
detached from the debates over the sweeteners or from the
14
pressures that were generated by the other participants to
influence its decisions.
In a straightforward food additive case, the FDA's
decision-making process would involve review of the scientific
findings. The agency could then act in accordance with the
law. The artificial sweetener cases, however, were
complicated by two important factors. First, the scientific
findings about the effects of sugar substitutes were
ambiguous. The absence of epidemiological evidence linking
artificial sweeteners with bladder cancer contributed
especially to the scientific and policy debates. Second, the
availability of a substitute was an important factor in
generating the public's involvement. Saccharin was on the
market when the cyclamate and aspartame decisions were made.
The regulation of artificial sweeteners was characterized
by uncertainty. The strategies adopted by the various
participants can be viewed as attempts to reduce this
uncertainty. The manufacturers wanted the security of having
their product on the market, free from health challenges by
scientists and consumer advocates and threats of government
action. The soft drink industry wanted to ensure stability
for its highly profitable diet segment.
Millions of consumers, interested in dieting, wished to
have available at least one sugar substitute. Diabetics
wanted the convenience of easy access to artificially
sweetened products. The risk of future ill-effects from
15
artificial sweetener consumption disturbed consumer advocates;
they recommended reducing the danger by restricting or banning
the sugar substitutes.
This study seeks to explain how these groups attempted to
influence the FDA's decision-making. It focuses particularly
on the strategies adopted by various participants during the
regulatory process to provide favorable interpretations of the
science, to control the scope of the conflict, to defend past
decisions, or to define the public interest.
The plan of the study
Open-ended interviews were conducted with officials of
the affected companies, FDA staff members, and representatives
from relevant trade associations, consumer advocacy
organizations, and the national diabetes associations.
Congressional staff members and scientists and lawyers in
government and industry were also interviewed. (See Appendix
for list of persons interviewed)
The next chapter (chapter II) will examine why science
has been uncertain in the study of artificial sweeteners and
will summarize the data on cyclamate, saccharin, and
aspartame. The middle chapters (chapters III-V) will discuss
the regulatory history of each artificial sweetener, tracing
the policy process as it occurred in each case, and
identifying the participants and their influence on the
government's decisions.
16
The cyclamate chapter (chapter III) will also examine the
soft drink industry and the major role it played in the
development of a diet food industry. The saccharin chapter
(chapter IV) will pay particular attention to the food
regulatory system in the United States and the role of the
FDA. The saccharin chapter will also consider the options
available to government in the regulation of popular consumer
products and the effect of conflict expansion on policy
outcome. The aspartame chapter (chapter V) provides a
contrast to the cyclamate and saccharin stories, describing
the effect on policy when the sweetener under consideration is
a new one rather than one long on the market. The final
chapter (chapter VI) will consider what the regulation of
artificial sweeteners may reveal about government and
corporate strategies to shape policy and the effect on the
conformity between intent and outcome.
NOTES: Chapter I
1 Strategy is used here to refer to a conscious course
of action adopted by the participants in an effort to achieve
their organizational or individual goals with respect to
artificial sweeteners. In the case of large organizations,
like the manufacturers of the artificial sweeteners, it is not
assumed that the approaches adopted necessarily reflected a
company wide policy. The strategies may have been the work of
individuals; it was beyond the scope of this inquiry to
determine the extent of the company commitment to the response
to the FDA decisions.
2 Carolyn Hulse, "Diet Coke Faces Hurdles as it Spreads
Worldwide," Advertising Aja, March 14, 1983.
3 Ibid.
Artificial sweetener is used in this study to refer to
a chemical compound that is sweet to the taste not including
sugar or any polyhydric alcohol. The definition is taken from
Food Additives and Contaminants Committee Report on the Review
of Sweeteners in Food by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1982).
5 Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, ParticiDation in
American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 37.
CHAPTER II
THE SCIENTIFIC ORIGINS OF A PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE
Hundreds of scientific tests have been conducted on
cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame individually. The mixture
of cyclamate and saccharin that was in standard use for almost
twenty years in the United States has also been extensively
examined. Some of these tests produced bladder tumors or
other serious effects in laboratory animals. Despite the vast
amount of research, however, the health risks to humans are
the subject of intense debate.
Scientific research often produces ambiguous results that
generate further research and lead to continued refinement of
the data. What is the norm for scientists, however, is an
uncomfortable state of affairs for policymakers, especially
with regard to decisions that have highly visible outcomes.
Those regulatory agencies that make science based policy are
often required to act on an issue even as the research
continues.
For example, the Food and Drug Administration cannot
indefinitely postpone a food additive ruling. The
consequences of delay could mean, in the case of an unsafe
additive already in use, that the American public is exposed
to a health hazard. Or, in the case of a safe additive, a
19
lengthy approval process could impose undue costs on the
manufacturer. The FDA will have to act on the basis of the
available information even if, as is usually the case, the
data are less than certain.
What will ultimately become apparent in each artificial
sweetener case was that the debates were only partly about
scientific issues and more significantly about political
judgments regarding risk allocation. A former general counsel
to the FDA described the dilemma that the agency often
encounters: "Given scientific uncertainty, policymakers must
confront the question of how much risk (from an additive) we
are willing to tolerate."1
The policy debate over artificial sweeteners has two
basic positions. One side (the FDA with cyclamate and
saccharin, some public interest groups, and the sugar
industry) finds the negative evidence from animal studies
sufficiently convincing to warrant government restrictions.
The other (the artificial sweeteners industry, Congress with
saccharin, and the FDA with aspartame) finds in the lack of
harmful human evidence justification for their unrestricted
use.
A position that seemingly occupies the middle ground
(held by the American Diabetes Association, the Juvenile
Diabetes Foundation, and the American Cancer Society) is
represented in the warnings for diabetics, pregnant women,
smokers, and children to moderate their consumption of
20
artificial sweeteners. Actually, these admonitions conceal
further support for their unrestricted use. Many products
such as toothpaste, mouthwash, and cosmetics, contain
saccharin, a fact that is generally unknown. 2 Although it is
easy to avoid diet soft drinks or tabletop packages, it would
be more difficult for the consumer in a subgroup at risk to
eliminate artificial sweetener use altogether. Moreover, the
unrestricted sale of diet soft drinks virtually guarantees
that children will continue to have unlimited access to sugar
substitutes.
Artificial sweeteners have been studied by a variety of
organizations. The cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame
manufacturers and the food industry, especially the major soft
drink companies, have been the primary sponsors of tests. The
cane sugar industry, in attempts to discredit any substitutes
for sugar, has also supported research. In addition, the FDA,
often because of pressure from the sugar industry or from
public interest groups opposed to artificial sweeteners, has
conducted studies either within the agency or through other
scientific organizations. Partly as a result of all these
varying interests, the data have been subject to competing
interpretations. Deciding whether an artificial sweetener is
safe for human consumption has become a matter for public
policy rather than for science. With an indeterminate
scientific base, the role of non-scientific factors in the
policy process has become decisive.
21
The groups on both sides of the artificial sweeteners
issue have utilized the equivocal aspects of food additive
science. The diet industry has, not surprisingly, been the
major source for data that contradict the negative findings on
sugar substitutes. Beginning with the cyclamate ban, the
industry attempted to generate more favorable science through
a network of research laboratories, universities and trade
associations. Through this network food companies have
anticipated and countered unfavorable scientific studies with
some success. Alternative explanations for the harmful
evidence about artificial sweeteners have been instrumental in
the shaping policy debates.
Public awareness that science can be uncertain is a
relatively recent phenomenon. After World War II, coverage of
scientific events increased, prompted in part by the drama of
the space race. Although today scientific news remains a
relatively small part of total reporting, it has grown
substantially in the past several decades. In the process
public skepticism toward science appears to have increased.
This may be due in part to the fact that the growth in
coverage has been accompanied by expanded reporting of
controversy among scientists. 3
Previously unquestioned scientific procedures have become
the object of scrutiny. In the area of food additives, the
awareness that scientists are not omniscient has been joined
by a growing public realization that all risks cannot be
22
identified or even quantified.4 To some extent with cyclamate
and more so with saccharin, the FDA's rulings were not greeted
with public acceptance. The media and the diet industry
focused particular attention during each case on the validity
of animal studies and in the process often distorted the
issues.
The complexity of scientific procedures
In 1902 Dr. Harvey Wiley, later chief of the Bureau of
Chemistry, the FDA's predecessor, formed what was called
"Wiley's Poison Squad". Wiley assembled teams of young men to
test the toxicity of preservatives and coloring agents. For
five years these volunteers (Wiley thought young men to be the
most resistant to possible adverse effects) ingested a variety
of foods, and Wiley collected extensive chemical and
physiological data. 5
Dr. Wiley found that the results of the tests from his
"poison squad" were difficult to interpret. Although
analytical and statistical methods have greatly advanced, of
course, since the turn of the century, the increased
sophistication in current scientific techniques has not always
made data interpretation less complicated, in part because the
problems have become more complex.
The development of the food industry has been assisted by
and in turn contributed to an intricate system of food
23
processing. Until this century food additives were primarily
used as preservatives. As the industry grew, the use of
chemical additives expanded to include a wide range of
applications. 6  The FDA currently has jurisdiction over 3000
direct additives, substances that are added to foods, and as
many as 10,000 indirect additives, those that may migrate
during processing, packaging, or storage. 7
The food additives most widely used now are those that
enhance the appeal of the food to the consumer. This group
includes coloring agents, flavors, flavor enhancers,
sweeteners, and acidifiers, all designed to modify the
appearance, taste, or odor of food. The use of food additives
for cosmetic purposes is often criticized as excessive by
consumer advocates who contend that they are intended for the
convenience of the retailer or the manufacturer, not the
consumer.8 In 1981 the consumption of food additives in the
United States was estimated to be about 139 pounds per capita.
Sugar accounted for 80 percent of the total, salt for 10
percent, and preservatives, artificial colors, and flavors for
about one percent or approximately 1.5 pounds. 9
In 1958 the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was amended.
Because these amendments constitute the most recent overhaul
of the federal food safety laws, the state of scientific
procedures during the 1950s often serves as a benchmark in
contemporary discussions of food safety. The number of
chemicals being tested today is around ten times as many as
were being tested 25 or 30 years ago. The capacity to detect
minute quantities of a potentially harmful substance is now at
three times the magnitude of the levels of detection in the
1950s. 10 Revisions in cancer testing technology sometimes
occur so rapidly that they are altered between the time a test
is started and when it is completed. 1 1
During the hearings on the 1958 Amendments it became
apparent that the state of scientific knowledge at the time
was insufficient to establish the absolute safety of any
chemical substance.12 Despite the advances that have occurred
since 1958, complete safety is still an unattainable
standard. 13 Although it is possible to identify chemicals that
are carcinogens, the exact dose level at which each will cause
cancer is unknown. In addition, substances that may not cause
cancer themselves sometimes act as cancer promoters for other
substances. 1 4
It is impossible even to know all the risks that may
occur from a particular additive. The progress in detection
procedures has resulted in the discovery that many chemicals
are potentially harmful to certain people under particular use
patterns.15 Even when a hazard is known, it is still unlikely
that a cause and effect relationship can be established
between consumption of a substance and the development of
cancer. Chemically induced cancers have a latency period of
ten to forty years from initial exposure to when symptoms of
the disease appear. 16 If an individual was to develop bladder
25
cancer, it would be impossible to attribute the disease to the
two packages of saccharin he added to his daily coffee and not
to where he lived, the number of cigarettes he smoked, his
occupation, or any number of other factors.
It may be possible in the future to single out a
particular substance, especially through advances in the field
of epidemiology. 17  Ironically, in the meantime, refined
scientific techniques have contributed to conflict in the food
safety area. For example, industry often attacks the 1958
standards on the basis of modern scientific procedures. 18
Likewise, the FDA has utilized current science to defend past
decisions. The agency's cyclamate ruling derived from studies
that linked it to bladder cancer. In the years since the
ban, a greater scientific concern has developed over the
possible teratological and mutagenic effects of the sweetener.
In defending the cyclamate ban, the FDA has emphasized the new
issues raised by later studies. 1 9
Not everyone is optimistic about the potential of
establishing cause and effect relationships with carcinogens
because of further specialization in the field of
epidemiology. A FDA toxicologist termed epidemiology "a
methodology, not a discipline", that is used in different ways
by practitioners depending on their individual biases.
Lawyers both in the FDA and the food industry also see little
likelihood that epidemiology will become precise enough to
provide sufficient legal grounds for assigning liability in a
food additive case. 2 0
The limitations of testing methods
The most widely used methods for assessing the safety of
food additives can be grouped into four categories:
molecular structure analysis, short-term tests, tests on
animals and epidemiological studies.21 The molecular
structure analyses provide limited information about the
cancer potential of a substance through examination of its
chemical composition. These tests are not considered as
reliable indicators of the risk a chemical may present to
humans.22
Short-term tests "examine the capacity of a substance to
cause mutations or other genetic alterations" in the cells of
various biological systems. Short-term tests are useful as
screening devices to detect potential carcinogens and they are
popular among researchers because of their speed and low cost
compared to animal or epidemiological studies. 2 3 For example,
in 1977 the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) commissioned
a battery of short-term tests to study saccharin. They were
designed to be completed in three months and were selected
partly to illustrate the way that short-term-tests can be
applied to a regulatory problem.24
Short-term tests are not viewed as definitive evidence
that a substance does or does not cause cancer, although
positive results are considered highly suggestive. 2 5 In the
27
OTA battery, seven tests reported negative findings with
saccharin, three reported positive, and two were incomplete.2 6
The reliability of short-term tests is a function of the
degree of test sensitivity, the amount of impurities in the
analyzed substance, and the dosage levels among other
factors.27
Animal studies are regarded as the best available method
for evaluation of the cancer-causing potential of a substance.
It is acceptable laboratory practice to administer large doses
of a substance to test animals in order to compensate for
their short life span relative to humans, for the increased
rate at which animals metabolize and excrete chemicals, and to
minimize the chance of producing a false negative result.28
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that a species of animals
chosen for a study is the appropriate model from which to
extrapolate the conclusions to human beings. 2 9
With artificial sweeteners, the species used most often
have been rats or mice. Critics of rodents as test animals
have argued that the physiological differences between humans
and rodents may invalidate the data. The organs of a test
animal might be especially sensitive to a carcinogen that
would leave the same organs unaffected in humans. 3 0 One
industry scientist noted the resiliency of the human organism,
saying that "humans have the best DNA repair system of all
animal species." 3 1
Even the large numbers of animals commonly used in a
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study are insufficient especially in detecting the effect of a
weak carcinogen. A FDA advisory committee described the
difficulty of minimizing the rate of error:
Although a positive answer to (is the agent
carcinogenic?) can be given in some particular
instances, no unqualified negative answer is ever
possible...Even with as many as 1000 test animals
and using 90 percent confidence limits, the upper
limit yielded by a negative experiment is 2.3
cancers per 1000 test animals...To reduce the upper
limit of risk to two tumors per one million with a
confidence coefficient of 0.999 would require a
negative result in somewhat more than three million
test animals. 3 2
Of about 35 chemicals known to cause cancer in people, 34
of these are also known to be carcinogenic in mice and rats. 3 5
Still, scientists will agree only that a chemical that causes
cancer in animals is potentially a cancer hazard for humans
for several reasons. The method for administering a chemical
usually is designed to replicate human exposure to the
substance. Some cyclamate-saccharin studies, however, used
pellet implantations, and the results were criticized because
artificial sweeteners are consumed orally in humans. 3 4 Also,
cancer that develops at one organ site in animals may occur at
a different site in humans. Once a human carcinogen is
identified, it is possible to find animal cancers developing
in the same organ, but the reverse is not always true. 3 5
Finally, there is always the uncertainty that every possible
effect of a substance has been sought out and identified. 3 6
Critics of animal studies, especially the industry's
scientists, frequently argue that the maximum tolerated dose
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(the highest dose that can be given without altering the
animal's normal life span from causes other than cancer) is
established at unreasonably high levels. They believe that
high dosage levels may affect metabolism and cause unusual
toxic responses or cancers that would not occur at lower
levels.3 7 With artificial sweeteners it has often been argued
that a person would have to consume hundreds of cans of diet
soft drinks a day to approximate the test dosages.
The disagreements over the applicability of animal study
to humans have made it difficult to determine the implications
of this kind of data for the regulation of artificial
sweeteners. The animal studies on cyclamate and saccharin are
often disputed because the epidemiological evidence has failed
to reveal any harmful effects from the sweeteners. The
principal concern with both sweeteners was that they could
cause bladder cancer, but studies of bladder cancer rates
since World War II provide contradictory findings.
There are about 30,000 new cases of bladder cancer per
year in the United States and about 10,000 deaths per year
where bladder cancer is the underlying cause. Seventy-five
percent of the cases occur among males, and the incidence is
slowly rising for both black and white males. In contrast,
the incidence of bladder cancer and mortality rates from the
disease are generally declining for females of both races.
Artificial sweetener consumption is not considered a
significant risk indicator for bladder cancer. Instead, in
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the United States the most important risk indicators are
smoking and occupation, especially jobs in the dyestuffs and
rubber industries where a worker is exposed to the chemicals,
benzidine and 8-napthylamine.3 8
Additional concern with artificial sweetener use has
focused on pregnant women and children. When tested in
two-generation animal studies, saccharin was found to produce
a significant increase in bladder cancer in male rats exposed
continuously in utero and throughout their lives. 3 9 Certain
cyclamate studies have also focused on the effect of that
sweetener on embryonic development and on second generation
test animals. 4 0 Yet it is unlikely that epidemiological
studies would be able today to detect any significant increase
in bladder cancer in the children of artificial sweetener
users. Diet soft drink consumption increased substantially in
this country less than two decades ago, generally too early
for the children of women who drink them to have developed
bladder cancer.
Epidemiology is a relatively insensitive measure of low
level risks from a weak carcinogen like saccharin. Positive
results are the most convincing but are exceedingly difficult
to obtain. A well-constructed epidemiological study would
involve large numbers of people over extended periods of
time. 4 1 Animal studies can be carefully structured to control
for genetic homogeneity, randomization of subjects, and other
factors that are impossible to ensure in human studies. Even
31
with careful design and execution, however, it is possible in
epidemiological studies only to estimate the degree of risk
for an entire population or to tentatively identify certain
sub-groups who are potentially at special risk.42
The largest epidemiological study of artificial
sweeteners involved 9000 cases and was initiated in 1978 in
response to a congressional request after the proposed
saccharin ban. The study, conducted by the National Cancer
Institute (NCI), found no association in the total population
between the incidence of bladder cancer and any past
consumption of artificial sweeteners. A slightly greater risk
appeared as consumption increased, particularly among
non-smoking, white females and heavy smoking, white males.43
Despite the quality of the study, interpretation of the
data has been disputed. Some critics have argued that chance,
not any causal factor, explains the positive finding of
increased risk for the two subgroups. They contend that it is
beyond the current capacity of epidemiology to determine
increased risk from low-level hazards like saccharin. 4 4
Nevertheless, epidemiological studies can be useful in putting
an issue into some perspective for a regulatory agency. They
can provide the best available estimate of the effect a
particular substance has on humans. 4 5
Food safety and the FDA
Given the existence of so much uncertainty, what
constitutes a sound scientific decision in the study of food
additives? The FDA places the responsibility for proving
safety on the manufacturer. The 1958 Amendments to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act require that a food additive petition
establish that the proposed use of the substance will be
"safe", although the term safe is not specifically defined.
From the legislative history of the 1958 Amendments, it is
apparent that congressional intent was to require "reasonable
certainty of no harm."
The agency has considerable discretion in deciding how
much proof is required for an additive, and the standards for
safety appear to be variably applied. For example, in denying
approval of cyclamate, the FDA ruled that: "Once cyclamate
were in the home and freely available, there would be
inappropriate or excessive use by some individuals over which
there could be no meaningful control." 47 By contrast, no such
criteria seem to have been applied in the aspartame case. One
month prior to the approval of aspartame for soft drink use a
study expressed concern to the FDA about possible deleterious
effects on human behavior from the sweetener. Although the
issue was unresolved, the FDA approved aspartame for soft
drink use.
The food additive petition that a company submits to the
FDA lists the identity of the new additive, its chemical
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composition, the methods of manufacturing the substance, and
the analytical methods to be used in detecting and measuring
the presence of the additive in the food supply under
anticipated levels of use. The data verifying that the
additive is safe for its intended use must consist of all
available toxicological research including the results of
animal feeding studies using at least two species of animals.
The petitioner must also identify the estimated average daily
intake of the substance and show that the proposed methods of
analysis are reliable and suitable for determining compliance
with the regulations. 4 9 By law, the FDA does not have to
consider the potential benefits of an additive. The
manufacturer only has to demonstrate that an additive is
functional, that is, that it will accomplish the intended
physical or technical effect in the food. According to the
FDA Consumer: "FDA must be satisfied that an emulsifier
emulsifies and that a stabilizer stabilizes. But the agency
is not authorized to determinine whether society needs another
emulsifier or stabilizer." 50
Cyclamate
In 1969 the Food and Drug Administration banned the
artificial sweetener, cyclamate, from food and beverages. The
plural form, cyclamates, is occasionally used to refer to the
various forms of the substance: cyclamic acid, calcium
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cyclamate and sodium cyclamate. The three are considered by
the FDA to be chemically and biologically equivalent, but
sodium cyclamate was used most frequently in food
preparations. Cyclamate is about 30 times as sweet as
sugar.5 1
Cyclamate was studied for at least fifteen years prior to
the ban, but the scientific concern generated little public
attention. (See Table II-A) The Food and Nutrition Board of
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) evaluated cyclamate
during the 1950s and 1960s and cautioned the FDA about the
greatly increased consumption of the sweetener resulting from
the growing popularity of diet soft drinks. 5 2 In 1962 NAS
questioned whether enough information was available to warrant
the widespread use of cyclamate in foods and beverages. 5 3
During the early years of cyclamate's production it was
believed that the sweetener was excreted from the body
unchanged. As more sophisticated analytical techniques were
developed, however, it was discovered that cyclamate underwent
slight changes. In 1966 two Japanese scientists found that
although cyclamate was not absorbed by the body, it
metabolized in some people into cyclohexylamine, a toxic
substance. This finding was contrary to the safety assurances
provided by Abbott Laboratories, cyclamate's manufacturer.54
FDA researchers found additional evidence of problems
with cyclamate. Dr. Marvin Legator, then chief of Cell
Biology Research, conducted a study that resulted in findings
TABLE II-A
CYCLAMATE: SELECTED ANIMAL STUDIES *
-- ---------- -------------------------------------------------
STUDY TYPE RESULTS
- ------------------------------ M ---------- M------------------
Oser Chronic toxicity study Evidence of
(sponsored by of the cyclamate- malignant
Abbott Labs) saccharin mixture bladder tumors and
(1969) in rats. testicular atrophy.
mm- ---------------------- ------------------mm--------------
Bryan Female mice: bladder Carcinogenic
(University implanted with response -
of Wisconsin sodium cyclamate- significant increase
Medical School) cholesterol pellets. in bladder tumors.
(1970)
MM------------------------------------
Friedman Animal metabolism study Slight evidence of
(FDA sponsored) of sodium and calcium bladder carcinomas
(1972) cyclamate. in rats fed calcium
cyclamate.
-------------------------- 
------ M-------
* These studies are often cited in reviews of the cyclamate
ban. The results have been contested on the basis of
inadequate testing procedures and other objections.
SOURCE: National Cancer Institute. Review of the Temporary
Committee for the Review of Data on Carcinogenicitv of Cvlcla-
mate (Bethesda: HEW, NIH, February 1976), pp.15-27.
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that cyclohexylamine caused breakage in a significant
proportion of the chromosomes of test animals. A biochemist
in the FDA, Dr. Jacqueline Verrett, reported evidence of
deformities in chicken embryos after injections of
cyclamate. 55
The cyclamate ban was not based on the indications of
chromosomal and embryonic damage but instead on tests in which
laboratory animals developed bladder tumors. In June, 1969,
University of Wisconsin researchers reported a significant
increase in bladder tumors in female mice implanted with a
cyclamate-containing pellet. The results were reported to
Abbott, and the company communicated the findings to the FDA.
Although the test was not considered by the FDA to be directly
relevant to humans, it did focus attention on the bladder as a
possible cancer site. 5 6
Another study, conducted by Dr. Bernard Oser and
sponsored by Abbott, examined the chronic toxicity of
Sndard cyciamate-saccharin mixture in a 10 to 1 ratio used
in most food formulations. The 320 test animals were divided
into a control group and three other groups of 80 that were
each fed a low, medium, or high amount of the sodium cyclamate
and saccharin mixture. No tumors appeared in the control
group (fed a standard diet) or in the low or medium dose
group. Twelve bladder tumors, of which four to eight were
diagnosed as carcinomas, were found in the high dose group.
This group had been fed the equivalent of 3000 Sucaryl tablets
37
per day. Seven of the eight tumors were in animals that
converted the cyclamate to cyclohexylamine. The data also
revealed fifteen cases of testicular atrophy. 5 7
This study precipitated the ban on cyclamate in foods and
beverages. Abbott notified the FDA and the National Cancer
Institute of the findings on October 13, 1969. The results
were forwarded to NAS for evaluation, and NAS scientists
recommended the removal of cyclamate from the FDA's list of
safe food additives. On October 18, 1969, cyclamate was
officially deleted from the list by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare. In September, 1970, the ban was
extended to include drugs and all other cyclamate containing
products.58
The cyclamate ban has received more criticism on
scientific grounds than the FDA's subsequent decisions with
saccharin and aspartame. The FDA failed to control for the
fact that the Oser study was not designed to evaluate
cyclamate alone. Abbott argued, plausibly, that either
cyclamate, saccharin, or cyclohexylamine might have been the
culprit. 5 9 Before banning cyclamate the agency also failed to
verify the results through additional tests. In fact,
subsequent animal studies failed to produce statistically
significant evidence of bladder tumors.
When the cyclamate-saccharin combination was tested, it
was generally assumed that cyclamate was responsible for the
negative results. Although critics of saccharin had been
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warning of ill effects of one sort or another since its
discovery, there was no human evidence to warrant serious
concern. Cyclamate was used in greater proportion in the
standard mixture which also contributed to the belief that it,
rather than saccharin, was at fault. Moreover, for years the
NAS studies had repeatedly cautioned against excessive
cyclamate use.
Following the ban it became known that the bladder tumors
were more likely caused by the saccharin than by the.
cyclamate. Since 1970 many long term animal studies of
cyclamate's carcinogenicity and cocarcinogenicity have been
conducted, and all have been negative. The studies of
cyclohexylamine to date are inconclusive. 6 0 Dr. Bernard Oser,
who conducted the two-year, chronic toxicity study later
expressed doubts about the way in which the results had been
employed as the basis for a ban.61 Five years after the ban,
the president of the National Academy of Sciences opened a
forum on sweeteners with the remark that the FDA cyclamate
decision in his personal view derived from a set of
experiments that "were badly designed, were inconclusive with
respect to the actual findings, and did not warrant any action
at the time.n 6 2
Since cyclamate was banned Abbott has attempted to refute
the scientific evidence and to have the decision reversed. In
1973 the firm submitted new studies to the FDA in a petition
for the reinstatement of cyclamate. In 1975 the FDA asked the
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National Cancer Institute (NCI) to establish a committee to
review the existing data on cyclamate's cancer causing
potential. The committee was composed of three working
groups - experimental design and toxicology, pathology, and
epidemiology.
In their final report the NCI committee concluded that
the available evidence "did not establish the carcinogenicity
of cyclamate or its principal metabolite, cyclohexylamine, in
experimental animals". No conclusion was reached regarding
cyclamate's potential carcinogenicity in humans. The report
cited the limitations of epidemiological studies and the short
exposure time. 6 3  The committee also recommended further
studies and noted that "cyclamate has pushed the technology of
carcinogenicity to its limit." 6 4 The NCI evaluation only
contributed further to the debate over cyclamate's safety.
The FDA argued that NCI did not make a definitive statement
that cyclamate was safe, and Abbott contended that NCI could
not have made "a more definitive statement regarding
cyclamate's safety." 6 5
The FDA, after reviewing the NCI report and other data,
denied Abbott's petition in 1976. Abbott began proceedings in
1977 before an administrative law judge that lasted for three
years. Finally, in 1980 Donald Kennedy, then commissioner of
the FDA, followed the lead set by the administrative law judge
who had ruled that cyclamate had not been shown "with
reasonable certainty" to be safe. Kennedy ruled that
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cyclamate "had not been shown not to cause cancer or heritable
genetic damage." 66  Since the ban, the FDA and consumer
advocates in support of keeping cyclamate off the market, have
continued to emphasize the unresolved questions about
cyclamate's chromosomal and embryonic effects.
Saccharin
Saccharin is manufactured by two processes. An older
method begins with toluene or a derivative,
orthotoluenesulfonamide (OTS). Toluene is obtained from coal
tar and is also used in the production of dyes and explosives.
The second method starts with either phthalic anhydride or
anthranilic acid, deriving from napthalene which is also
produced from coal tar.6 7 Saccharin is 200 to 700 times
sweeter than sugar.
Disputes over saccharin's safety started shortly after
the sweetener began to be used regularly in foods. Early
concerns focused on appetite and gastrointestinal problems
reported in an 1886 study conducted in France. 6 8 From 1920 to
1950 a number of tests were conducted to evaluate saccharin's
toxicological effects on laboratory animals. These studies
were generally of short duration and did not generate any
particular concern about toxicity. The National Academy of
Sciences first reviewed saccharin in 1955 and found that if
persons adhered to a maximum daily intake of one gram
saccharin was unlikely to present a hazard.69
From 1960 to 1967 the use of saccharin alone and in
combination with cyclamate increased significantly largely due
to the growth in diet soft drink consumption. In 1967 at the
request of the FDA, a NAS ad hoc committee on nonnutritive
sweeteners evaluated saccharin again because of the expanding
diet soft drink market. The committee concluded that
consumption of saccharin at the one gram level for an adult
was still acceptable but recommended further, more
sophisticated studies. 7 0
Scientific interest in saccharin was heightened following
the 1969 cyclamate ban. (See Table II-B) As the only
artificial sweetener left, it was anticipated that saccharin
consumption would increase. In 1970 NAS suggested several
areas of further research: epidemiological studies with
special attention to diabetics and pregnant women, comparative
metabolic studies in humans and animals, and tests of the
toxicologic interactions of saccharin with selected chemicals.
In 1972 a study by the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (WARF), partially sponsored by the Sugar
Association, found evidence that saccharin increased the
incidence of bladder tumors in male rats, especially in the
second generation. Based on the preliminary results from the
WARF study, and given the general atmosphere of scientific
concern, the FDA removed saccharin from the list of substances
it considered acceptable for use in the food supply. Under an
interim additive regulation, the agency allowed the use of
TABLE II-B
SACCHARIN: SELECTED ANIMAL STUDIES *
STUDY TYPE RESULTS
STUDY TYPE RESULTS
Wisconsin Alumni
Research
Foundation (1973)
FDA (1973)
2-generation rat
study
2-generation rat
study
Bladder tumors in
offspring generation
Bladder tumors in
offspring generation
Canadian National 2-generation rat Bladder tumors in
Health and Welfare study parent and offspring
Ministry (1977) generations
SOURCE: NRC/NAS, Report No------------------------, pp. 3 18 to 3 22
SOURCE: NRiC/NAS, Report No.1, pp. 3-18 to 3-22.
International
Research and
Development
Corporation (1983)
2-generation, life
time rat study.
Largest animal
study on saccharin
ever conducted.
Benign and malignant
bladder tumors in
offspring generation
exposed from birth.
* The first three studies cited were influential in the FDA's
decision in 1977 to restrict saccharin use.
SOURCE: "Saccharin Carcinogenicity Confirmed by Calorie
Control Council Study", Food Chemical News (16 May 1983),
pp. 3-8.
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saccharin pending further study, but published regulations
intended to discourage consumers from continued use of the
sweetener.71
In April 1977, the FDA proposed to ban saccharin in
foods, beverages, cosmetics, and most drugs. 7 2 Precipitating
the FDA action was a long awaited Canadian study that
corroborated earlier tests of second generation laboratory
animals. The Canadian research showed that saccharin, and not
an impurity caused in the manufacturing process, was
responsible for the presence of bladder tumors.
In October 1977 the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
reported the results of its evaluation of cancer-testing
technology and saccharin, undertaken at the request of the
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate
Committee on Human Resources. OTA concluded that saccharin
must be considered a potential cause of cancer in humans but
that there were no reliable quantitative estimates of the risk
it poses to humans. 7 3 As a result of the Saccharin Study and
Labeling Act, passed in November 1977, NAS was asked to
evaluate saccharin's risks and benefits and to review federal
food safety policy in general. NAS also found saccharin to be
a carcinogen of low-potency and a promoter of the
cancer-causing effect of some other compounds in laboratory
animals. The epidemiological studies examined by NAS did not
provide "clear evidence to support or refute an association
between past saccharin use and bladder cancer in males." In
44
assessing saccharin's risks, the NAS report noted that "even
low risks to a large number of exposed persons may lead to
public health concerns."
7 4
In 1979 in an attempt to finally settle the disputes over
saccharin's safety, the Calorie Control Council, the trade
association of the diet food industry sponsored the largest
animal study ever organized. Conducted by the International
Research and Development Corporation (IRDC), the study
involved over 2000 rats. The Council expected the IRDC test to
confirm that the tumors that had occurred in the Canadian
study were the result of the high doses and not associated
with levels of saccharin connected with human consumptions.
The IRDC tested saccharin at levels ranging from 1 to 7.5
percent in the diet. The earlier studies that incriminated
saccharin were at 5 and 7.5 percent levels. Instead of
exonerating the sweetener, however, the IRDC test appeared to
confirm its carcinogenicity. Bladder tumors developed in the
test animals and, their incidence declined rapidly with a
decrease in dose. 7 5
The major health concern with cyclamate and saccharin has
been the potential that they cause bladder cancer. Unlike the
cyclamate studies that were the basis for the FDA ban in 1969,
the saccharin studies have constituted a series of carefully
refined experiments, confirming its carcinogenicity in
animals. Standard scientific practice makes acceptable the
extrapolation of the results to humans. Because the
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epidemiological evidence, however, is unable to demonstrate
the incidence of bladder cancer attributable to artificial
sweetener use, the diet food and beverage industry continues
to dispute the results of animal studies. (See Table II-C)
Aspartame
Aspartame, 180 times sweeter than sugar, is composed of
two amino acids, the methyl ester of L-phenylalanine and
L-aspartic acid. These amino acids occur naturally in many
food proteins such as hamburger or milk, but are synthesized
in the laboratory for the production of aspartame. Aspartame
is absorbed by the body so the FDA classifies it as a
nutritive sweetener, although as a protein diabetics are able
to use it.
The FDA approved aspartame for use in dry foods and
beverages in 1974 with the stipulation that products
containing the sweetener carry a warning label for people
suffering from phenylketonuria (PKU), an inherited protein
metabolizing deficiency affecting approximately one in 15,000
people in the United States that can cause mental retardation
if not monitored. Most states require a screening program to
detect the disease at birth. 76 In addition the label was
required to include the information that aspartame lost its
sweetness in cooking or baking. Finally, if sold as a food
for special dietary use, the product had to carry a label in
compliance with the FDA' special dietary food regulations. 7 7
TABLE II-C
SACCHARIN AND CYCLAMATE: SELECTED EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES
------------------------------------------------------------
STUDY TYPE RESULTS
-------------------------- K~~~ýi__ogic1---t-m-e------- -o--l---a---a-s-s---i-----Burbank and Epidemiological time No clear associa-
Fraumeni trend analysis of tion with rise in
(1970) U.S. Bladder cancer consumption during
rates 1950-1967 1960s
--------------------------- ----- m ---------------------- m
Kessler Diabetics No evidence of
(1970) association be-tween bladder
cancer and
dietary habits
of diabetics
----------------------------------------------
M- -mm m--- --
Armstrong and Epidemiological - No evidence of an
Doll time trend analysis increase in bladder
(1974) of bladder cancer cancer mortality.
mortality rates Expected association
against use of not found with high
saccharin and consumption during
cyclamate in United World War II.
Kingdom from
1911-1970
---------------------------- m-- --- --m mosttitcal
Kessler Epidemiological case- No statistically
(1976) control study of significantbladder cancer and differences for
artificial sweetener either sex or both
use matched by sex, combined in propor-
race, age, marital tion of artificial
status, and hospital sweetener users, in
mean intake of
artificial
sweeteners per day
or in number of
mean years that
artificial
sweeteners were
used. No statis-
tically signifi-
cant differences
in use of diet
beverages.
-------------------------------------
m -----M--mm-----
Armstrong, Diabetics No evidence of
et. al. association between
(1976) bladder cancer anddietary habits of
diabetics.
SOURCE: NRC/NAS, Report No. .---------------
TABLE II-C, cont'd.
SACCHARIN AND CYCLAMATE: SELECTED EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES
------------------ ----HPi --- ------------ HU T-S-----------STUDY TYPE RESULTS
--------------------- ------------------ M-----------
Howe Canadian matched case No increased risk
(1977) control. 632 bladder of bladder cancer
cancer patients. associated with
artificial
sweetener
use in females.
Males using
artificial
sweeteners had
increased bladder
cancer risk. The
results are
significant only
for the tabletop
use of artificial
sweeteners.
---------------- -------------- ------------------------
SOURCE: NRC/NAC, Report No.1.
----------- M --- M ------ M --- M ------- M ---- M---------------
Hoover. et. al. Epidemiological case No evidence in
(National control study in U.S. general population
Cancer 3010 cases ages 21-84, of association
Institute male and female. between artificial
1979) sweeteners andbladder cancer.
Some evidence that
certain subgroups
at increased risk.
-------------------------------------
SOURCE: Robert Hoover and Patricia Hartge Strasser,
Progress Report to the Food and Dru Administration from
the National Cancer Institute concerning the National Bladder
ancer itudy (1982).
48
Marketing was delayed, however, when Dr. John Olney, a
scientist at Washington University, raised several objections
concerning aspartame's safety. At issue according to Olney was
whether the sweetener caused nerve cell and brain damage and
possibly brain tumors. 7 8 Olney identified possible toxic
effects from the component amino acids in aspartame and from
methanol which is released during absorption and digestion. 7 9
Olney also expressed particular doubts about the safety of
aspartame use for children or pregnant women. Finally, he
pointed out the possibility that some people unknowingly carry
a recessive PKU trait and might be adversely affected despite
the warning labels.
In 1979 the FDA established a public board of inquiry
composed of three scientists, two from MIT and the other from
the University of California in San Diego, to evaluate the
available data and provide the commissioner with scientific
recommendations. The board considered two allegations against
aspartame: that it might entail a risk of brain damage
resulting in mental retardation, endocrine dysfunction, or
both and that aspartame consumption might increase the
incidence of brain tumors. 8 0 The dispute over aspartame was
complicated by charges that Searle falsified data submitted to
the FDA. 8 1 The board, however, accepted the evaluation of the
FDA and the results of an audit conducted by the Universities
Associated for Research and Education in Pathology that
Searle's data were authentic.
49
On the first issue the PBOI ruled in 1980 that the risk
of brain damage associated with aspartame consumption in
humans was negligible. On the second issue, whether aspartame
could be implicated in causing brain tumors, the scientists
found that the the problem was "a complex one and difficult to
judge fairly on the basis of available data. " 8 2 Nevertheless,
the board decided that the possibility that aspartame
contributed to the development of brain tumors could not be
ruled out, at least when administered in the quantities
employed in the reviewed studies. The FDA commissioner,
however, overruled the board, disagreeing with the
interpretation of the brain tumor studies. The commissioner
also cited a long-term Japanese study assessing aspartame's
carcinogenic potential that was submitted after the PBOI
issued its decision and that appeared to be negative with
regard to brain tumors.83
The FDA's initial ruling did not include aspartame's use
in beverages because of concern that, in storage for long
periods of time, the sweetener broke down into a substance
called diketopiperazine (DKP). One possible effect of DKP is
the formation of carcinogenic nitrosamines. 8 4 In July 1983 the
FDA granted Searle permission to market aspartame as a
sweetener in soft drinks and in certain wet foods such as
peanut butter, jelly, canned fruit, and ice cream. The
agency was reportedly convinced that Searle would be able to
overcome the problem of aspartame's stability in the soft
drink solution. 8 5
Scientists in the policy process
Members of the aspartame public board of inquiry found
the process to be a difficult, "not particularly happy"
experience. Although the board was specifically instructed by
the agency not to consider the impact of its decision on
industry or others, the participating scientists were well
aware of the concerns of all the interested parties. At least
two members felt that the process was useful in airing issues
a.L. .. wing the attention of the FDA to weak or rash
arguments. They also felt that the agency should have
stressed the advisory nature of their participation "to anyone
who would have listened." 8 6
By securing the advice of prominent scientists, the FDA
attempted to develop an irreproachable basis for a regulatory
decision and to avoid an adversarial situation in which
according to an agency scientist, "the best lawyers would
win." In the end, however, the FDA did not appear
enthusiastic about the PBOI even as a mechanism for settling
scientific problems. Several agency officials expressed
impatience with the board's desire for further study, finding
the three scientists "too academic" and unprepared to
understand the practical implications of further delay. 8 7 The
agency's complaints about the board, however, appear to be
somewhat disingenuous. The PBOI made an important scientific
and regulatory contribution by framing the major concerns with
aspartame. The board's review represented an impartial,
thorough analysis of the aspartame data. Even though their
decision was overturned, the participation of well-respected
scientists helped to legitimate the regulatory process.
The use of outside scientific organizations has in
general failed to bring more certainty to the artificial
sweeteners proceedings. According to Joel Primack and Frank
von Hippel, the role of the scientific advisory organization
is "to provide information, analysis and critical advice".
Temporary groups, however, are unable to provide continuous
oversight. Consequently, their involvement is usually
restricted to reviewing scientific findings that may be
outdated because of rapid changes in technology.89
The composition of the panel is generally determined by
the sponsoring government agency as well as are the questions
to be addressed and the timetable for the panel's
deliberations. Primack and von Hippel noted that "scientists
(are) often unprepared when they become advisors and find
themselves confronted with difficult and unfamiliar decisions,
often in an atmosphere of great pressure." 90 It is often to
the agency they are advising that the scientist looks for
guidelines regarding his role, as occurred with the aspartame
public board of inquiry. 9 1
Although the scientific panel may expand the range of
opinion available to government, the composition of the panel
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may provide expansion only in one direction. Consumer or
public interest organizations may be represented in some
advisory panels that are designed to have a more diverse
composition such as occurred with the NAS panels on saccharin
and food safety policy. Consumer groups often charge,
however, that they are usually excluded from the wholly
scientific group whose voice may be influential, particularly
in legitimizing a policy. 9 2
In the artificial sweeteners case, the principal
contribution of the scientific advisory groups has been simply
to add to the data or to synthesize existing studies. The
results of their participation often seemed to be to allow the
FDA or Congress to delay a decision or to corroborate a policy
already in existence. For example, the assessment of cancer
testing technology and saccharin conducted by the Office of
Technology Assessment for Congress in 1977 was well received
but has not prompted any further legislation on saccharin or
food safety.
In the cyclamate case according to the House subcommittee
that reviewed the ban, a medical advisory committee was formed
by the FDA only to legitimate the decision:
HEW used an outside advisory body to make
recommendations on matters which had already been
decided... At the time HEW convened the medical
advisory group on cyclamates, the Secretary had already
announced publicly that cyclamate sweeteners and
cyclamate-containing food products would be available in
the future as non-prescription drugs. In affirming the
Secretary's decision, the group acted on the same
scientific facts that had been considered by the FDA's
medical staff in reaching a contrary
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conclusion...Similarily, the reconvening of the Medical
Advisory group served no valid scientific purpose after
the subcommittee's hearings had spotlighted FDA's
illegal cyclamate regulations." 93
The participation of the National Academy of Sciences
often enables the government to speak with greater authority
about a scientific subject. 9 4  NAS describes itself as an
advisory body whose role does not include telling government
how the advice should be used. Over the years, the NAS
reports on cyclamate and saccharin appear to have had little
immediate impact on FDA actions, either in precipitating a
decision or in providing a coherent structure for FDA
policymaking Instead, the FDA has added the NAS work on
cyclamate and saccharin to an already enormous data base. The
fourteen years (in 1970) of NAS advice on the cyclamate issue
have been characterized as "remarkably ineffectual", prompting
one author to remark that "it makes one wonder why such
advisors keep coming quietly back." 9 5
One reason for continued involvement is that NAS
activities are prestigious, a mark of professional
distinction. In general, serving on a government sponsored
scientific committee provides recognition within a scientist's
field; there is usually no financial remuneration.. The
professional incentives for participating may serve, however,
to inhibit dissenting views.
Scientific advisors often find themselves pressured by
their own research or reputational requirements. The
composition of scientific advisory committees tends to be
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relatively small with overlapping memberships by several
hundred scientists. Continued access to information and
resources, maintaining peer respect, and ensuring
participation in future scientific groups are all sources of
professional motivation. 96  The iconoclast scientist on an
advisory panel must weigh the consequences of a dissenting
opinion against these considerations.
Conclusion
Sugar substitutes are often referred to as if they are
beneficial for losing weight. The FDA has appeared on various
occasions as confused as the public about the validity of this
belief, citing the medical benefits of both cyclamate and
saccharin. 9 7 The diet food industry, mainly through
advertising, has been largely responsible for associating
artificial sweeteners with successful dieting. Saccharin and
aspartame (and, in the past, cyclamate) do provide substantial
economic benefits to their manufacturers and the soft drink
companies. But there is no evidence to support the belief that
artificial sweeteners assist the dieter.
There has been little scientific interest in assessing
the effectiveness of artificial sweeteners, in part because it
would be difficult to identify all the variables or to measure
benefits quantitatively. When cyclamate was banned only a few
controlled studies had been conducted to test artificial
sweeteners and weight loss. None of the studies established a
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useful role for artificial sweeteners as weight reducing aides
except under very closely controlled conditions. 9 8
It was not u-ntil Congress mandated a study of saccharin
in 1977 that benefits were specifically considered. NAS,
which conducted the study, reported that there were no long
term, well-controlled clinical trials using saccharin to
control obesity or diabetes. NAS was also unable to report on
any evaluations of the benefits of cyclamate-saccharin
combination that had dominated artificial sweetener use during
the 1950-1970 period. Other reputed benefits from artificial
sweeteners such as reducing the number of dental caries,
improving the palatability of dentifrices and therapeutic
drugs, or assisting in the dietary management of chronic
diseases also could not be substantiated. 9 9
Scientists have also been reluctant to weigh the benefits
of sugar substitutes because some are considered
"psychological" and therefore highly subjective. The NAS
report stated there was insufficient evidence to determine
whether the human desire for sweets is an innate biological
need, an acquired taste, or some combination of the two. NAS
did find "a perceived need or psychological reliance on
nonnutritive sweeteners" among certain groups in the
population.100
One author has proposed that consuming artificial
sweeteners may actually increase the body's desire for sugar.
According to William Bennett, consumption of an artificial
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sweetener may establish a cycle in which a person drinks a
diet soft drink, the body expects to receive sugar, feels
cheated and responds with a physiological demand for more
sugar, and the person responds with more artificial sweetener.
Bennett suggested that the diet industry may have created an
101ideal market, where demand could grow endlessly.
The involvement of the diabetic associations in the
artificial sweeteners controversy has contributed to the
impression that the sugar substitutes provide a medical
benefit. Cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame are not
effective in treating or alleviating diabetes. They are
considered to be of assistance in helping the diabetic to
adhere to dietary restrictions. The Juvenile Diabetes
Foundation and the American Diabetes Association have both
testified at congressional hearings about the "lifestyle"
benefits artificial sweeteners provide for diabetics.
The belief in the benefits of artificial sweeteners,
however misplaced, is firmly entrenched in the American
consciousness, and is a major reason why policy in this area
has been so controversial, and why the public was moved to
protest the saccharin ban. The confusion over benefits
continues to be matched by debate over the risks. The
uncertainty of the science has contributed to the lack of
coherence in artificial sweetener policy.
A scientific comparison of cyclamate and saccharin would
suggest that saccharin presents the greater health hazard.
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The conclusion is not reflected in the current status of each
sweetener. The majority of evidence since the ban indicates
that cyclamate is not a carcinogen, but the FDA remains
unconvinced. Questions still linger about the carcinogenicity
of cyclohexylamine and about possible chromosomal or embryonic
damage from cyclamate consumption. Animal studies with
saccharin overwhelmingly suggest that it is a potential human
carcinogen, but the lack of epidemiological evidence has been
used by saccharin supporters to forestall the FDA's attempted
ban.
The limitations of science have been exploited by
interest groups attempting to draw support for their own
perception of what would be a desirable policy for each of
the sweeteners. For the Food and Drug Administration sorting
out the scientific problems in each of the cases has been
complicated by pressures that transformed these scientific
problems into political debates.
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CHAPTER III
CYCLAMATE: THE SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY AND THE CREATION OF A DIET
MARKET
The widespread use of artificially sweetened foods and
beverages is a post-World War II phenomenon. Although
saccharin has been more or less continuously available since
its discovery in 1879, cyclamate was the first artificial
sweetener to be consumed by millions of Americans on a regular
basis. Cyclamate was in use in the United States from 1950 to
1969 when it was banned as unsafe by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. Almost 18 million pounds of cyclamate
were consumed in 1969 in food products with a total value of
one billion dollars. 1
Cyclamate was discovered in 1937 by Michael Sveda, a
doctoral student in chemistry at the University of Illinois.
Sveda's discovery was the classic scientific accident; he was
conducting experiments on sulfamic acid and its salts and
noticed a sweet taste on a cigarette that he had left on his
laboratory bench. From the twenty compounds he was working
on, Sveda identified the sweetener as sodium
cyclohexylsulfamate or cyclamate.2
Sveda took out a patent on cyclamate which he later
assigned to DuPont chemical company where he went to work in
1942. Dr. Ernest Volwiler, president of Abbott Laboratories,
a major pharmaceutical firm, heard of Sveda's discovery on one
of his periodic visits to DuPont. Because DuPont lacked
experience in the marketing of consumer products, the company
licensed Abbott to develop cyclamate for commercial use. 3
In 1950 Abbott asked the Food and Drug Administration for
permission to market sodium Sucaryl, a tabletop sweetener
containing cyclamate. The approval was delayed because the
FDA had reservations about the quality of the safety tests
submitted by the company in support of the application. The
FDA conducted two years of additional animal feeding studies
on its own, and approved Sucaryl as a non-nutritive sweetener
that was required to carry the warning label that it was
intended for use "only by persons who must restrict their
intake of sweets. v4
Although more expensive than saccharin, cyclamate was
considered by the food industry and by many consumers to be an
almost ideal sugar substitute. It was free from the bitter
aftertaste that was often experienced with saccharin.
Cyclamate was also versatile; it could be used in both dry and
liquid food applications, and it maintained its sweetness when
heated or frozen. Most food and beverage preparations added
cyclamate and saccharin in a 10:1 combination, a synergistic
mixture in which the two together were sweeter than their
simple sum. In the standard mixture cyclamate and saccharin
each contributed about half of the final sweetening power.5
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Before cyclamate became popular, artificial sweeteners
were associated with illness. For over fifty years saccharin
had been used almost exclusively by diabetics primarily as a
sugar substitute in liquids. In its most common tabletop
version saccharin resembled aspirin or other tablet drugs.
People often carried pill boxes with their own supply to be
opened when coffee or tea was served. Moreover, saccharin's
bitter aftertaste did nothing to dispel the notion that it was
a medicine.
Saccharin consumption was limited also by government
regulations. The FDA required that artificially sweetened
foods indicate the number of calories contained in a specified
portion and display a warning label of the type initially
carried on Sucaryl. Before the 1958 amendments to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the states were involved with
regulatory issues that are now handled by the FDA. Most
states required that synthetic sweeteners be identified as
products for special dietary purposes, and any foods
containing saccharin were labeled "dietetic." 6
In 1953 only three states allowed artificial sweeteners
to be marketed without special regulations. Seventeen states
placed limitations on their use; ten states specifically
banned saccharin, and the remainder required dietary labeling.
In Massachusetts and Florida consumers had to have a doctor's
prescription to buy a synthetic sweetener. 7
Many of these laws were enacted under pressure from soft
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drink bottlers and food packagers who had been opposed to
saccharin, fearing competition for their higher priced sugared
products. However, as cyclamate became increasingly popular,
these laws were relaxed or repealed, often at the urging of
the same manufacturers who had been against saccharin earlier.
In working to repeal the restrictions, Abbott adopted a
strategy that it and other companies would follow later in the
cyclamate and saccharin controversies. Abbott suggested that
the diet industry encourage consumers to lobby for regulatory
changes on the industry's behalf. An Abbott executive
recommended in a major food trade journal that: "If artificial
sweeteners are promoted for use by the people for whom they
are intended, it is felt that most states will come to permit
their use." 8
The easing of legal restrictions made it possible to
market cyclamate nationwide; by 1955 the sweetener was allowed
in all the states. 9 Cyclamate's popularity was also enhanced
by the simple but important reason that it tasted much better
than saccharin. But the major determinant of its success (and
of the continued success of artificial sweeteners to date) was
the transformation of sugar substitutes in the public's
perception from "medicine" to aids for dieting. This change
resulted from the American obsession with slimness that
developed after World War II and from the marketing campaigns
undertaken by Abbott, the soft drink manufacturers, and other
companies that exploited this new preoccupation with dieting.
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Before the war, being overweight was not a problem for
most Americans who found mere subsistence difficult especially
during the Depression years. Dieting was almost exclusively
an "upper class sport."1 0 The economic prosperity of the
post-war years produced a "democratization of obesity".
Eating to repletion, a practice previously reserved for the
very few, became available to millions of formerly poor
Americans who could now afford to overeat. 1 1
Prosperity also provided discretionary income that
encouraged an interest in fashion among more American women.
Fashion advertisements of the 1920s principally used drawings,
but by the 1930s the leading fashion magazines had begun to
photograph very slender models. By the late 1940s clothes
were designed exclusively to accentuate a thin figure.12
The popularity of cyclamate and all artificial sweetener
use since the 1950s has been underwritten by the largely
unexamined assumption that they are an effective aid to
dieting. This belief developed during the fifties when
obesity was identified in the popular press as a major
American health problem: "Almost all doctors firmly believe
that obesity is one of the nation's gravest health
problems...there are 50 percent more deaths of fat people than
of thin or average ones. Fat people are highly susceptible to
diabetes, heart, and circulatory disturbances, kidney and
gall-bladder diseases and other life-shortening ailments." 13
The proliferation of dieting advice that began in the
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late 1950s helped to create confusion about what was effective
for losing weight. In 1960 a review of a dozen various and
often conflicting dieting maxims noted the impossibility of
prescribing a single dietary solution that would work for
everyone: "No doctrinaire solution will work for them all.
Each individual has conditioned habits of eating, of taste, of
appetite, of expenditure of energy, of nervous rhythms, and
most important of all, of metabolism." 14 The American Medical
Association called weight reducing in 1959 a "national
neurosis." 15 The dieting craze, however, made any clear
analysis of what actually worked incidental. With 34 million
overweight Americans (one in five at the time) any reducing
diet, especially if written by a physician, was likely to find
a publisher.1 6
From the beginning of cyclamate's use in this country,
the press and the public appear to have accepted a
straightforward relationship between simply eliminating one
source of calories and losing weight. Because sugar is a
major source of calories in the American diet, it has been a
common assumption that replacing sugar with an artificial
sweetener would lead to weight reduction. A widely read
periodical in the 1950s echoed this belief, and by extension,
that cyclamate could aid in ameliorating serious illnesses
aggravated by obesity:
The significance of Sucaryl's role in the national
health picture is obvious...Dietary experts who have
studied the problem suggest that the best diets are
those which cut down on sugars, starches and fats, and
retain the proteins. It has already been demonstated
that the substitution of Sucaryl for sugar can have
spectacular results. There are 120 calories, for
instance, in an eight-ounce glass of sugar-sweetened
ginger ale, but only seven calories when it is made with
Sucaryl. A serving of vanilla ice cream has 110
calories with sugar, only 50 with Sucaryl. Other dishes
show similar calorie savings when sugar is left out. 17
The belief that artificial sweeteners aid dieting has
persisted despite the absence of corroborating scientific
evidence.
Abbott's introduction of cyclamate was fortuitously timed
for the company. Sucaryl entered the market at the start of
America's interest in weight control and its popularity with
dieters was unanticipated. When Abbott applied to the FDA for
approval of Sucaryl, the company filed a new drug application.
Abbott intended to market Sucaryl to diabetics and others who
had to restrict their sugar intake for health reasons.
The first soft drink manufacturer to use cyclamate was
also surprised at the popularity of the low calorie drinks
with dieters. Diet soft drinks sweetened with saccharin were
produced by the Cott Beverages Corporation in 1947. The sales
were insubstantial until the 1950s when Kirsch Beverage
introduced its No-Cal soft drink sweetened with Sucaryl.
Kirsch intended its low calorie drink to be for diabetics,
until the company learned that many of its sales were coming
from people concerned about their weight. Kirsch changed its
advertising strategy to directly appeal to the dieter. In
less than a year, the No-Cal drink was outselling all other
Kirsh brands with a production of two million cases. 18
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In 1955 DuPont's patent and exclusive licensing of
cyclamate to Abbott expired. Other companies began to produce
cyclamate for the bulk market and for home use in tablet or
liquid form. After 1955 DuPont, which had produced some bulk
cyclamate independently of Abbott, had eight percent of the
industrial market, and two pharmaceutical companies, Pfizer
and Merck, held fifteen and two percent of the consumer
market. Abbott maintained a 75 percent share of the bulk
market and a 60 percent share of the tabletop sales during
most of the years cyclamate was in production. 1 9
Sucaryl was sold through Abbott's distribution
organization only to drug stores. Bulk sales were handled
through the chemical sales division. Before 1955 the chemical
sales division had placed advertisements for Sucaryl only in
the trade journals of the food and beverage industries.
Direct consumer advertising was limited to displays in
drugstore windows and at cash registers. Because Abbott was
experiencing competition from other manufacturers, the
company's board of directors decided to break with their usual
advertising policy that had refrained from direct appeals to
consumers and had concentrated on the bulk market. 2 0 Abbott
undertook a campaign specifically to expand the use of Sucaryl
from a product for diabetics to one used by overweight or
weight conscious people. 2 1 The company sponsored
advertisements in women's magazines that described Sucaryl as
a diet aid and as a way for children to avoid the dental
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caries associated with sugar.
The interest in dieting that developed in the 1950s gave
Abbott the incentive to promote cyclamate as a diet aid rather
than as a product for diabetics. The FDA, however, made the
new use a success. In 1958 as required by the amendments to
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA compiled a list of
food additives generally recognized as safe (often referred to
as the GRAS list). Scientists in a national survey were asked
to indicate any reservations about the substances on the list
including cyclamate and saccharin. Of the 900 asked about
cyclamate, the 355 who responded said they knew of no ill
effects from it. As a result, cyclamate was exempted from the
testing that was to be required of new food additives.
Saccharin was also listed as GRAS.22
Under Abbott's initial petition in 1950, cyclamate's use
was restricted to special dietary foods carrying a warning
label. By placing cyclamate on the GRAS list, the FDA made it
possible for manufacturers to use cyclamate in any foods, in
unrestricted amounts, and often without any warning label.
Once the list was compiled, the diet industry responded to
consumer inquiries about cyclamate's safety by citing the fact
that the FDA had included it in a group of substances
generally recognized as safe. 2 3
Without this expanded use it is doubtful that any major
controversy would have developed over cyclamate. As a
sweetener for diabetics, cyclamate consumption could have
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been monitored by physicians and easily regulated by the
individual consumer. It is unlikely that the FDA would have
felt compelled to ban a product used by a relatively small
number of people particularly with the confusion that existed
over whether cyclamate had some medical benefits. Moreover,
even if the agency had found sufficient evidence to ban
cyclamate, its action would have affected a much smaller
number of consumers than the millions who eventually included
artificially sweetened soft drinks and other food products in
their daily diet.
Until the 1950s the diet industry was composed almost
entirely of the manufacturers of saccharin and cyclamate. The
weight reduction fad encouraged the food and soft drink
companies to develop diet products. When it was banned in
1969, cyclamate was an ingredient in over 250 foods. Cyclamate
was not always listed as an additive in each of these
products. For example, bacon and ham cured with cyclamate or
children's vitamins coated with cyclamate carried no warning
labels. Eventually, almost 75 percent of American families
consumed cyclamate in some form. 2 4
The new products and their popularity with consumers drew
the attention of the sugar industry and increased concern
among the scientific community about cyclamate's safety. The
most popular products, tabletop sweeteners and low calorie
soft drinks, reinforced cyclamate's new image as a diet aid.
By 1963 several national soft drink companies were
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manufacturing a diet cola in response to the success the
regional manufacturers were experiencing with their cyclamate
sweetened drinks.
The Cumberland Packing Corporation of Brooklyn, New York,
first produced cyclamate in powdered form for tabletop use.
After World War II Cumberland received a contract to package
sugar in envelopes for restaurant use. Contract packaging
became the basis for the company's growth, but the family who
owned and managed Cumberland Packing decided to create their
own product. In 1958 artificial sweeteners were available
only in liquid and tablet form for tabletop use. Cumberland
Packing developed a powdered, cyclamate-saccharin combination
(in the 10:1 ratio) that resembled sugar in one serving sizes
under the brand name Sweet 'n Low.
Like the Kirsch and Cott beverage companies, Cumberland
Packing expected that the convenience of their product would
appeal to diabetics. The company was initially surprised to
receive letters instead from consumers who praised Sweet 'n
Low's taste and described their belief that it helped in
dieting. In response, Cumberland Packing modified its
advertisements to appeal to America's growing diet
consciousness. Although other companies manufactured packaged
versions of cyclamate, Cumberland Packing dominated the
market.25
The Soft Drink Industry
Artificial sweeteners became controversial as a result of
their use in soft drinks. Since 1963 the consumption of soft
drinks has more than doubled from about 18 gallons per capita
to a 1982 rate of almost 40 gallons. Americans today drink
more soft drinks than any other beverage. Coffee was in second
place in 1982 at 28 gallons per capita; milk consumption in
third place at only 22 gallons. Diet drinks currently account
for almost 18 percent of total soft drink sales.2 6  (See
Figure III-A)
The activities of Coca-Cola and Pepsi, including the
constant rivalry between the two giant companies have
dominated the soft drink industry. In 1962, sugarless brands
accounted for three percent of the soft drink market. A year
later Pepsi introduced Patio Diet Drink and Coca-Cola
introduced its low calorie brand, Tab:
Pepsi-Cola's new low-calorie soft drink, Patio Diet
Drink,...will hit hard for a share of rising of
low-calorie drink market. Coca-Cola, countering
quickly, is bringing out Tab as its low-calorie entry.
Coke's campaign...is obviously going all out to gain a
fat share of the $18 million low-calorie trade. Coke is
the bellwether in the overall soft drink field. Pepsi
is the aggressive second place occupant. Now that each
has entered strongly into a new area of contention, the
resulting advertising clash could have implications for
the whole field. 2 7
After Coca-Cola and Pepsi brought out their diet
products, some anaylsts estimated low calorie sales would rise
by the end of the decade to 30 or 40 percent of the market.
This proved overly optimistic, but diet drinks did find a
FIGURE III-A
Soft Drink Industry Regular and Diet Packaged Sales Mix
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Source: Beverage Industry Annual Manual and National
Soft Drink Association.
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receptive audience during the sixties. In The Cola Wars, J.C.
Louis and Harvey Z. Yazijian describe one reason this
occurred: "The post-war baby boom and a Camelot-enhanced
prosperity produced a consumer class voracious for new
products to complement leisure-minded lifestyles." 2 8
By 1965 the major soft drink manufacturers viewed the
United States market as highly segmented. Coca-Cola and Pepsi
introduced seven new brands between them in a three year
span.2 9 The first of the national diet brands, Royal Crown's
Diet Rite Cola, held a 45 percent market share in 1963. When
Coca-Cola and Pepsi introduced Tab and Patio Diet Drink, Royal
Crown's lead began to slip. Diet Rite, which was Royal
Crown's flagship brand, permanently lost first place after
cyclamate was banned in 1969.30 Tab and Diet Pepsi, which
replaced the faltering Patio Diet Cola, have consistently
ranked among the ten top diet drinks since the middle 1960s.
In 1982 Tab was the fifth best selling brand among all soft
drinks and Diet Pepsi was sixth. Moreover, Tab and Diet Pepsi
far outranked the other brands in 1982 in terms of rate of
growth with a 10.2 and 11.3 percent rise in sales respectively
over the previous year. 3 1
Soft drinks have been explicitly linked in advertising
with youth, health, vigor and patriotic American themes. For
example, until World War II, current events were never
depicted in Coca-Cola's advertisements. Instead, Coca-Cola
sent the message that Americans were "pleasant people in
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pleasant places doing pleasant things as a pleasant nation
went pleasantly on its course." 3 2 It was necessary, however,
for the companies to adapt their promotion of diet drinks to
fit the less staid sixties and the medium of television. The
amount of television versus print advertising began to grow
rapidly in the early 1960s. The soft drink firms,
particularly Coca-Cola and Pepsi, had the resources to use the
"new" medium extensively to support their diet brands with
massive advertising campaigns.
Almost from the beginning of its advertising history,
Coca-Cola utilized pictures of beautiful women, and the
campaign for its diet products continued this tradition. But
it was Pepsi whose advertising strategy best echoed the impact
that the members of the baby boom generation were having on
American culture. In 1963 Pepsi introduced what has been
termed "lifestyle advertising" with a campaign called the
Pepsi Generation. The Pepsi Generation celebrated young
people in everyday activities. These images were combined in
the promotion of diet drinks: young, slim, attractive women
were shown drinking Diet Pepsi while playing sports or in
other commonplace situations.
With the exception of Dr. Pepper, the first low calorie
cola drinks did not use the original name of the company's
principal cola drink. The companies wished to disassociate
their artificially sweetened products from any connotations of
illness that the diet label might imply. Although Pepsi
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initially feared giving consumers the impression that regular
Pepsi was calorie laden, after much agonizing, the company
introduced Diet Pepsi as the replacement for Patio. 3 3
In Coca-Cola's case, the company was especially
interested in protecting its flagship product from the
suspicion that it was fattening. It was not until 1983 that
Coca-Cola would introduce a brand called Diet Coke. The name,
Tab, was selected from a total of 250,000 phonetic
combinations because it sounded streamlined. The Tab bottle
was carefully chosen. According to company instructions, the
bottle had to "make a lasting impression on both the public
and packaging industry. Aesthetically it had to imply the
same high quality consumers have come to expect of all
products from the Coca-Cola company. That this drink was both
tasty and easy on the diet also had to be implicit in the
design.
It was not simply the immense popularity of diet soft
drinks with consumers that accounted for their importance to
the industry. The high cost of sugar relative to cyclamate
and saccharin and the volatility of sugar prices has also made
the artificially sweetened product profitable for the
companies and the bottlers. The sugarless brands since their
introduction have been sold at the same price as brands
sweetened with sugar. This practice of level pricing has been
defended by the soft drink firms who contend that the price
set for both sugared and artificially sweetened drinks
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represents an average of the cost of the ingredients. The
firms argue that without level pricing, the sugared soft
drinks would be much more expensive. 3 5 Despite this
rationale, the price of artificially sweetened sodas has
remained on a par with the sugared drinks regardless of the
fluctuations in the cost of sugar or corn sweeteners.
The bottlers have been crucial to the secular growth in
soft drink consumption in this country, to the success of
sugarfree brands, and to the preeminence of Coca-Cola and
Pepsi. The soft drink industry is composed of parent
companies, each with their own network of franchised bottlers,
who distributed the new diet brands nationwide during the
1960s through hundreds of thousands of easily accessible
retail outlets and vending machines.
The production and marketing of soft drinks through
independent bottlers began in 1899 when Coca-Cola agreed to
let two Atlanta lawyers establish franchises throughout the
country. Parent Coke was initially skeptical about the idea
of using bottlers to market its soft drink.3 6 The company was
only fourteen years old at the turn of the century and Asa
Candler, Coca-Cola's second owner and an Atlanta druggist,
believed soda fountain outlets were the key to success.
In 1902 Pepsi also began to grant franchises. Seventeen
years later, Coca-Cola was bought by Ernest Woodruff, an
Atlanta entrepeneur, who viewed the bottlers as the best
mechanism for achieving growth, and he worked to extend the
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network. When the bottlers's sales of Coca-Cola surpassed
those in soda fountains for the first time in 1928, the
franchise system became a permanent feature of-the industry.
The lack of a strong distribution network can hinder
growth whatever other assets a company may have. For example,
despite Royal Crown's innovative efforts in bringing out the
first national brand diet drink and in pioneering the use of
aluminum cans, its bottlers have lacked the strength to make
the company a major contender to Coca-Cola and Pepsi.3 7 The
bottlers are fierce rivals for sales within their franchised
area. The competition is manifested in constant product
differentiation and intense advertising to support new brands.
The parent companies supply the syrup or syrup
concentrate which the bottlers mix with carbonated water at
the local plant. Traditionally, Coca-Cola purchased sugar
directly and sold it to its bottlers at a fixed price. As
sugar prices became more volatile during the 1970s, the
company attempted to renegotiate its 58 year old contract with
the bottlers to have them absorb more of the price increases.
The new contract strained the relationship between the
bottlers and the parent company. Pepsi and other companies
have maintained more flexibility in their syrup pricing
arrangements over the years, and their relationships with
their bottlers have not been as contentious as Coca-Cola's.
In 1982 Pepsi had 470 franchises nationwide and Coca-Cola
had 685.38 The number of independent bottlers has gradually
declined because of pressure from the parent companies on the
smaller franchises to merge with larger ones. In addition the
soft drink industry was often confronted by health and
environmental challenges during the late 1960s and early
1970s. The bottlers had to absorb the rising costs and
uncertainty associated with stricter government regulations
and environmental laws that resulted from these concerns.
The soft drink forms have worked diligently to promote
their products as wholesome and refreshing. They have usually
attempted to avoid direct involvement in the controversies
that have developed over various ingredients. In 1982 7UP
advertised its flagship brand as caffeine free and was roundly
criticized, not just by other soft drink firms, but by the
entire food industry. In general, companies fear that
focusing on the hazards of one ingredient will lead the public
to question other ingredients and eventually generate doubt
about the safety of the entire food supply. 3 9 Seven-Up was
charged with using "scare tactics" and with unduly provoking
public concern about an additive that had not been proven
harmful. Despite the diatribes against 7UP that ran in
beverage and advertising industry publications, all the major
soft drink firms have since introduced a caffeine-free
brand. 4 0
Louis and Yazijian noted that Coca-Cola had long
experience with what it considered the "volatile mixture of
public sentiment and political advocacy." By themselves,
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"neither an unorganized public nor government scrutiny" were
considered cause for alarm, but the mixture was to be
avoided." 4 1 Around the turn of the century, the company was
charged with adding cocaine to Coca-Cola. The accusation was
vigorously denied by Asa Candler, but the company quietly
switched to the use of spent coca leaves without cocaine in
its formula. Beginning with this first controversy over an
additive and continuing through each artificial sweetener
debate, Coca-Cola has adopted a public air of distant concern
while privately working diligently to protect its product.
When the Senate Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs
held hearings on soft drinks in the early 1970s, Louis and
Yazijian noted that Coca-Cola and Pepsi maintained a low
profile:
Their (Coca-Cola's and Pepsi's) responses have been
placid, even meek, in proportion to the vast interest
they share in the issue's outcome. If anything, the
companies have been conspicuously calm, expressing
themselves primarily through the National Soft Drink
Association or favorable medical channels. Their
discretion was a response to a growing struggle within
the federal establishment over what the proper American
diet should be. That struggle could easily merge with
mounting public concern over the same question, and
thereby sweep the siblings (Coca-Cola and Pepsi) from
their lofty stations in American life to a defensive,
embattled stance.42
The parent companies used their bottlers to politically
protest the cyclamate and saccharin decisions. On the national
level Coca-Cola's southern base has given it a traditional tie
to the Democratic party although the company has occasionally
supported Republican candidates, most conspicuously Dwight
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Eisenhower. More recently, when Jimmy Carter ran for president
in 1976, he received the help of parent Coke and prominent
bottlers. On the other hand, Pepsi's affiliation with the
Republican party has been long-standing and was most visible
during the Nixon presidency. Donald Kendall, current head of
Pepsi, has been a Nixon supporter since 1960 and was a close
advisor during the 1968 election. 4 3
With artificial sweeteners the national political
influence of the soft drink companies has been less useful
than the local presence they display through their bottling
networks. The bottlers are major employers and they spend
heavily in local advertising. Usually prominent in their
community, the bottlers are well known to their congressional
delegations. The opposition of the soft drink firms to the
cyclamate and saccharin decisions was primarily expressed
through the appeals of their bottlers to Congress.
The Sugar Industry and the Cyclamate Ban
The sugar industry also played a central role in the
cyclamate controversy. Cyclamate troubled the domestic
producers and refiners of cane and beet sugar even more than
saccharin had although saccharin had been around for decades
longer. The opposition of the sugar industry to saccharin was
instrumental in passage of the state and federal laws that
restricted artificial sweetener use and imposed labeling
requirements on diet products. Cyclamate's better taste,
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however, made it a more formidable competitor than saccharin
whose popularity had been limited by its aftertaste.
The caloric sweeteners produced in this country include
cane and beet sugars, corn sweeteners, honey and other edible
syrups. 4 4 From 1963 to 1965 when cyclamate emerged as a
popular sweetener, the consumption of domestic cane and beet
sugars increased but the growth was short lived. Although
refined sugar has constituted the largest percentage of
caloric sweetener use in the United States, the share of the
market held by domestic refiners has slowly, but steadily,
declined since 1965. (See Table III-A) In addition, from
1963 to the ban in 1969, cyclamate consumption grew at a very
rapid rate. (See Figure III-B)
In the 1960s the soft drink companies led by Coca-Cola
were (and remain today) the largest buyers of refined sugar.
In 1950 the wholesale price of cyclamate was $3.85 per pound;
in 1955, $2.95 per pound; and in 1968, $.55 per pound. In
contrast, wholesale refined sugar prices rose during this
period from 8.15 cents per pound in 1950 to 10.17 cents in
1968. The 55 cents of cyclamate was equivalent in sweetness
to $3.05 worth of sugar. (See Tables III-B and III-C) With
the practice of level pricing among the different brands, the
profitability of the diet lines, therefore, was substantially
greater than that of the regular, sugar sweetened brands. The
sugar companies were quite apprehensive that cyclamate's
popularity would have the long term effect of reducing the
TABLE III-A
CALORIC AND NONCALORIC SWEETENERS: PER CAPITA U.S. CONSUMPTION, 1963-80
Refined cane and beet sugar Corn sweeteners' Minor caloric' I I
U.S. grown sugar
Beet Cane
sugar sugar Total pc
Cane sugar Corn sirup
Im- Total High-
)rted Total fructose Glucose
Dex-
trose Total Honey
Edible
slrups Total
Total
caloric
Pounds
27.2
28.6
29.1
28.3
26.6
27.8
30.3
31.3
31.1
30.4
30.4
26.0
30.5
32.4
30.3
27.9
27.0
26.3
28.2
30.3
30.1
28.7
29.6
26.8
25.3
25.0
22.8
25.4
24.9
21.0
24.9
22.7
23.3
23.3
21.5
21.7
55.4
58.9
59.2
57.0
56.2
54.6
55.6
56.3
53.9
55.8
55.3
47.0
55.4
55.1
53.6
51.2
48.5
48.0
41.9
37.9
37.8
40.3
42.3
44.6
45.4
45.5
48.5
47.0
46.2
49.5
34.8
39.5
42.1
41.9
42.6
37.6
70.1
68.2
67.9
69.0
71.9
71.4
70.7
70.5
71.3
72.4
71.1
70.5
59.7
62.2
65.4
65.2
64.1
59.3
97.3
96.8
97.0
97.3
98.5
99.2
101.0
101.8
102.4
102.8
101.5
96.5
90.2
94.6
95.7
93.1
91.1
85.6
.7
.9
1.3
2.1
3.0
5.0
7.3
9.6
12.3
15.4
18.9
9.9
10.9
11.0
11.2
11.9
12.6
13.2
14.0
15.0
15.6
16.7
17.4
17.7
17.7
17.9
18.1
18.2
18.4
14.2
15.0
15.1
15.4
16.2
17.2
18.2
19.3
20.9
21.3
23.6
25.3
27.8
30.1
31.7
34.3
37.2
41.1
113.3
113.5
113.9
114.4
116.1
118.0
120.8
122.6
124.7
125.6
126.5
123.0
119.3
126.1
128.7
128.7
129.8
128.0
'Dry basis. Recent corn sweetener consumption may be under stated due to Incomplete data. 2Sugar sweetness equivalent-assumes saccharin Is 300 times as sweet as
sugar, and cyclamate is 30 times as sweet as sugar. 'Cyclamate food use was banned by the Food and Drug Administration, effective In 1970. 4 preliminary. s Estimate.
Source- Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Sugar and Sweetener: Outlook
and Situation Report.
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FIGURE III-B
CYCLAMATE CONSUMPTION IN THE U.S. BY CALENDAR YEAR, 1950-1969
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SOURCE: Unpublished data, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Cited by Fred
Burbank and Joseph F. Fraumeni, "Synthetic Sweetener Consumption and
Bladder Cancer Trends in the United States, Nature 227 (18 July
1970), p.296.
TABLE III-B
WHOLESALE PRICES OF NONCALORIC SWEETENERS, 1955-68
Calendar Calcium Saccharin
Year Cyclamate
[1] [2]
Dollars Per Lb,
1955 2.95 1.60
56 2.95 1.60
57 2.95 1.60
58 2.82 1.60
59 1.95 1.57
1960 1.95 1.40
61 1.95 1.48
62 1.95 1.56
63 1 .6 1.60
64 1.12 1.52
65 .78 1 .40
66 .62 1.39
67 .55 1.30
68 .55 1.30
[1J The price was identical for sodium cyclamate and
cyclamic acid.
[2] Includes insoluble saccharin and sodium saccharin;
does not include calcium saccharin.
----------------------------- 
------ 
----------
SOURCE: Oil. Paint. anj Druz Reporter, the chemical
marketing newspaper. Published weekly by Schnell Publishing
Company, New York, N.Y. Calcium cyclamate, drums, ton lots:
Saccharin: Granular, drums. 1.000 pound lots. Data
for 1955-b5 collected by: Roy A. Ballinger, Noncaloric
Sweeteners: Their Position in the Sweetener Industry,
Agricultural Economic Report. Table supplied in Steven
Plotkin, "The Cyclamate Ban: Science, Politics, and Law" (unpublished
Thesis).
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TABLE III-C
COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN SUGAR PRICES, UNITED STATES, 1950-68
:Sz:sRzsuzg::xzuuuuguuz z auxuxuu 2 zza*xiZ zs2Wasszas za2:52zZcxazzflZ3Z8
Cal- : Raw
endar : Sugar : Wholesale Refined [2]
Year : New :--------------------------------------- : ---- U.S.
York North- : Pacific : Chicago : U.S. Average
: I] : east : Coast : -West : Average : Retail [3]
---------------------------------------------------
Cents Per Lb,
1950 5.93 7.94 7.93 7.74 8.15 9.75
51 6.06 8.29 8.28 8.03 8.48 10.12
52 6.26 8.50 8.44 8.29 8.75 10.31
53 6.29 8.57 8.45 8.27 8.77 10.56
54 6.09 8.54 8.22 8.17 8.61 10.51
55 5.95 8.38 8.22 8.08 8.62 10.42
56 6.09 8.53 8.41 8.14 8.90 10.57
57 6.24 8.88 8.75 8.35 9.37 11.03
58 6.27 8.97 8.83 8.38 9.37 11.26
59 6.24 9.00 8.77 8.34 9.03 11.43
1960 6.30 9.07 8.60 8.41 9.16 11.63
61 6.30 9.01 8.45 8.20 9.01 11.77
62 6.45 9.18 8.65 8.53 9.16 11.70
63 8.18 11.49 10.26 9.89 9.99 13.58
64 6.90 10.20 9.37 8.90 9.90 12.81
65 6.75 9.71 8.73 8.64 9.38 11.80
66 6.99 9.82 9.01 8.90 9.58 12.04
67 7.28 10.03 9.52 9.10 9.95 12.10
68 7.52 10.33 9.84 9.41 10.17 12.18
--,.- --1  -b-- .------------------------------------------------
[1) Contract No. 10, beginning November 21, 1960, replaced Contract No.
7, includes duty paid, if dutiable; New York Coffee and Sugar
Exchange.
[2] Northeast, Pacific Coast, and Chicago-West estimated bulk dry re-
fined beet and cane sugar prices. Mostly cane sugar in the North-
east and largely beet sugar in the Chicago-West and Pacific Coast
marketing areas.
13] Five-pound package, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data.
------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Raw and U.S. average retail prices are from Sugar
Reaorts, published monthly by Sugar Division, Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service, Washington, D.C. Bulk dry
refined sugar prices are rough approximations estimated from above
sources and trade sources. U.S. average wholesale price refined price
is a weighted annual average price of all sugar actually delivered to
U.S. confectionery manufacturers -- data annually reported in
Confectionery Manufacturers: Sales AnA Distribution, prepared by
Marjorie D. Kennedy in recent years, published annually (about May), by
Business and Defense Services. U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington,
D.C. Table supplied in Steven Plotkin, "The Cyclamate Ban: Science, Politics, and
Law" (unpublished thesis).
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demand for sugared drinks and thereby affecting their sales to
the soft drink companies.
The high cost of American sugar results in part from
outmoded plants, equipment, and processing methods. In the
last sixty years there have been no fundamental changes in the
sugar industry's structure. With the exception of a few of
the largest, most progressive firms, most cane producers and
refiners have experienced considerable difficulty staying in
business, as have the beet sugar refiners whose industry
developed during World War I. Many of the processing
factories in existence today are from that period, and they
tend to be small, inefficient, and fuel and labor intensive.47
Protection of the domestic sugar industry has been part
of American agricultural policy at least since the turn of the
century. Ironically, the legislative umbrella over American
companies ultimately aggravated, rather than resolved the
industry's problems. The Jones-Costigan Sugar Act of 1934 and
its successor, the Sugar Act of 1948, established import
quotas that kept the price of domestic sugar well above the
world market price. The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981
which replaced the 1948 Act guarantees domestic sugar growers
a minimum market price, with unsold sugar purchased by the
government. Corn sweeteners, now the chief competitor to the
sugar industry also benefited from the bill because their
price follows that of sugar's.4 8
The Act may have provided some protection against foreign
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competition, but it has not insulated the domestic sugar
industry from competition at home. The sugar quotas that the
growers argued would improve price stability were opposed by
the soft drink and food processing industries. The
artificially high price of sugar, however stable, threatens
the profits of the large sugar buyers like the soft drink
firms. In 1977 it was estimated that a change of one cent in
the price of raw sugar would increase Coca-Cola's costs by $20
million. 9
The sugar industry responded to cyclamate's increasing
sales by attacking it in two ways: through advertisements
that contrasted the artificiality of cyclamate with the
"naturalness" of sugar, and through the funding of scientific
studies to research cyclamate's harmful effects. The
industry's opposition was orchestrated during the 1960s by
Sugar Information, Inc., a now defunct or; rization (its
successor organizati: , the Sugar Association, professes to
have had little involvement with artificial sweeteners since
the cyclamate ban) that represented cane sugar refiners, beet
sugar processors, and raw-sugar producers. 5 0  In 1964 the
president of Sugar Information, described his industry's
belief that cyclamates posed a major threat: "... in the
long run, the popularity of...low-calorie products must
subtract from sugar consumption. (The challenge of
nonnutritive sweeteners had to be) faced and beaten back by
using all possible means of advertising, public relations,
information, and education." 5 1
From the early fifties until the ban, the sugar industry
and the artificial sweetener manufacturers and soft drink
companies were embroiled in competitive advertising campaigns.
For example, in 1964 Sugar Information sponsored
advertisements that ran in popular periodicals. The
advertisements were also carried in the trade journals of the
soft drink, baking, candy, ice cream, food processing, and
supermarket industries. The campaign contrasted
"synthetically" sweetened soft drinks with "real" sugar,
alleging that diet soft drinks robbed children of the energy
that sugar provided. 5 2  (See Figure III-C) Two years later,
another sugar campaign asked, "Do you use artificial
sweeteners and still gain weight?" These advertisements
contended that sugar could actually help the dieter lose
weight by curbing the primary cause of overweight, overeating.
Sugar was portrayed as benefiting in weight reduction because
it provided a means of satisfying hunger with "no
aftertaste. ,,53
Royal Crown responded with full page advertisements in
newspapers across the country that stated: "Guilty of
upsetting the sugar cart! We plead guilty...If it's wrong to
do millions of people a favor by taking the sugar out of
cola...Diet-Rite pleads guilty." Abbott also sponsored a
campaign that concentrated on television viewers. Commercials
for Sucaryl proclaimed that the consumer could save
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180 calories daily using it instead of sugar. Other
manufacturers increased promotion of tabletop sweeteners,
emphasizing their convenience when used in beverages.54
The sugar industry was reported to have more than simply
run advertisements to discredit cyclamate with the public.
Through the Sugar Research Foundation (now called the
International Sugar Research Foundation) the industry
apparently sponsored a study at the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (WARF). The WARF data suggested that cyclamate
caused growth retardation in rats, and the results were
publicized. Two years later when a Japanese study reported
fetal deaths in animal feeding studies with cyclamate, the
results were also reported by the Sugar Research Foundation. 5 5
European sugar companies followed the increased usage of
cyclamate as well. Eight months before the ban a scientific
meeting held in Paris under the sponsorship of the European
Committee of Sugar Manufacturers reported on research that
indicated that "so far as world health is concerned, sugar is
not so guilty nor artificial sweeteners so blameless as has
been indicated. The finding was published in the
International Sugar Journal. 5 6 The sugar industry in the
Netherlands initiated an advertising war to discredit
cyclamate. In the summer of 1969 an Amsterdam district court
rebuked the companies for making "disparaging" remarks about
cyclamate and for citing dubious scientific data about its ill
effects. 5 7
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Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, authors of Participation in
American Politics, describe two basic types of political
agendas: the systemic agenda which consists of all issues
legitimately within government's jurisdiction, that are
perceived by members of the political community as meriting
public attention and the formal agenda or the items explicitly
under government's consideration. 5 8 The sugar industry was
instrumental in keeping cyclamate on the systemic agenda and
moving it to the formal agenda. As Cobb and Elder noted, for
an issue to acquire the public recognition necessary to place
it on the systemic agenda, its supporters must have sufficient
resources to communicate to the public and the access to the
media to do so.
The sugar industry's advertising cast doubt on
cyclamate's efficacy in weight reduction and as a source of
energy, and by implication, on its safety as a food additive.
The campaigns increased the attention being given cyclamate,
and the industry sponsored research contributed to the
scientific debate over cyclamate's safety. It seems likely
that without the pressure generated by the sugar industry, the
FDA would not have ruled on cyclamate on the basis of the
evidence available in 1969. After all, the agency had reason
to be concerned about cyclamate since 1950. Other food
additives, including some as common as pepper or caramel
coloring, were also suspected as presenting a health hazard
but were not under active review.
The consumer advocacy movement was also instrumental in
prompting the cyclamate ban. A variety of organizations,
often formed in the late sixties in response to public
concerns about health and environmental issues were
influential in Congress and in the regulatory agencies. 5 9
Beginning in the 1950s the public had grown increasingly
concerned about the connection between diet and disease. The
cyclamate-cancer link made the disposition of the sweetener of
special interest to consumer advocates.
James Turner, a public interest lawyer who had worked
with Ralph Nader, investigated the FDA in the months before
the cyclamate ban. He was highly critical of the agency's
record of protecting the public from abuses by the food
industry. One of Turner's principal examples of FDA bias
toward industry was the agency's handling of cyclamate which
he discussed in his book, The Chemical Feast, published in
1970. The scrutiny of consumer advocates like Turner and
public support for stringent regulation of carcinogens
increased the pressure on the FDA to rule on cyclamate.
On October 18, 1969, the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare removed cyclamate from the list of substances
considered safe for use in the food supply and ordered the
phasing out of existing supplies. Finch stopped short of a
total ban by allowing cyclamate's continued availability as an
over-the-counter drug. In June 1970, Congressman L.H.
Fountain, chairman of the House Intergovernmental Operations
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Subcommittee, convened hearings on cyclamate. Fountain
concluded that the FDA failed to establish cyclamate's safety,
and he recommended that the ban be extended to include all
uses of the the sweetener. On September 11, 1970, cyclamate
was banned from all products. 6 0
The sugar industry fostered doubt about cyclamate's
safety. Consumer advocates placed the FDA on the defensive,
questioning the agency's record of protecting the nation's
health. The public was supportive of regulatory measures that
addressed health hazards. These factors contributed to the
FDA's decision to ban cyclamate. What made the ban politically
tenable, however, was the availability of saccharin as a
substitute. As a result, neither the public nor the diet
industry with the exception of cyclamate's manufacturer,
Abbott Laboratories, was moved to vigorously protest the ban.
Since the Cyclamate Ban
The media stressed the suddenness of the ban. Newspaper
and magazine stories repeated industry's assertions that there
had been no indications of the FDA action. The misperception
has persisted since that the regulatory process in this
instance imposed an unduly hasty prohibition on a popular
substance. Many companies probably were taken unaware by the
actual decision because it was made virtually over a weekend.
In reality, however, there had been ample warnings for months
before the announcement was made that cyclamate was in serious
trouble.
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Food Chemical News, a weekly journal that has wide
circulation in the food processing industry, reported as early
as December, 1968, that the status of cyclamate would likely
change with the coming of the Nixon administration in January
1969.61 After the journal described the FDA as "torn" about
the most felicitous way to remove cyclamate from the list
without undue financial hardship to the industry, the agency
was pressured by soft drink manufacturers, canners, and
chemical companies to delay any cyclamate action. 6 2 Despite
these forewarnings and their own involvement in postponing a
cyclamate decision, the diet industry contended that the FDA
decision was "precipitous".
Following the ban, Abbott Laboratories, as the principal
cyclamate manufacturer, tried to enlist allies among others in
the industry. Abbott's efforts were largely unsuccessful.
The availability of saccharin as a substitute served to mute
both consumer and industry protest. Many consumers wrote
angry letters to the FDA and to Congress, but many also felt
"grateful" that the government was protecting them from a
potential carcinogen.6 3 Public opposition to the ban was much
less intense and widespread than the protest that followed the
attempt to ban saccharin seven years later. 6 4
The ban affected the companies using cyclamate with
varying degrees of severity. Abbott sought to make the case
that the FDA's decision presented a problem for the entire
diet industry in terms of its suddenness and the uncertain
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scientific grounds on which it was based. 6 5 To the extent that
a company was ready to reformulate its diet products, it was
less likely to be involved in any formal attempt to have the
ban rescinded.
Moreover, the industry may have been unsympathetic to
Abbott's predicament because Abbott had repeatedly reassured
its bulk customers that cyclamate was safe. For example, in
the very month in which cyclamate was banned, Abbott had
conducted a seminar for fruit and vegetable growers to attest
to cyclamate's safety. The company, however, included
clauses in its contracts with bulk buyers that vitiated
Abbott's liability in case of problems with cyclamate.66
Food and beverage companies are zealous about protecting
their reputations because their sales are dependent upon
public trust. The soft drink industry also had enormous
stakes in preserving consumer confidence because the diet
segment was so profitable. Soft drink manufacturers quickly
issued statements to reassure retail customers that cyclamate
sweetened drinks would immediately be removed.
While publicly declaring their surprise and cooperation,
the major manufacturers were readying reformulated, repackaged
diet brands.67 On the Monday following the Saturday ban,
Coca-Cola announced that a new formulation for Fresca would be
ready for distribution in some markets by late the same week.
A reformulated version of Tab followed shortly.68
Reformulation of an entire line is not any overnight
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process. The development of a sweetener for use in the soft
drink solution requires testing for stability, safety, and
taste and extensive production preparation.69 The companies
would have been unable to respond to the cyclamate ban in a
matter of weeks unless they had been readying themselves long
in advance. In fact, two weeks before the ban, Coca-Cola had
announced to its bottlers that new formulas for Fresca and Tab
were under development because of warnings about cyclamate
from the FDA.7 0
Although the soft drink industry was worried about
consumer response to the taste of a saccharin sweetened drink,
its initial fears were quickly allayed. In the Baltimore
area, for example, sales dropped to under 200 cases in the
week after the ban, increased to 2,614 cases the following
week, and 4,481 cases in the second week after the FDA
announcement. Any consumer hesitation about saccharin's taste
had apparently been permanently overcome. The sales of diet
soft drinks, although leveling off in the two years following
the ban, have continued to grow steadily since then. 7 1
The ban was turned into a marketing device by Coca-Cola
and Pepsi. The repackaged diet drinks and new advertising
used the absence of cyclamate in slogans that announced:
"Cyclamates? Diet Pepsi Can Do Without Them!". The phrase,
"Cyclamate Free", was prominently displayed in print
advertisments and on packaging.
A Coca-Cola report to its bottlers acknowledged the
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preparation that prevented the ban from causing the company
major disruption:
On October 18, it could fairly be said that as a result
of the cyclamate issue, Coca-Cola USA suddenly became an
integrated, professional, production/marketing/sales
team, stimulated by the unexpected crisis...The strength
and maturity of any organization can be measured by the
way it reacts to a crisis. The October 18th ban on the
use of cyclamates provided just such a testing ground
for Coca-Cola USA and the bottlers of Coca-Cola.
Production was stopped on Fresca and Tab, the two
products of the Company that contained cyclamates on the
same day the announcement was made. Two days later, a
new formula for Fresca was in production. In another
week, on November 4, bottlers were told that a new
formula for Tab was ready. By the end of the first week
after the ruling, interim point-of-sale advertising
materials were ready and shipments were en route to
bottlers.72
In the years since the ban there has also been little
incentive for the soft drink companies to join in Abbott's
efforts to have the ban rescinded. Ideally, they would like
to have a wide range of sweeteners available to provide them
with flexibility in taste, stability, pricing, etc. But as
long as the ban exists, no one company can use cyclamate
domestically, and no foreign products sweetened with cyclamate
can be imported. There is no competitive advantage in
investing the resources required to rescind a ban that would
only benefit all producers.
For Cumberland Packing as well as Coca-Cola and Pepsi,
the ban eventually helped sales. By the Monday after the
Friday announcement of the ban, the company was prepared with
a reformulated, cyclamate version of Sweet 'n Low containing
saccharin and dextrose, a filler. Cumberland's quick reaction
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to the ban gave it prominent shelf space in supermarkets
nationwide, and made it until recently the leading tabletop
sweetener. Sweet 'n Low became a household word after the
cyclamate decision. Its nearest competitor, Alberto- Culver's
Sugar Twin, held only a quarter of Sweet 'n Low's market
share. 7 3
Despite the warnings not every company was able to
respond quickly to the ban with new versions of their
cyclamate products. The canners and packers of diet fruits,
represented by the National Canners Association (the
predecessor to the National Food Processors Association),
claimed to have suffered the highest losses because their
inventory was greater than that of most other producers of
diet foods, especially the soft drink companies. The canners
argued that they were unable to redesign their complicated
labeling and packaging materials to indicate that a product
did not contain cyclamate. 7 4
The California Canners and Growers (CalCan), a
cooperative of 1145 fruit and vegetable producers, initially
declared a loss of $20 million. At least 25 percent of the
cooperative's sales were in low-calorie fruits and
vegetables.7 5 In 1964 CalCan began extensive promotion of
their Diet Delight line, some of which was sweetened with
cyclamate. By 1968 because of oversupply and other problems,
the canning industry generally faced economic difficulties,
but the Diet Delight line was performing well. When the
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cyclamate ban was announced in October, 1969, CalCan had just
packed the year's Diet Delight harvest. The government's
decision represented a total loss of all the products
sweetened with cyclamate. Some of these losses were
eventually recouped through dumpiig on foreign markets, but
the individual California farmer in the cooperative suffered
financially.7 6
The "suddenness" of the ban and the resulting financial
losses formed the basis of the Cyclamate Indemnification Bill
(H.R. 13366) that was introduced in Congress in 1971 to
compensate diet food and beverage companies, cyclamate
manufacturers, and the canners. The bill had appeared earlier
in a Senate version in 1970 but was thwarted by HEW
opposition. H.R. 13366 permitted claimants to demonstrate to
the United States Court of Claims that their cyclamate losses
stemmed from "good faith reliance" on the FDA's GRAS list.
Under the proposed bill, the court would have the power to
grant compensation for claims of less than $100,000. Congress
was entitled under the bill to award claims in excess of
$100,000; most companies in the diet industry professed to
have lost considerably more. The legislation was backed by
both the National Canners Association and the National Soft
Drink Association.
Small farmers from Cal Can were prominent participants in
hearings on the bill. The biggest beneficiaries, however,
would have been the soft drink companies and the cyclamate
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manufacturers, especially Abbott. In the final version, total
damages were estimated at between $100-120 million, a figure
that included indirect losses such as advertising and the
conversion of cyclamate equipment.77
Among opponents to the bill was the FDA which argued that
the government should not reimburse losses resulting from "one
of the risks of doing business." The chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Cellar, questioned the wisdom of
the government rewarding private industry for having been
careless of the public's health. Others, including
representatives from a public interest group and the consumer
advocate, James Turner, pointed out that the diet industry had
had ample warning of an impending ban. Despite support from
President Richard Nixon, the bill was defeated. 7 8
Abbott's decision to fight for cyclamate's use in soft
drinks may have cost the company its entire cyclamate market.
James Turner argued at the time that artificial sweeteners
should only be sold in tabletop form. This limited use was an
alternative that might have gained the support of those
opposed to cyclamate's unrestricted availability. The
scientific community and HEW initially appeared amenable to
allowing cyclamate as a tabletop sweetener for diabetics and
others whose health required curtailed sugar use. Cumberland
Packing offered to support Abbott in any effort to maintain
cyclamate's tabletop use, but Abbott decided instead to
attempt to have the ban totally revoked. 7 9
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In the years since cyclamate was removed from the market,
Abbott has pursued legal action to have the ban overturned,
and it has sponsored further scientific studies. In 1973 the
company began formal appeal procedures at the FDA. Abbott
submitted a petition that included more than 300 individual
toxicology reports and the results of several long term animal
feeding studies. 80 The reports failed to prove to the FDA's
satisfaction that cyclamate was safe. The agency ruled that
the burden of proof rested with Abbott to prove cyclamate's
safety. The company rejected the FDA's offer of a public
board of inquiry to review the data further. Abbott's
petition to reinstate cyclamate was refused by the FDA in
1980. The company is presently continuing its legal efforts
to have the ban repealed. 8 1
The Calorie Control Council and the National Soft Drink
Association (NSDA), later quite active during the saccharin
controversy, were unwilling or unprepared to launch a full
response to the cyclamate ban. The Calorie Control Council, a
trade association of the diet industry, was formed in 1966 to
combat the developing cyclamate controversy. Many companies
in the industry were initially reluctant to join the Council.
They feared the adverse publicity about an organization
founded solely to push for the continued use of an additive
whose safety was in doubt, especially during a period of
intense public worry about carcinogens.
The National Soft Drink Association (NSDA) represents 90
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percent of the bottlers, about 600 soft drink sales and
distribution outlets, and as associate members, the firms that
provide products and services to the industry including the
parent companies. Its members are an "integral part of their
respective local communities...(and) provide jobs for more
than 100,000 people and support many community activities in
the towns and cities where they are located." 8 2 The NSDA
maintains a government affairs department that monitors
impending regulations and legislation and evaluates their
potential effect on the industry. The scientific and
technical affairs division plans and monitors research on soft
drink ingredients and packaging materials. NSDA also provides
information to its members and the public about industry
concerns through its public and media relations department.
The NSDA did not mobilize its members to protest the
cyclamate ban vigorously as it would later with the proposed
restrictions on saccharin. The Association said it was
surprised at the "instantaneous" action that HEW took upon
receiving the results of only two studies. The bottlers
apparently were also wary of promoting continued use of a
suspected carcinogen especially because saccharin was
available and their parent companies were quickly prepared
with reformulated diet syrups.
The cyclamate ban demonstrated to the NSDA and others the
vulnerability of the food or drink manufacturer to an additive
controversy. Until 1969 the soft drink or food processing
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companies generally believed that the manufacturer of a food
additive bore the responsibility for its safety; cyclamate
changed that belief.8 3 James Turner has argued that the
cyclamate episode did more than educate the industry about
potential problems with food additives. In The Chemical Feast,
he contends that public concern about chemicals in the food
supply began with cyclamate. There is current evidence to
suggest that consumers remain apprehensive about
carcinogens. 8 4 Nevertheless, the public was apparently
supportive of the cyclamate ban less because a carcinogen was
being removed than because a substitute existed.
Conclusion
There is now a whole generation of diet soft drink
consumers who have never tasted cyclamate. Dr. Michael Sveda,
cyclamate's discoverer, fought throughout the 1970s to have it
reinstated and his name cleared from the charge of having
invented a carcinogen. The financial cost and Sveda's
advancing years, however, have caused him recently to cease
his participation in cyclamate reviews.85
Abbott Laboratories and the Calorie Control Council are
the principal organizations still pressuring the FDA to
rescind the ban. Abbott continues to be interested in
repudiating any health claims against cyclamate and thereby
finally clearing its name of any allegations that the company
was careless with the public's health. A pharmaceutical
109
company has special reason to be concerned about maintaining
an unblemished safety record. An inadequately tested or
contaminated product may cause injury or death. The
deleterious effects of a food additive, drug, or
over-the-counter preparation receive widespread publicity
often with adverse attention given to the manufacturer.
Abbott continues to have extensive dealings with the FDA where
a company's good scientific record is often essential in
approval of a new drug or chemical. Abbott also wishes to
recoup whatever it can of the lost cyclamate sales and
extensive legal costs accrued over the years.
There is little incentive, however, for the FDA to
reverse the ban and admit an error in a decision that is now
over a decade old. The doubts about cyclamate's safety still
remain. To bring it back on the market when there are
currently two other artificial sweeteners available will
probably require a more compelling case for its safety and
value to the public than can now be made.
One sentiment often expressed by the diet industry is
that cyclamate was given away, suggesting that the companies
were caught without sufficient time to respond and that they
conceded the issue without protest. In reality the diet
industry faced the cyclamate ban almost with equanimity
because saccharin was available as a substitute and because
the cost of fighting for cyclamate's return was too great.
A similar view is also often expressed that "cyclamate
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taught industry a lesson." The ban apparently did contribute
to an awareness that food and beverage companies could no
longer rely on their traditional, lofty approach to
controversy. Cyclamate alone was not responsible for this
realization, however. A review of substances on the GRAS list
begun after the ban, the 1972 food additive hearings of the
Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, and the
continued concern of public interest groups and consumers
about carcinogens in the food supply were also contributing
factors.
The cyclamate case established patterns that would be
important in subsequent artificial sweetener controversies.
The principal interest groups who would be concerned in
varying degrees with all three sugar substitutes organized
around the cyclamate debate: the diet food industry and its
trade associations, the sugar industry, the diabetes
associations, and consumer advocates. Two features of the
cyclamate controversy, competitive marketing practices nd the
availability of a substitute, have also proven to be of
enduring significance.
The cyclamate episode also provided a lesson for the
manufacturers of artificial sweeteners challenged in the
future. It demonstrated the potential vulnerability of a
defense predicated on scientific issues alone. As one company
fighting the ban with a substitute sweetener waiting in the
wings, Abbott was unable to find meaningful reception for its
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interpretation of the cyclamate data.
FDA decision making in the cyclamate case had two
unanticipated consequences for future artificial sweetener
policy. First, by placing cyclamate on the GRAS list, the
sweetener's use was greatly expanded ultimately creating a
regulatory problem. Second, when cyclamate was banned the FDA
helped to precipitate the saccharin crisis seven years later,
having left on the market the more hazardous, but only
sweetener.
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CHAPTER IV
SACCHARIN: CONFLICT EXPANSION AND THE EFFECT ON POLICY
In 1977 the FDA proposed a ruling that would have
eliminated virtually all commercial uses of saccharin,
prohibiting its addition to foods, beverages, cosmetics, and
most drugs. The agency left open the possibility of
saccharin's continued use as a tabletop sweetener provided the
diet food industry could prove it was beneficial to diabetics
or dieters. (Because the FDA's proposal was so extensive, it
is generally referred to as a ban.) The decision provoked an
uproar from the industry and among the public and caused an
intense political and scientific debate.
The extent of the saccharin controversy was unparalleled
in the history of the FDA's regulation of food additives.
Pressured by the widespread opposition, Congress passed a bill
that prevented the FDA from restricting saccharin until
further research could be conducted on its safety and on the
laws governing food additives. President Jimmy Carter signed
the Saccharin Study and Labeling Act in November 1977. Often
called the saccharin moratorium, the law has been extended
three times. 1
Saccharin has been available for almost 100 years. For
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much of its history it was protected from permanent government
restrictions because it was the only artificial sweetener
available and because it was used principally by diabetics.
When cyclamate became commercially available around 1955, its
popularity drew much of the attention of scientists and the
sugar industry away from saccharin. Once cyclamate was
banned, however, there was renewed interest in saccharin
especially as the diet food industry continued to grow.
The cyclamate and saccharin controversies had important
features in common. Both sweeteners were in widespread use
among the same consumers: dieters and diabetics who used the
noncaloric sugar substitutes in the belief that they were
effective for weight control. The biggest use of both
cyclamate and saccharin was in soft drinks. Essentially the
same interest groups, including the Calorie Control Council,
the National Soft Drink Association, and the American Diabetes
Association, were concerned about the effect of both FDA
decisions. By the time the FDA decided to ban cyclamate in
1969 and saccharin in 1977, each sweetener had been available
for years with no evidence of adverse human effects. In both
cases, the principal reason for concern stemmed from studies
in which animals fed the artificial sweeteners developed
bladder tumors.
Notwithstanding these similarities the status of
cyclamate and saccharin are today very different. Cyclamate
has not been reinstated despite the continuing legal efforts
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of Abbott Laboratories and even though additional evidence
supports the claim that it is not a carcinogen. By contrast,
saccharin remains available although further studies have
corroborated the findings that it causes animal bladder
tumors.
Two important features of the saccharin controversy
account for its current availability. First, in 1977 saccharin
was the only artificial sweetener allowed the American public;
any substitute was at least several years away from
production. The diet food industry's economic loss would have
been substantial if the ban had gone into effect. The public
also perceived the loss of saccharin to be costly because of
saccharin's reputed benefits as a weight reducing aid.
Opposition to the cyclamate ban was tempered by the
availability of saccharin. National surveys conducted after
the FDA saccharin decision revealed that consumers
overwhelmingly preferred less stringent measures than a ban.
The majority of those responding chose a warning label as
sufficient indication of saccharin's hazards. 2
Second, the entire diet food industry, not just
saccharin's manufacturer, resisted the FDA's decision. When
cyclamate was banned in 1969 the soft drink manufacturers and
other producers of artificially sweetened foods responded as
individual firms not as an industry. Reformulation and
repackaging of their diet brands were the companies' major
concerns, not developing a unified response to the ban.
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Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and others rushed diet drinks labeled
"cyclamate-free" to the market in an effort to turn the ban
into an advantage. The diet industry's only attempt at a joint
effort was unsuccessful. It backed legislation that was
ultimately defeated in Congress to reimburse producers of
artificially sweetened foods for their cyclamate losses.
By contrast, the industry opposed the FDA's saccharin
decision by challenging the grounds for the ban and adding new
issues to the debate. This was accomplished through the
funding of scientific research that offered alternative
explanations of the saccharin data. For example, the American
Council on Science and Health (ACSH), an association of
scientists, was formed after the ban with support from the
diet food industry, especially soft drink manufacturers. ACSH
has made refuting the charges against saccharin a primary
activity. Because reputable scientists were organized in
questioning the ban, it was more comfortable for prominent
health and medical organizations to oppose the decision.
The redefinition of the saccharin issues expanded the
scope of the conflict. Through an extensive public relations
campaign, the industry mobilized the public to write letters
to Congress. Key trade groups and the diabetes associations
organized their members in appeals to local congressional
delegations. As the public manifested its opposition to the
ban, the incentive for congressional involvement became
apparent. Once Congress began its review, the nature of the
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saccharin issued changed. The problem for the FDA was to
determine whether saccharin was a safe food additive. The
problem for Congress was to deflect political repercussions
from an unpopular decision while maintaining some support for
the FDA.
The FDA was cautious in building the case against
saccharin because the cyclamate experience had demonstrated
that it was imprudent to base a controversial decision on one
or two ambiguous studies. 3 There was much less uncertainty in
the scientific evidence regarding saccharin's effect on
animals than there had been with cyclamate. Ironically, the
agency's diligence failed to prevent controversy because,
although the scientific basis for the ban was sound,
nonscientific factors became the issues on which the merits of
the decision were judged.
History
The oldest nonnutritive sweetener in the world, saccharin
was first synthesized in 1879 by Ira Remsen, professor of
chemistry at Johns Hopkins University, and a postdoctoral
fellow, Constantin Fahlberg. Remsen and Fahlberg noticed the
sweetness of a compound called benzoic sulphanide while
experimenting with coal tar derivatives. A description of the
new compound was published in the American Chemical Journal in
1880. Fahlberg then took out a patent on "Saccharine" giving
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Remsen no credit in the discovery. Remsen did not contest the
patent, and Fahlberg returned to his native Germany where he
founded a company to produce saccharin.
Saccharin was initially used as an antiseptic and food
preservative, but its taste (it is 200 to 700 times sweeter
than sugar) quickly led to its use as a cheap substitute for
sugar especially in canned goods. Within ten years of its
discovery, saccharin was widely prescribed in the therapeutic
treatment of diabetics and the obese. 5
Virtually from the beginning of its history, the
sweetener has been a source of controversy over its health
effects. Early concerns focused on appetite and
gastrointestinal problems reported by a French study conducted
in 1886. Additional criticism was generated by the sugar
industry. Then, as now, saccharin was a cheap substitute for
sugar. One pound of saccharin could provide the equivalent
sweetening power of 500 pounds of sugar.
In 1907, Dr. Harvey Wiley, head of the Bureau of
Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture, began a campaign
to ban all derivatives of benzoic acid including sodium
benzoate, a popular preservative, and saccharin. 7 Wiley
objected to saccharin on the grounds that it was an adulterant
and that it was suspected of interfering with kidney function.
The canning industry, which had organized early in 1907 into
the National Canners Association (later changed to the
National Food Processors Association) protested directly to
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President Theodore Roosevelt about Wiley's efforts to ban some
of its most widely used additives. Roosevelt initiated a
conference and established several panels to review Wiley's
claims.
The basis for this earliest saccharin controversy and the
method used to settle it were comparable to the saccharin
dispute that was to occur 70 years later. In 1907 the
principal disagreement was over the validity of the scientific
evidence as it would be in 1977. The charges against saccharin
were reviewed by representatives from a variety of interests
including industry, government and the scientific community.
Similarily, in 1977 at congressional request, the National
Academy of Sciences would organize a panel composed of
scientific and non-scientific members to review the saccharin
data. The consumer interest in 1907 was informally
represented by President Roosevelt, who was a daily saccharin
user. At the outset of the panel's deliberations, TR
unequivocally proclaimed his position, declaring that,
"Anybody who says saccharin is injurious is an idiot."
Several major participants in the 1907 deliberations had
reason to be somewhat less than impartial about the outcome.
The conference was chaired by Representative James S. Sherman
of New York, who owned a canning firm. A panel of chemists
was appointed to review the saccharin charges. Its chairman
was Ira Remsen, then president of Johns Hopkins University,
who was described as still bitter about his former graduate
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student securing a patent for saccharin production. Harvey
Wiley was also a member of the panel which was often referred
to as the Remsen board. As a chemist in the Department of
Agriculture, he had been instrumental in the development of
refining techniques for the sugar industry. 8
In 1910 the Remsen board concluded that there was no
evidence to suggest that saccharin was harmful to humans. The
reprieve, however, was of short duration. In 1911 saccharin
was banned from foods in the United States, not because it was
deemed unsafe, but because, under pressure from the sugar
industry, the Department of Agriculture ruled that:
In every food in which saccharin is used, some other
sweetening agent known to be harmless to health can be
substituted, and there is not even a pretense that
saccharin is a necessity in the manufacture of food
products.
When the discrepancy between the findings of the Remsen board
and the Department of Agriculture's ruling became apparent, a
new decision was reached. In 1912 Food Inspection Decision 146
allowed the use of saccharin in foods "intended for invalids"
and identified by a label. General use was restricted. When
sugar shortages developed during World War I, however,
saccharin was reinstated. 9
When sugar was rationed during World War II, saccharin
consumption increased dramatically. Soft drink bottlers
unsuccessfully asked the FDA for permission to augment their
reduced sugar supplies with saccharin. Saccharin's
manufacturers found it difficult to meet the wartime demand,
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in part because of the severe shortage of a saccharin
component, toluene, that was also a basic raw material for
explosives.10
Until the mid-1950s saccharin's availability was limited
by numerous state regulations. 1 1 Many of these laws had been
enacted, not on scientific grounds, but under pressure from
soft drink bottlers and food processors who feared competition
for their higher priced sugared products. The laws were
repealed as diet soft drinks grew in popularity when cyclamate
became commercially available. In 1960 saccharin consumption
was equivalent to 1.9 pounds of sugar per capita. By 1977 the
per capita consumption of saccharin had reached a weight
equivalent to sugar of 6.6 pounds per capita. 12
The infant organic chemical industry in America initially
displayed little interest in saccharin, and all of the
earliest manufacturers were German. In 1901, the Monsanto
Chemical Company in St. Louis, Missouri, began producing
saccharin for sale to food processing companies. Six German
firms, known as the "dye trust" attempted to halt Monsanto's
production by driving down the price of saccharin. Their
efforts were unsuccessful, and Monsanto continued
manufacturing the sweetener until 1972 when the company phased
out several of its operations including saccharin. The journal
Science pointed out, however, that there was reason to believe
that the increased concern among the scientific community and
in the FDA about saccharin's safety contributed to Monsanto's
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decision.13
Sherwin-Williams, a 117 year old company based in
Cleveland, Ohio, is currently the sole domestic producer of
saccharin, with 60 percent of the American market and
approximately 25 percent of foreign sales. Sherwin-Williams
began production in 1966 when it acquired the Maumee Chemical
Company, a saccharin manufacturer. Sherwin-Williams supplies
saccharin for foods, beverages and industrial uses. 1 4 In 1981
the estimated worldwide retail value of products containing
saccharin was $3 billion; Sherwin-Williams' saccharin sales
were $70 million, a relatively small part of its total
revenues of $1.5 billion. 1 5
Saccharin is also imported from Japan and Korea. The soft
drink companies purchase saccharin from foreign sources and
from Sherwin-Williams; Cumberland Packing receives most of its
saccharin for tabletop package production from Japan.1 6 The
method of production differs for imported and domestic
saccharin. The imported saccharin is manufactured following
the Remsen-Fahlberg process; Sherwin-Williams uses the Maumee
process that does not result in creation of an impurity that
was suspected at one time of being a carcinogen. 17
The price competition from foreign imports was a factor
in Monsanto's decision to cease manufacturing saccharin.
Until the spring of 1982 Korean saccharin was given duty free
status because of Korea's trade rank as a developing nation.
In March 1982 Korean imports exceeded 50 percent of the
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saccharin brought into the United States, and consequently
Korea became subject to the same duty rates as Japan.1 8
In 1978 it was estimated that fifty to seventy million
Americans used saccharin on a regular basis. Nearly seventy
percent of this conm:.iption was in soft drinks. When the
s>ccharin ban was proposed, diet soft drink sales totalled
$1.1 billion in the United States. The remaining consumption
of saccharin was in the form of tabletop sweeteners, canned
fruits and other food uses, and as flavoring for drugs,
cosmestics, and toothpaste. (See Table IV-A)
Women generally consumed more saccharin than men in 1978.
Among female users those in the childbearing years of 20 to 39
were found to consume saccharin most heavily. Sixty to ninety
percent of diabetics were also regular consumers of saccharin.
Diabetics also tended to use saccharin with more frequency and
in larger amounts than did non-diabetics. A particular cause
for concern was the growth in saccharin consumption in the
younger age groups especially. 1 9
Federal regulation of food additives
One of the ways the diet industry expanded the scope of
the conflict over saccharin was to link its resolution with
reform of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
establishes safety requirements for the use of food additives.
The law was last revised in 1958. The industry argued that
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TABLE IV-A
Use of Saccharin in Foods and in Nonfood Items
in the United States, 1976 1
Quantity used,
million lbs
2.900
1.200
Percentage of
saccharin used
in food
58
24
Percentage of
saccharin used
for all purposes
45
18
Other foods (in-
cludes fruits,
premixes, juices,
candy, gum, jel-
lies, etc.
Nonfood Items
Cosmetics (toothpaste,
moutnwash, lipstick,
etc.)
Pharmaceuticals (coatings
for pills)
Smokeless tobacco
products (chewing to-
bacco and snuff)
Electroplating
Cattle feed
Miscellaneous
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
0.900
5.000 100
0.650
0.455
0.135
0.130
0.065
0.065
1.500
6.500 100
Table supplied in Committee for a Study on Saccharin and Food
Safety Policy, Saccharin: Technical Assessment of Risks-and
Benefits (Washington , D.C.: National Research Council,
National Academy of Sciences, 1978), Report No. 1, p. 2-5.
Foods
Soft drinks
Tabletop
sweeteners
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the improved capacity to detect minute quantities of a harmful
substance and other scientific advances in the last two
decades have made the law obsolete. Linking saccharin with a
review of the food safety laws is not a new tactic. From the
beginning of saccharin's use in this country, its disposition
has been tied to legislative reform proposals.
Federal regulation of the food supply began a little over
one hundred years ago. In the late nineteenth century several
laws were passed to prevent the adulteration of tea and to
impose discriminatory taxes on oleomargarine, imitation
cheese, and imported flour. The specific intent of this
legislation, however, was economic protection of farmers and
importers; concern for the consumer was only incidental. 2 0
The first safety requirements occurred as a result of the
development of a national food industry. Around the turn of
the century, the factory rather than the local farm became the
source of food production. As the manufacturing of food
became. increasingly distanced from the consumer, the
individual's control diminished over safety and sanitary
conditions, and health abuses became more public.
The industrialization of food production also led to a
proliferation of preservatives and coloring agents. Shortly
after Upton Sinclair published The Jungle and created an
outcry about the meatpacking industry, Harvey Wiley began to
work for regulation of food additives. 2 0  Finally, when
President Roosevelt included a recommendation for legislation
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to regulate interstate commerce in misbranded and adulterated
foods in his annual message to Congress, the Food and Drugs
Act of 1906 was passed. Under the 1906 law the government's
authority was limited to prohibiting the marketing of
adulterated food and known toxic products. Unless a substance
was determined to be harmful, the government could not act to
prevent its use. 2 2
In 1938 Congress passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
which partly responded to the weaknesses of the earlier law.
The 1938 Act required premarket proof of safety for new drugs
but did not address the issue of food additives. After World
War II a variety of food products were introduced that used
numerous synthetic flavorings and other additives. In 1958
the Act was amended, and the burden of proof to establish an
additive's safety was shifted to the manufacturer.
The Food Additives Amendments of 1958 and the Color
Additive Amendments of 1960 required the manufacturer to
submit animal test data to demonstrate that a substance is
safe for its proposed use. Congress, prodded by the food
industry, made it clear that benefits were not to be
considered in evaluating an additive's safety. The industry
was concerned that the FDA would have little reason to approve
new food additives that served no additional functions than
those already on the market. 23
One section of the 1958 Amendments, often referred to as
the Delaney clause, was cited by the FDA in its 1977 saccharin
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decision. Named after its sponsor, James J. Delaney, a
Democratic Congressman from New York and chairman in 1955 of
the House Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals
in Food, the clause states that "no additive shall be deemed
to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by
man or animal". 2 4
Despite the exactness of the language in the Delaney
clause, the legislative history reveals that the term "safe"
was not intended to require proof of absolute safety. A House
committee report stated that "safety requires proof of a
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from the
proposed use of an additive." 2 5 In 1958, as had occurred in
1907 and would again with the 1977 saccharin debate, it was
"impossible in the present state of scientific knowledge to
establish with complete certainty the absolute harmlessness of
any chemical substance.?2 6
Not surprisingly, the food industry was opposed to
adoption of the Delaney clause, apprehensive that in practice
it would impose a heavy financial burden. Also opposed was
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which
argued the clause was unnecessary because of the general
safety requirements for additives already part of the proposed
amendments. HEW also objected to singling out cancer because
of concern that other serious disorders such as hypertension,
nephritis, or diabetes might be given less attention. In the
end HEW agreed with the addition of the Delaney clause because
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it wanted to expedite passage of the 1958 amendments.
2 7
The Delaney clause has become the center of a scientific
and ideological debate over the extent to which government
rather than the individual should be responsible for
determining or preventing risk. Various scientists have
attacked Delaney as an inept statement, asserting that it
reduces complex procedures and principles to deceptively
simple terms. Other scientists have supported retaining the
law. They contend that it does allow scientific discretion,
because only if a chemical is found to cause cancer can it be
removed from the food supply.2 8
When the saccharin ban was proposed in 1977, the diet
food industry included vigorous criticism of the Delaney
clause in its protest over the FDA's decision. The industry
branded the clause as inflexible and antiquated. The clause
was faulted for setting a standard that failed to take into
account the degree of dosage used in tests, the sensitivity of
detection methods used, the potency of carcinogens, or the
risk of exposure.2 9 During the publicity over the saccharin
announcement, the industry also contended that Americans were
capable of deciding for themselves whether the "benefits" of
saccharin were worth the alleged slight hazards.
The Delaney clause had strong support from those who
believed that it was the government's responsibility to
protect citizens regardless of the degree of risk. The two
most active of the consumer organizations that supported the
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saccharin ban, the Center for Science in the Public Interest
and the Public Interest Health Research Group, were adamantly
opposed to proposals to change or repeal the clause. They
argued that any modifications would increase the number of
carcinogens in the food supply, contending that "the law's
great strength is its clear standard of safety that
discourages compromising by federal agencies." 3 0
In reality, the effect of the clause has been largely
symbolic; its actual impact on the food industry has been
inconsequential. The general safety requirements also in the
1958 law stipulated that any food additive must be found to be
safe for human consumption before it can be approved, or in
the case of additives already permitted, continue to be used
in foods. Most of the controversial actions taken by the FDA
against food additives have been based on these provisions,
not on the Delaney clause. 3 1  From 1950 to 1980 the FDA tried
to ban nineteen food chemicals. Prior to saccharin, the
clause was only invoked twice in rulings, once in 1967 to ban
a food packaging adhesive, and again in 1969 to prohibit a
food packaging component. 3 2
Although the 1958 Amendments formally placed
responsibility for ensuring the safety of a food additive on
the manufacturer, other events during the late 1960s and early
1970s also made it clear that food companies using a
potentially hazardous substance risked embarrassing public
exposure. Between 1967 and 1973 Congress passed more than
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twenty-five consumer, environmental and other social
regulatory laws. Consumer advocacy organizations were at
their most influential during this period in Congress, in
influencing FDA policy, and in attracting media attention. 3 3
For the first time in its history, the food industry
received adverse publicity about its use of even common
additives such as sugar and salt. The industry responded to
these and other controversies with more than their usual
strategies which had been generally limited to traditional
lobbying tactics. Many companies began actively to support or
establish organizations that undertook scientific studies to
defend a threatened substance. The findings of these
organizations were heavily publicized. For example, several
major food companies sponsored scientific review panels to
address concerns raised about controversial items on the FDA's
list of substances generally recognized as safe (GRAS). When
this approach quickly proved redundant, the International Life
Sciences Institute (ILSI), an organization of scientists,
including some from the soft drink industry, was established
to provide a more coordinated defense of challenged
additives. 3 4
In 1977 the administration of Jimmy Carter placed less
emphasis on requiring zero risk and more effort on developing
a coherent policy toward carcinogens for all the regulatory
agencies to follow. Despite the goal of achieving more
flexibility, guidelines were developed under Carter that
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proposed fairly stringent standards. Any substance that
caused cancer when tested in animals would be considered a
potential human carcinogen. For regulatory purposes it was
agreed that a single animal test would suffice. The
regulatory agencies were instructed not to wait for longer
than two years for additional test results before taking
action.3 5
The Reagan administration considered the recommendations
of Carter's task force "dogmatic", arguing that they were
based on scientifically unsupportable statements. Another
review was begun in 1982 to evaluate the federal
decision-making in the regulation of carcinogens. One result
of this most recent effort was a report that suggested that
the agencies adopt a standard that distinguishes between
carcinogens that affect the cell's genetic mechanism and those
that do not, like saccharin. This distinction was considered
invalid by many scientists who argue that there is evidence
that some carcinogens that do not cause genetic changes are
more potent than those that do. 36
These shifts in the political climate affect the
receptivity of the public and Congress to FDA decisions.
Neither the public's or Congress' attitudes are shaped
independently of the influence of public relations efforts,
advertising, biases in news reporting, etc. Science has
attributed the confusion about saccharin's carcinogenicity on
the part of Congress and the public to the "aggressive effort
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of the diet food industry to foster this misunderstanding (of
toxicological methodology and the nature of animal testing),
and its ability to bring its views forcefully to the attention
of Congress." 3 7
Before the saccharin controversy there was only tepid
political support for changing the Delaney clause. Many in
Congress were apprehensive that a vote against Delaney could
be construed as a vote for cancer. The widespread
opposition to the saccharin decision provided a sympathetic
environment for proposals to revise the food laws. In 1977
twenty-seven percent of those persons queried in a nationwide
survey favored retaining the Delaney clause; 54 percent
supported changing the law. 38 Saccharin made it less risky to
support a modified safety standard. Between February and
October 1977, 62 bills were introduced in Congress with
bipartisan support to amend or repeal the Delaney clause. The
chief bill, sponsored by Representative James Martin, had 200
co-sponsors and would have provided that the benefits of an
additive be explicitly considered before a ban could be
proposed. 3 9 Because of the complexity of the issue, none of
the proposals passed.
Since the saccharin debate, reform of the food laws has
generated periodic, but modest interest in Congress. Public
opinion has again shifted toward increased support for the
Delaney clause, making modifications potentially unpopular.
By 1982, 48 percent of persons surveyed thought the law should
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be retained; only 32 percent were in favor of changing it. 4 0
Other food additives have received public attention since
saccharin, notably a proposal by the Department of Agriculture
and the FDA to phase out sodium nitrite, a carcinogen used in
curing meats. As each issue arises there is a flurry of
criticism by the food industry and some members of Congress
about the food laws and the Delaney clause. However,
revisions of the law are difficult, involving highly
technical issues. By repeated extensions of the saccharin
moratorium, Congress has also avoided a major confrontation on
the food safety laws.
Although public opinion and overall congressional
interest have varied, the food industry has continued to work
assiduously to have the laws revised. Senator Orrin Hatch,
chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee since
1980, and Congressman Martin have continued to sponsor
legislation. Both efforts have received strong support from
the food industry, including the soft drink companies. The
latest and most signficant of these was a bill introduced by
Hatch in 1981. Among other provisions it called for a
"flexible regulatory response based on the risks and uses
associated with a substance." 4 1 The bill was opposed by the
Coalition for Safe Food, an amalgam of three dozen consumer
advocacy and labor organizations. Their opposition as well as
other issues in Congress of a more immediate nature have
prevented the bill from reaching a vote to date.
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The Food and Drug Administration
Under the 1906 law, the Bureau of Chemistry in the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) was given responsibility for
the regulation of food safety. The Bureau's enforcement
activities, however, were circumscribed by the fact that it
was organizationally in the part of the government charged
with the promotion of food production and distribution. Much
of the Bureau's work, especially under Harvey Wiley, was
inimical to the efforts of the Department.
The responsibility for enforcement of the Food and Drugs
Act also left the Bureau of Chemistry little time for
research.42 In 1927 the research functions of the Bureau of
Chemistry were separated from its regulatory and enforcement
activities. The latter were placed in a newly created Food,
Drug and Insecticide Administration that was established as a
separate unit within the Department of Agriculture. In 1930
the name was simplified to the Food and Drug Administration,
and in 1940, Franklin Roosevelt moved the FDA out of USDA to
the Federal Security Agency. When the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (now called the Department of Health and
Human Services) was created in 1953, the FDA was transferred
to its jurisdiction.
The FDA has six divisions, one of which is the Bureau of
Foods, responsible for the regulation of food additives
including saccharin. The agency's basic function is to carry
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out statutory mandates through formal and informal procedures.
The FDA currently has jurisdiction over almost 3000 direct
additives, substances added to foods, and as many as 10,000
indirect additives, those that may migrate during processing,
packaging, or storage. This authority includes 80 percent of
all processed foods, excluding red meat and poultry. 4 3 Over
the years the agency has shifted its role from policing
blatant offenses to approving proper practices. 44
Much of the FDA's workload is dictated by these statutory
requirements. The weight of the regulations is probably not
as formidable as it may appear; many are repetitious, and some
are inconsistent or conflicting. Additionally, the agenda of
the agency is predetermined to some extent by issues that have
carried over from the previous administration or that are part
of the regulatory routine such as items imposed by the
budgetary process or by workload cycles. There are also
topics of pressing importance that arise from crises, scandal,
or other unanticipated reasons. 4 5
Direct public participation in the process of FDA rule
making is a consequence of the Administrative Procedures Act
of 1946. Among its other provisions, the Act allowed
interested parties the opportunity to submit comments to the
agency, and in some cases required that public hearings be
held on proposed regulations. The participation of consumer
advocacy organizations resulting from these provisions has
been a consistent feature of the regulation of artificial
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sweeteners.
The most significant external control over the agency,
however, comes through Congress. Congress can restrict the
FDA's authority (as occurred with saccharin). It can require
the agency to undertake specific action or it may become
involved in FDA activities by exercising continual supervision
or conductin5 ~Eriodic investigations. Congress cxon rols the
FDA's appropriations, an important mechanism for determining
the agency's agenda. It can also affect the operation of the
agency through the selection and approval of the Secretary of
HHS. Finally, Congress may become involved informally because
of the interest of individual congressmen in particular issues
as occurred with food safety reform proposals.
Herbert Kaufman has argued in his study of the FDA and
other federal bureaus that organizational constraints are
especially influential in determining the behavior of the
agency. 47 These can include the learned behavior of staff
members from professional affiliations, from training, and
from established work patterns. A highly stable work force can
make these factors especially salient; at the FDA the turnover
rate is generally only about 5 percent. The professional
orientation of an agency can be an important determinant of
regulatory activities. As James Q. Wilson has described some
regulatory agencies have tasks that can be performed only by
professionals. 4 8 These professionals, in varying degrees, have
acquired distinctive ways of approaching policy problems.
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They also tend to be sensitive about their reputation among
their professional colleagues.
The FDA is dominated by professionals from various
scientific disciplines. They place great importance on
maintaining the agency's reputation as a competent scientific
organization and on their own personal standing in their
individual fields. During the artificial sweeteners
controversy there appeared to be some conflict between the
professional norms of the scientist and those of the FDA's
lawyers. Scientists in the Bureau of Foods spoke of how the
debate over the safety of cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame
was often framed as a legal issue. Once that occurred they
complained that the regulatory process was reduced to a
dispute between lawyers rather than a debate on scientific
grounds.
The commissioner of the FDA is not appointed by the
president as in other major regulatory agencies but by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. The political climate
and the values held by the current administration are often
reflected in the choice of commissioner. The FDA commissioner
from 1980 to 1983 of the Reagan administration was Arthur
Hayes, a physician. Hayes was popular with industry, but his
professional orientation was probably less responsible than
his advocacy of fewer regulations and greater dependency on
voluntary cooperation from industry, guidelines determined not
only by his own preferences but also by the Reagan
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administration.50
The commissioner's background does not appear to be
especially important in determining the reception given to the
FDA's decisions. For instance, Donald Kennedy, commissioner
during the saccharin controversy, was a neurophysiologist with
a largely academic career. Kennedy's scientific background
was acclaimed as an asset in the press when he was appointed
and in Congress, where he scored high marks with his testimony
during saccharin hearings. 5 1 Nevertheless, the fact that a
highly respected academic scientist supported the ban did
little to appease the widespread criticism of the FDA's
decision.
Commissioners have changed frequently at the FDA; Donald
Kennedy was the ninth commissioner in 24 years. By contrast,
some members of Congress, many congressional staff members,
and lobbyists and career civil servants are generally in
office much longer.52 The constellation of interests making
demands of the FDA therefore is stable over time. It is
relatively easy for a trade association or a consumer advocate
to be consistent in their efforts and in the alliances they
establish. Each commissioner, however, is likely to bring new
influences to bear on the agency. The personal interests of
the commissioner can determine some of the FDA's activities as
was apparent with Hayes' particular concern about
hypertension. But as the regulatory philosophy or priorities
shift when commissioners change, the agency's decision can
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lose coherence.
The FDA values its reputation as a scientific
organization, but the quality of its research is occasionally
the focus of attention from the agency's critics in the food
industry and among public interest groups. The FDA has
periodically responded to the charges that its research
efforts are inadequate by establishing review committees. 5 3
Despite these problems evaluations of the FDA as a scientific
organization are not predominantly negative. The top
scientists at the agency are often favorably compared to top
scientists anywhere by representatives from the food industry
and by consumer advocates.5 4
There will inevitably be criticism from affected groups
over adverse decisions. A more persistent problem and one
that often appears to be at the heart of negative evalutions
of FDA performance is the discrepancy between the
responsibilities of the agency as mandated by law and the
expectations of its active clientele: the food industry and
public interest groups. The president of an organization that
instructs lawyers about FDA regulations described the food
safety system as "inherently adversarial." He noted that
because the FDA approves additives and drugs and conducts
safety inspections, its relationship with industry is often
antagonistic. For example, in 1981 it was found that the FDA
took an average of 31.2 months to approve a new additive. 55
Consumer advocates contend that the FDA is dilatory in acting
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to restrict potentially hazardous substances in an effort to
avoid controversy. The food industry often complains that the
cost of this process is prohibitive. Yet the agency's
responsibility of protecting the safety of the food supply is
not usually compatible with swift action. In addition, the
intrusion of political factors into scientific decisions as
occurred with each artificial sweetener is further incentive
for the FDA to proceed cautiously.
The ban
Saccharin use leveled off in the two years following the
cyclamate ban but has risen steadily since then. As
consumption increased scientific attention focused on the
association between saccharin and bladder tumors in animal
studies. Although one source of information about saccharin's
ill effects was the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,
earlier involved with cyclamate, the sugar industry was not as
concerned about saccharin's competition as it had been with
cyclamate. After the cyclamate ban, the Association found
that the expected increase in demand for sugar failed to
materialize. Instead, it discovered that cyclamate had
created a new market. The consumers of artificially sweetened
soft drinks were generally new to the soft drink market rather
than former drinkers of sugared beverages.56
In 1972 the FDA required that foods containing saccharin
carry a warning that they should be used only by persons who
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had to restrict their intake of ordinary sweets. The agency
also removed saccharin from the GRAS list. In the spring of
1977 the Canadian government released the results of a study
that found that an impurity caused during the manufacturing
process was not responsible for the bladder tumors. Upon
receiving the news, the acting FDA commissioner, Sherwin
Gardner, proposed the saccharin ban. 57
Although the agency went to considerable lengths in its
decision to argue that under the general safety provisions of
the food law, saccharin would have been banned anyway without
the Delaney clause, this was often overlooked in media
coverage of the ban. That the FDA was forced to act under the
law to restrict saccharin is the most widely given explanation
for the decision within the agency and from FDA staff
members.58 This explanation is unsatisfactory. A ban on a
harmful substance is a rare event despite the vast numbers of
questionable substances.
A more plausible explanation for the saccharin ban was
that the agency failed to understand the extent of the
public's commitment to artificially sweetened foods and
beverages, especially soft drinks. As a result, the FDA did
not anticipate the widespread opposition to its proposal. In
addition, there were significant pressures on the agency to
act. For several years before the saccharin decision, consumer
groups and Congress had been especially critical of the FDA's
handling of health hazards in food. 5 9 Faced with substantial
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evidence that saccharin was a likely human carcinogen, the FDA
felt compelled to recommend restrictions on its use.
In attempting to prevent consumer panic, the FDA issued a
statement that minimized the significance of the animal data.
The agency said that: "Saccharin has been in use for more than
80 years and has never been known to harm people, and since
the Canadian data do not indicate an immediate hazard to
public health, we do not consider the recall of existing
products to be necessary. ' 60 Sherwin Gardner described the
amount of saccharin used in the studies in terms that made the
tests appear ludicrous. Gardner said that the saccharin dose
given the test animals "exceeded the average human exposure
by at least 800 times, and that the human equivalent would be
that of drinking 800 twelve ounce cans of diet soda every day
for a lifetime." Instead of preventing the anticipated crisis
among consumers, the reassurances became the target of
ridicule in the press and from the diet industry, especially
the phrase "800 cans a day."
Consumer groups supported the ban but castigated the FDA
for minimizing the seriousness of the risk. The Health
Research Group disputed the benefits of saccharin pointing to
the absence of proof that it is efficacious in weight control.
The organization also argued that any increased risk of
bladder cancer of less than 30 to 40 percent would probably be
undetected. Consumer Reports, a widely read periodical that
evaluates the safety of consumer products, stressed the
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validity of scientific tests that utilized large doses in
animal studies to estimate human effects.61
The saccharin question placed the FDA in a difficult
position. There were considerable pressures on the agency to
act and there was a law that clearly stated a carcinogenic
substance was not to be permitted. The FDA, however, must be
seen as at least partly responsible for the problems it faced
with saccharin. Having banned cyclamate seven years before,
the agency made it likely that without an acceptable
substitute, restrictions on saccharin would be unpopular.
Although the Delaney clause clearly spells out a strict
standard for the agency to follow in the regulation of
carcinogens, this guideline has been ignored far more often
than it has been enforced. With saccharin, a widely used
substance that posed no overwhelming risk, the agency might
have more seriously explored other options although short of
no restrictions at all, none of the alternatives would have
been entirely uncontroversial.
For example, the FDA could have emphasized that saccharin
would still be allowed as a tabletop sweetener. In Canada
saccharin sweetened soft drinks were banned but saccharin
continued to be sold in pharmacies as an over-the-counter
substance. Following the ban, the Canadian soft drink bottlers
introduced sodas with reduced sugar content, although sales
were not as high as they were with the artificially sweetened
drinks. Sugarless drinks were also available to which
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saccharin could be added. 6 2
For the most part, the consumer advocacy organizations in
the United States would have accepted the option of preserving
saccharin's use as a tabletop sweetener. These groups had
argued that the freedom of choice issue was not a compelling
one for small children or for those whose mothers had consumed
saccharin during pregnancy. Saccharin sold only in tabletop
form would mean that consumers were presumably acting with
some deliberation.63
This policy choice would have done little, however, to
appease the diet food industry. For the bottler the cost of
sweetening a gallon of syrup concentrate with sugar has
consistently been more expensive than the cost with saccharin.
The cost of a can of diet soft drink to the consumer, however,
was the same as that of one sweetened with sugar. The large
soft drink manufacturers and their bottlers were determined to
protect this market. Nor would this option have satisfied
dieters or diabetics who claimed "lifestyle" reasons for
opposing the ban, arguing that it was the accessibility to
low-calorie products that made it possible to adhere to a
restricted diet.
The FDA could have required the warning label alone on
products containing saccharin, although that would have been
one of the least effective methods to curtail consumption. In
conveying risk, labels are of limited utility in helping
consumers to make decisions. Labels can display very little
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information, and they necessarily synthesize a great deal in a
simplistic fashion. Significant or conflicting data is
omitted.
It is also difficult to understand how great is the risk
from a food additive described on a label without a
comparative context. However, tables of comparative risks are
facile, ignoring the degree of uncertainty that may exist and
other considerations. Decisions about risk require the
consumer to have the ability to probabilistically evaluate
rare, but consequential, events. 64 Finally, surveys of
consumer response to both the warning labels on cigarette
packages and saccharin products have indicated that most
consumers never read them. The labels have not adversely
affected sales in either instance.65
Reaction to the ban
The press had a mixed response to the ban. The New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal opposed the ban and
recommended replacing the Delaney clause with a procedure for
weighing risks and benefits. A month later the Times softened
its opposition somewhat, noting in cautious support for the
FDA that "... for the moment there seems to be no alternative
to judgment and action by a government agency like the FDA..."
By contrast the Washington Post supported the Delaney clause
and the proposed ban.66 Because most newspsaper accounts
mentioned the phrase "800 cans of soda" to described the
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saccharin dose, the press coverage fostered the impression
that the FDA had acted unwisely.
Consumers were overwhelmingly opposed to the ban. A
survey of public reaction in 1977 compared to the response to
the cyclamate ban in 1969 revealed important changes in
attitude. In 1969 87 percent of those surveyed indicaated
they were "grateful" to the government for protecting them
against a suspected carcinogen. A few (18 percent) felt
cyclamate's dangers were exaggerated. When the saccharin ban
was proposed, only 16 percent indicated that they felt
grateful. Sixty-nine percent believed saccharin's dangers had
been exaggerated and 47 percent saw the ban as an infringement
of their individual rights.67
The diet food industry fought the ban in three ways.
First, the validity of animal evidence was disputed. The
industry utilized the public's lack of understanding about the
study of carcinogens, emphasizing in advertisements the
absence of evidence that bladder cancer in humans could be
attributed to saccharin use.
Second, the "benefits" of saccharin were heavily
promoted, especially the impression that they were a medical
necessity for diabetics and were effective in weight control.
The publicity generated by the Council often mentioned that
ten million diabetics would be deprived of diet soft drinks
and other artificially sweetened foods. The involvement of
the American Diabetes Association (ADA) and the Juvenile
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Diabetes Foundation (JDF) in the saccharin controversy was an
important factor in linking artificial sweeteners with health
in the minds of the public. The attention that these
organizations attracted to diabetes contributed to the
perception that saccharin was beneficial in treatment of a
medical problem.
Representatives from the ADA and the JDF testified
extensively against the proposed ban. Their state affiliates
organized their members in letter writing campaigns to
Congress. The ADA called for a review of the current food
safety laws and further study of saccharin, citing a "lack of
agreement between the results of animal experimentation and
human studies." The ADA recommended the continued
availability of saccharin until more information was available
and stressed prudent use of the artificial sweetener by
pregnant women and young children." 6 9
The JDF took the position that a ban would cause its
500,000 members to be set further apart from their peers
without convenient access to artificially sweetened soft
drinks and foods.70 At a congressional hearing, the founder
of the JDF, Lee Ducat, stated that the sudden ban had the
"diabetic population in virtual shock." Moreover, Ducat
predicted that a ban would result in increased numbers of
diabetics in the United States although there is no scientific
evidence to warrant his conclusion.7 1
The American Cancer Society displayed some interest in
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the saccharin debate, but its role was a peripheral one with
little active participation. In 1980 the Society issued a
paper cautioning moderate use of artificial sweeteners, again
for the groups potentially most at risk, pregnant women and
children. The report noted that if any of the current cases
of bladder cancer could be attributed to saccharin
consumption, the number must be very small. 7 2
The third way in which the diet industry fought the ban
was to redefine the issues under debate. Instead of contesting
the saccharin data alon., the industry called for an overhaul
o. cderal food safety legislation. Press coverage amplified
the idea that the saccharin case was illustrative of the law's
inadequacy. The point was often made that to consider
saccharin without an appraisal of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act would simply allow similar controversies to occur.
In fact, saccharin is exceptional among food additives
that may present a health hazard. There are other substances
that can be substituted for many of the additives used by the
food industry. In addition, it would be hard to make the case
that the public "needs" a particular flavor enhancer or
emulsifier. There are also few contested additives that are as
widely used as saccharin. With those that are, such as salt
and caffeine, product innovations have blunted the demands for
strong regulatory actions. Low-sodium, and caffeine-free
versions of many standard foods are on the market in response
to the various health concerns that have been raised.
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The saccharin debate was also redefined as a threat to
individual freedom. Instead of whether or not a carcinogenic
substance should be banned, the issue became freedom of choice
for the consumer. The American Council on Science and Health
has made freedom of choice the basis of its objections to a
saccharin ban. ACSH recommended that consumers should be
informed about saccharin's alleged risks and benefits
(presumably through brochures in drugstores and groceries) in
order to make an informed judgment. The organization is
strongly opposed to the label that saccharin products carry
warning that warns that it has caused cancer in laboratory
animals. ACSH has focused much of its opposition on
contrasting the sanctions against saccharin with those against
cigarettes. The message on cigarette packages does not
mention the word cancer. 7 3
Under the original terms of the debate, the FDA's role
was that of decision-maker. After the redefinition as the
public and non-industry groups became mobilized in opposition,
Congress became the decision-maker. Congressional hearings on
the FDA proposal examined the validity of animal tests, the
effectiveness of the food safety laws, and saccharin's
purported benefits to diabetics and dieters.
Congressional participation increased the visibility of
the saccharin issue with the media. Without congressional
involvement it is likely that some non-industry groups may
have testified at FDA hearings or submitted written comments
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to the agency. It is highly unlikely, however, that the
number of organizations who participated would have been as
great if the issues had not been redefined to appeal to as
many diverse groups as possible. Nor is it likely that
hearings would have been held by the subcommittees in
Congress; the degree of public participation would have been
much less.
Sherwin-Williams found strong commercial allies in its
opposition to the FDA's decision. The soft drink companies
and Cumberland Packing envisioned a collapsing diet market
without saccharin. Although a number of alternative
sweeteners were under development at the time, approval of an
acceptable substitute was perceived to be years away.
The diet industry watched the saccharin issue develop,
following closely the studies conducted by the National
Academy of Sciences and others over the years. The Calorie
Control Council, especially, and the National Soft Drink
Association coordinated industry resistance to the ban. Other
trade associations, representing canned food and
pharmaceutical companies were also involved but figured less
prominently in organizing industry and public opposition.
The National Soft Drink Association presented the
opposition of its members to the FDA and to Congress. Its
state affiliates wrote their various congressional
representatives to describe the loss of jobs that would occur
in their districts if diet soft drinks were made unavailable.
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Television and radio broadcasters were contacted by bottlers
who warned of decreased advertising revenues if diet soft
drinks were banned. 7 4
The Calorie Control Council was more adept at shaping the
saccharin controversy than it had been with cyclamate partly
because the diet industry gave the Council its full backing
with saccharin. The public relations firm of Hill and
Knowlton was retained by the Council to coordinate its
publicity efforts. Less than a month after the FDA
announcement, the Council was estimated to have spent close to
one million dollars on its saccharin campaign. 7 5 The support
of the diet industry provided the Calorie Control Council with
resources unmatched by any of the groups who supported the
restrictions on saccharin.
The Council undertook an extensive campaign to persuade
the public that the ban was an example, not of government
protection, but of government intrusion into private
decisions. The Council ran advertisements opposite the
editorial pages in newspapers throughout the country that
urged the public to write Congress. (See Figure IV-A) The
phrase, "800 cans of diet soda a day," from the FDA
announcement of the ban figured prominently in the Council's
newspaper advertisements. Millions of unorganized consumers
were mobilized into a saccharin constituency. Congressional
mail on saccharin was reported to have reached record
amounts.76
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FIGURE IV-A
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Why is the verdict
almost in on saccharin
when all the evidence isn't?
Shortly, the FDA's proposed ban on saccharin can become a
harsh reality.
Ifis adecision based on insufficient evidence: chiefly, the results
of a single unfinished Canadian test of 200 rats that were fed the
human equivalent of over 1250 twelve--ounce beverages a day over a
lifetime. Quite frankly, there is considerable scientific disagreement
over this test's validity because of the "mega-doses" of saccharin fed
to these rats.
On the other hand, and what you may not know, the large body
of existing research dues not indicate that saccharin causescancer
in animais or humans.
For instance. there have been at least a dozen experiments on
animals conducted over the last decade. which the National Academy
of Sciences reviewed and concluded no regulatory action against
saccharin was indicated.
More importantly, there have been at least six studies involving
a large number of humans (more than 60.000) with no evidence
that heavy saccharin ingestion results in an increase in bladder
cancer.
Of course, the most rigorous "test" could well be the fact that
saccharin has been in use or over 80 years without a single case of
cancer attributed to it.
If any cancer danger is demonstrated from diet foods and
beverages containing saccharin, everyone agrees that they should be
taken off the shelves. But, at this point, there appears to be a lot of
confusion. controversy and insufficient evidence to ban saccharin.
And more time to sort it all out seems iustified.
Your desires as an American
are being flagrantly ignored.
The majority of American people disapprove of the proposed
ban on saccharin. A recent maior national survey confirms it.
However, the FDA intends to ban saccharin in foods,beverages,
and all other products. Fo soften the blow and quiet the voice ol
protest, the FDA announced it swould comider allowing saccharin to
be sold over the counter as a drug. But...
It is not certain you will be able
to buy saccharin over the counter.
Frankly. the FDA action is conusing and there is a catch. Weigh
carefully the statement bv Donald Kennedy Commissionerof the
Food and Drug Administration: "I \ant to make it clear that
permanent approval of sacchann for drug use is not automatic"
To run the drug tests, the FDA %would require "5 ears at a
minimum" states Dr. Leonard Haime,. President of the Amencan
Society of Bariatric Phsicians.
The fAct is. B sa ,harin is not a I\ rpial drue. since it, sole function
is to provide sweetness ithout calones. Thus. sacchann may not be
as easy to buy as you've been led to believe.
There is no substitute for saccharin available.
Many people are under the mistaken impression that.American
industr' has a substitulc \taiting in the wines, ready to go as soon as
the sacchar, ban goes into ei ect. 7h1:tis t'.c!u!v usnmte.
"No other alternate sweetener is far enough along... there is
nothing around the corner next scar to kook lorward to:' according to
FDA Deputy Comnrmusioner Sherinm Gardner. This means that if
saccharin is banned. millins of diabeutics may not expenence the taste
of sweetness or a long time. perhaps ever. in theirdiet ioods and soft
drinks. And millions ol wveirht.-conscious Americans will have to
forego the benehts of low-,alorie-sweetened soft drinks.candy, gum,
and desserts.
What Congress does will depend on you.
Both Senator Edssard Kennedvand Representativel Paul Rogers
have suggested that a thornugh scientific review should take place.
Independent scientists should judee the data on sac~chrin and
especially the validity of the Canadian experiment as it relates to
humans.
We think this is a sensible and essential sugzestion and we urge
you to urge Congress to support that proposai and prov;de the time
necessary to iudge all the data.
Without your support. the ban on saccharin 'siWl becomearealirt
we'll all have to Lue with.
ACT NOW.
YOU'VE GOT LESS THAN AWEEK TO BE HEARD.
Below you'll find a list of government leaders who have a special interest in the prop,,ed bJonon ,accarnn Inone them rite
them. and do it hefore Ma 18. That 's the date the FDA puts saccharin on trial in a pubhc hearin,. Let them know •ou upp'ort
postponemen of a ban u an indulp•cditie, ta iul stiC"ifi,. ,.., b.i 6L d, ,.•.,; c l. : :,:.; ; ;.j.:.. ,r, .,i....
ConrimsAn Paul G. Rotem Chaniman
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This ad s sponsored by the Calone Control Council, an international a, o :,atiun i mManutaturers and upplher, ol dietar tood and teseralge.
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Two years later, when the saccharin moratorium came up
for its first extension, the industry and the Calorie Control
Council continued their campaign to discredit the science and
to mobilize industry and non-industry groups. Coca-Cola sent
brochures to its bottlers that described the amount of
saccharin fed to the rats in the 1977 Canadian study as the
equivalent of 1200 twelve ounce servings of Tab or Fresca per
day for two lifetimes, a substantial increase from Coca-Cola's
own earlier descriptions of the dosage. This material was
accompanied by exhortations to the bottlers to again contact
their congressional representatives.
The Council consistently depicted the FDA decision as
total ban, ignoring the option of selling saccharin in
tabletop form. The Council also misled the public about the
extent of industry awareness, portraying the soft drink
companies and other manufacturers as surprised by a
precipitous FDA action. In fact, the industry had known at
least since the cyclamate ban, if not before, that saccharin
was the subject of a major review. Through the Calorie
Control Council and other trade groups, the industry had
monitored the test results of the numerous studies on
saccharin that had been conducted over the years as well as
sponsored research of their own. 78
The Calorie Control Council served as a buffer between
industry and the criticism that can occur when a company
engages in obvious efforts to lobby on its own behalf through
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controversial advertisements. The soft drink firms and the
food companies were protected from the publicity of being
visibly involved in the debate. Their public participation
was limited for the most part to expressions of outrage at the
FDA's action.
The company that would have suffered the most if
saccharin was restricted was Cumberland Packing. Because
sales of Sweet'n Low represented 90 percent of the company's
business in 1977, a ban would have eliminated most of the 500
jobs the company provided at its plant in an economically
depressed area in New York City. Newspaper coverage during
this period, occasionally with the soft drink firms as sources
of information, focused attention on the plight of this family
owned company and helped to personalize the FDA's decision.
Conclusion
E.E. Schattschneider has described how the outcome of
conflict is determined by its scope of its contagion; "the
number of people involved in any conflict determines what
happens." 7 9  He argued that consequently the most important
strategy of politics is concerned with controlling the scope
of a conflict. Schattschneider further contrasted the effect
of the "privatization of conflict" with the "socialization of
conflict." In the former case, the conflict becomes almost
completely invisible. In the latter , universal ideas in the
culture such as freedom of speech, justice or liberty are
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often used to form the basis of "appeals to public authority
for the redress of private grievances".80
The success of the diet industry's efforts to block the
saccharin ban resulted from expansion of the scope of the
conflict and appeals to public authority, in this case,
Congress. The cyclamate ban in 1970 had demonstrated the
vulnerability of a defense that rested on too narrow a
definition of the issue. In the words of an executive of a
major soft drink company, "cyclamate taught industry a
lesson." With saccharin the issues were broadly defined.
Instead of a fight between one company and the FDA, the
saccharin ban was made into the public's battle.
This expansion occurred through redefinition of the issue
under debate and through subsidization of the information flow
to government and the public. The essential issue in the
saccharin debate was a straightforward one. Under the law the
FDA was required to ban any substance shown to cause cancer in
animal tests. Simply put, the original question was whether
there was reasonable certainty that saccharin caused cancer.
Determining that answer would only have involved the FDA, a
review of the available data, and the standard regulatory
appeals process if the decision was contested.
The diet industry redefined this single issue into a
series of new questions that confused the scientific and legal
aspects of the problem. In Participation in American Politics
Roger Cobb and Charles Elder describe how changing the terms
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of a debate can amplify the appeal of the controversy, thus
involving greater audiences: "The issue should be defined or
redefined... as ambiguously as possible, with implications
for as many people as possible, involving issues other than
the dispute in question, with no categorical precedence, and
as simply as feasible. ''8 1
Under the redefinition of the saccharin issue, the
original question was expanded to include at least seven other
questions:
(1) Does the law requiring a ban make sense?
(2) Are the scientific practices of food safety studies valid
and are they applicable to the saccharin case?
(3) Is the FDA a scientifically competent agency?
(4) Is it actually possible to protect consumers from all
risk?
(5) Should the government determine whether people can have
access to substances they want if the level of risk is low?
(6) Are there other courses of action government should adopt
in these instances?
(7) Does the government have the right to deny diabetics a
"medicine" ?
The new questions did more than just increase the issues
under debate. They changed the focus of the controversy so
that the central argument was no longer over the merits of the
FDA's saccharin decision but over much larger topics: the
competency of the FDA, the saliency of federal food safety
legislation, and the validity of the scientific procedures
used in studying food additives. The bigger issues added
dimensions to the controversy that could not be addressed
without complex and time consuming proceedings. The efforts
to resolve these new topics to any extent have involved many
161
more individuals and organizations than would have been
interested simply in saccharin. In the food industry alone
other companies that were not users of saccharin have had
major reason to be concerned about the food safety laws,
testing procedures, and evaluation of FDA performance.
Moreover, expanding the saccharin issue allowed the diet
food industry to furnish answers more favorable to its own
interests. The significance of the negative findings on
saccharin was diluted by industry supported research that
stressed the scientific limitations of the studies.
Alternative explanations were heavily promoted within the
industry, to the public, and to Congress. A decision on
saccharin was indefinitely postponed because the issue was
made more complex and therefore more difficult to resolve.
The redefinition also used slogans to evoke deeply
ingrained cultural values, especially the concept of freedom
of choice and American individualism. In the process, the
subject under debate became confused because the saccharin
decision was not an example of government intrusion into
individual freedom. For the consumer to have freedom of
choice in selecting foods that are potentially hazardous would
involve enormous individual investments of time and energy.
Instead, the government has traditionally assumed the
responsibility of assuring food safety. By portraying the
saccharin ban as an infringment of a personal freedom, the
industry was skillful in transforming the saccharin debate
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into an issue that has great appeal to the American public but
that is only weakly connected to whether saccharin should be
allowed on the market. The result was to widen the appeal of
the debate, enlarging the number of people interested in the
outcome of the controversy.
The diet industry bought itself time with the saccharin
moratorium. Once saccharin was linked with appraisal of the
food safety laws, it became unlikely that the debate would be
resolved quickly. Placing saccharin (now subsumed in the
review of the food laws) on Congress's agenda gave the
appearance of action while effectively sidestepping a
decision. Food safety continues to be an issue that has
consistently been pushed aside in each congressional session.
In the absence of crisis, there is little incentive for
Congress to proceed in such a complex area.
A saccharin ban was prevented because the diet industry
was able to pressure Congress, to shape the media's perception
of the issues, and to galvanize consumers to protest the FDA's
decision. These efforts might have been unsuccessful,
however, if the industry had not had latent, but overwhelming
public support. The FDA inadvertently assisted in creating
this support by having earlier removed cyclamate with
insufficient consideration of the implications for a saccharin
decision. Without a substitute, millions of people, persuaded
by over two decades of advertising that artificial sweeteners
were effective in dieting, were unwilling to give up saccharin
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and willing to accept what they clearly believed was a modicum
of risk.
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CHAPTER V
ASPARTAME: THE QUIET CONTROVERSY
When the FDA acted on cyclamate and saccharin, both
substances had been in use for years. The diet food industry
and the public were accustomed to their availability. In 1969
when cyclamate was banned and again in 1977 when the saccharin
ban was proposed, dozens of consumer products were
artificially sweetened. Despite government action, health
scares and slow growth in overall soft drink sales, the diet
segment of the soft drink industry continued to flourish.
A new sugar substitute, aspartame, was approved for dry
foods in 1981 and for soft drinks in 1983. The regulatory
process for the new sweetener took eight years while char-es
about its safety were reviewed by the FDA. In comparison to
cyclamate and saccharin, the aspartame controversy is of much
shorter duration and is less well documented. Aspartame is
included here, however, because it provides an interesting
contrast to cyclamate and saccharin and an opportunity to
consider several questions about policymaking and artificial
sweeteners.
First, aspartame shows how the policy outcome nray be
affected because the sweetener under consideration is a new
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one rather than one long on the market. The challenge for
aspartame's manufacturer, G.D. Searle and Company, was to
defend the sweetener throughout the regulatory process yet,
once approved, have aspartame emerge unscathed in the public's
perception. Searle had an opportunity to respond differently
to controversy than did the producers of cyclamate and
saccharin because the initial debate over aspartame's safety
occurred before it reached the market. 1
In contrast to the disputes over its predecessors,
aspartame's unsteady route to FDA approval transpired
privately, with virtually no public attention. The conflict
was contained within the regulatory process. There were no
appeals to the public or to Congress and no publicity
campaigns sponsored by the Calorie Control Council. The quiet
handling of the regulatory conflict contributed to aspartame's
introduction virtually free of publicity about health
problems. 1
Second, the aspartame case furnishes a perspective for
further understanding the role substitutes have had in the
regulation of artificial sweeteners. The availability of a
substitute was an important factor in consumer and industry
acceptance of the cyclamate ban, just as the lack of a
substitute was the key reason for the protest over the
proposed saccharin ban. Aspartame was entering a market where
health problems had occurred with regularity. In response
Searle presented aspartame as a unique sweetener, a
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replacement for saccharin with its negative history as well as
sugar with its calories.
Finally, of the three sweetener cases consumer advocates
were most influential with aspartame in affecting the
regulatory outcome. The impact of public interest
organizations during the cyclamate and saccharin debates was
indirect. Their opposition to artificial sweeteners and their
critique of FDA performance added to the pressure on the
agency but their efforts did not cause the bans. By contrast,
consumer advocates had a direct role in the aspartame case:
they blocked its approval, forced a reexamination of the
scientific evidence, and in the process delayed the
sweetener's marketing for eight years.
History
The cyclamate ban and saccharin's uncertain future made
it apparent that the diet industry would require a new
sweetener, free from health concerns. The National Soft Drink
Association has described the ideal sugar substitute as:
"significantly sweeter than sugar with a pleasant taste and no
aftertaste, chemically and physically stable, and colorless,
odorless, water soluble. It should be competitive in cost,
free of adverse health effects, and compatible with a broad
spectrur. of food uses." 2
The Calorie Control Council has advocated a "multiple
sweetener concept". According to the Council, a combination of
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sweeteners would enable manufacturers to offer consumers a
wider range of better tasting products. 3 rMultiple sweeteners
would also provide industry with greatly enhanced flexibility
in product formulations, reducing the health risk from any one
while lowering ingredient costs. For example, a more
expensive but better tasting substance like aspartame used in
combination with a cheaper sweetener like saccharin would
maximize the advantages of each.
Several dozen alternative sweeteners have been under
development in the United States and in other countries since
the mid-1970s. The only sweetener to receive approval in this
country has been aspartame. The sweetening power of aspartame
was discovered in 1965 by a Searle chemist, James D.
Schlatter, although aspartame had been synthesized earlier by
the British company Imperial Chemical Industries. GettinL
aspartame to the American market took Searle 17 years and by
1983 had cost the company $160 million in research and
development activities for the product.5 Searle has a patent
on aspartame's use as a sweetener that will expire in 1992.6
In 1977 Searle reported a loss of $28 million on sales of
$749 million. The company hoped to add significantly to its
revenues and earnings through aspartame sales. Financial
analysts termed aspartame as "the critical variable at Searle"
and "the most important single new product in the company."
Aspartanle sales apparently have been important to improvinc
Searle's financial health. In 1982 the sweetener contributed
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about $50 million to Searle's earnings; no other product had
revenues of over $30 million. 7  That year Searle earned $140.4
million on total revenues of $1 billion. 8 By 1990 aspartame
sales are projected to reach $500 million and by 1996 more
than $1 billion, a figure that would double the current size
of Searle. 9
Leading Searle's revival until recently was Donald
Rumsfeld, former congressman from Illinois, former White House
chief of staff and Secretary of Defense under Gerald Ford,
head of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Cost of
Living Council under Richard Nixon, and special envoy to the
Middle East under Reagan. Rumsfeld became president and chief
executive of Searle in 1977.10 Under brothers William and
Daniel Searle, the company had been in serious difficulty
because of a series of unprofitable acquisitions and the lack
of breakthroughs in drug research. Searle also had a
tarnished reputation with the FDA resulting from discreparcies
in data submitted in support of aspartame.1 1
Aspartame was viewed as an important part of a five year
turnaround strategy for Searle by Runsfeld and his ranagenent
team, composed in large part of Ford administration veterans.
Runsfeld took several steps to revitalize Searle including
trimming staff and increasing long term research efforts. He
also concentrated on securing the approval of aspartame, which
was languishing in the FDA regulatory process. 1 2
In July 1974, three years before Rumsfeld arrived at
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Searle, the FDA had approved aspartame for use in dry foods
and beverages. A month later Dr. John Olney, professor of
psychiatry at Washington University and James Turner, the
consumer advocate formerly involved with cyclamate and
saccharin, objected to aspartame's safety. In December 1974
the FDA offered to establish a public board of inquiry (PBOI)
composed of three outside scientists to review the objections
as an alternative to the usual procedure of an evidentiary
hearing before an administrative law judge. 1 3
The board of inquiry was used for the first time in FDA
history to scrutinize the aspartame data and to advise the
commissioner. The role assigned to the PBOI was to make
recommendations, not to reach an actual decision, which
remained the prerogative of the commissioner.14 Several
features of the procedure appeared to favor aspartame's
reapproval. The company was able to submit five nom:inees for
the PBOI to the FDA (as were Olney and Turner), and the board
members were selected with the concurrence of all parties. The
FDA also informed Searle and the others of the issues to be
considered by the board and invited comments. 1 5
The Bureau of Foods in the FDA, having already approved
aspartame in 1974, was still in favor of its reapproval when
the board was convened, so Searle was not faced with any
agency opposition to a favorable ruling. The bcard was asked
to consider two principal issues: whether asparta:e
consumption would entail a risk of brain damage causing mental
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retardation and whether aspartame use would increase the
incidence of brain tumors. Based on the answers to these
questions, the board was asked to decide whether aspartame
should be approved for use.1 6
The board decided that the risk of brain damage was
negligible, but that it could not rule out the possibility
that aspartame consumption might contribute to the developnment
of brain tumors. As a result, the PBOI recommended in
October, 1980, that aspartame's approval should be withheld
until further experiments could be conducted. 17  After the
board reached a decision, the Bureau of Foods urged the
commissioner "to reverse the PBOI's decision and lift the stay
of effectiveness of the aspartame regulation. ''18 Searle
provided scientific rebuttal to the concerns raised by the
board. In July 1981 FDA Commissioner Arthur Hayes overruled
the board and approved aspartame for use in dry foods. Hayes
disagreed with the recommendation that further research was
needed on aspartame's ability to cause brain tumors in rats.
He concluded that the available data established "reasonable
certainty of aspartame's safety for its proposed use.
19
In the opinion of scientists who served on the PEOI its
purpose also was to inform the public of the health concerns
with aspartame. In practice the procedure served to reinforce
the privacy of the aspartame debate. The board was charged
with detaching itself fror public controversy. The three
merbers, all academic scientists, were specifically instructed
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not to consider any cost/benefit issues in their evaluation of
aspartame and to confine their investigation to scientific
concerns.20 In addition, the board conducted three days of
hearings with little publi; zrticipation. According to the
recor. ýf the proceedings, testimony was presented primarily
by Dr. Olney and representatives from the Bureau of Foods in
FDA and Searle. The only other participants were James
Turner, who made a brief presentation, Richard Wurtman,
professor of nutrition and food science at IMIT, and three
physicians, two of whom were consultants to the PBOI. 2 1
With the exception of a few trade journals, there was
also virtually no media coverage given to the board's
proceedings. Consequently, the PBOI provided only the
illusion of informing the public. The dieters and diabetics
who might have provided non-scientific support for a new sugar
substitute were officially excluded from the aspartame
proceedings because the PLEO was instructed to liirit its
evaluation to the scientific aspects of the dispute.
Theoretically, if a consumer had been interested in
participating, he would have been able to do so.
Realistically, however, the likelihood was slight that an
individual would assume the considerable costs of becoming
informed about the complicated, highly technical aspartame
controvcrsy.2 2
The support of the Bureau of Foods was significant in
aspartare's approval but other factors constributed to a
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favorable decision. When Donald Rumsfeld came to Searle,
Jimmy Carter was in office, the saccharin controversy was in
full swing, and the FDA was headed by Donald Kennedy, widely
perceived as pro-consumer. The political environment was not
especially conducive for approval of a new artificial
sweetener. The arrival of the Reagan administration in 1980
and the appointment of Hayes as FDA commissioner was greeted
with enthusiasm by the food and drug industries which believed
a more relaxed attitude toward government regulation would
follow.
Hayes was inclined to take a different view toward
sweeteners than his two predecessors who had been involved in
the saccharin ban. Commissioners Jere Goyan and Donald
Kennedy were opposed to saccharin partly because they believed
its benefits were psychological and therefore less important.
As a result Coyan and Kennedy argued against saccharin's
continued use because of the evidence about its potential
health risks. Hayes, however, held the view that the
psychological benefits could be worth the risks.2 3
With saccharin's status still uncertain and with rountirn
evidence confirning it as an animal carcinogen, the FDA had
considerable incentive to support approval of a new sweetener.
The years of testing had convinced the agency of aspartame's
safety. Moreover, aspartame would provide a substitute should
saccharin be banned, potentially blunting consumer opposition.
In addition to the change in regulatory climate, it is
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also likely that a Washington veteran like Donald Rumsfeld was
able to negotiate the regulatory process more adeptly than his
predecessors at Searle. Close observers of the aspartame
controversy have suggested that Rumsfeld's solid Republican
credentials and his close ties with Vice-President George Bush
contributed to the 1981 approval. As likely was that Rumsfeld
was long accustomed to political situations in which the
desired outcome was threatened by opposing interests and that
he was experienced in crisis management.24
The FDA required that Searle monitor aspartame's
consumption by the American public, but the agency did not
establish any levels of use that would trigger special review.
There are currently two phases to the company's evaluation of
aspartame consumption. First, Searle provides the FDA with
quarterly reports of the tonnage of aspartame used in foods
and the estimated use of aspartame by age group calculated
from a survey of 5000 families. Second, when regular
consumption reaches 30 percent of any age group under twelve,
the company will measure how much aspartame is used in
different products.25
Marketinr a "natural" surar substitute
When aspartame was launched Searle scrupulously avoided
referring to it as an "artificial" sweetener in order to
disassociate it fror. thc negative health images of cyclamate
and especially saccharin. In introducing aspartame to
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consumers, the company followed a strategy that was fairly
unusual in advertising campaigns, promoting an industrial
product to a consumer audience.26 Bulk aspartame, sold only
to food and beverage companies, was given the brand name
NutraSweet. The tabletop sweetener was given the name Equal
and was sold directly to consumers. The two brands are
managed by separate divisions in Searle, a NutraSweet group in
marketing and an Equal group based in the consumer products
division.27
Advertisments for NutraSweet ran on television and in
popular magazines beginning in the spring of 1983. The ads
listed the products that would be using the new sweetener,
praised its true-to-sugar taste, and stressed that although
consumers would be unable to purchase NutraSweet, they were
going to love it. -laking the rather circuitous claim that
"since NutraSweet is a food ingredient, you can only find it
in foods and beverages", Searle's promotion helped tc create a
demand for the products that would contain aspartame.2 8
NutraSweet was initially used in a number of dry products
including drink nixes, gum, and cereals. General Foods was
one of the first companies to introduce aspartame sweetened
products. Sales from these foods were predicted to total
between $100 to $200 million by the mid-1980s.2 9
Equal was packaged in the sane type of serving envelopes
used by Sweet 'n Low and Sugar Twin, the saccharin sweeteners.
Cumberland Packing, manufacturer of Sweet 'n Low, predicted
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that Equal's high cost, almost three times that of Sweet 'n
Low, would deter consumers. But price has apparently not
been a drawback. By the fall of 1983, a little over a year
after it was introduced, Equal was reported to be the
best-selling sugar substitute. Having surpassed Sweet 'n Low,
the perennial leader, Equal held more than 50 percent of the
$150 million tabletop market. 3 0
Searle contended that aspartame was so different from
sugar or saccharin that its introduction required special
"consumer education". The company's promotion described a
"revolutionary new sweetener", never mentioning the word
aspartare. Because aspartame is synthesized from two amino
acids that are present in many food proteins, Searle claimed
that it was a "natural" sweetener. The campaign emphasized
that NutraSweet was a substitute not only for sugar but for
"artificial" sweeteners, often mentioning saccharin by name.
(See Figure V-A) A Searle brochure stated that "Unlike
artificial sweeteners, NutraSweet has no bitter chemical or
metallic aftertaste."
Through a public relations firm Searle arranged to
introduce aspartame to the relevant trade groups and medical
and health care professionals. The company also conducted
media forums and sponsored fundraising activities for the
diabetes associations. Advertisements for NutraSweet claimed
that it was effective in weight control. They asserted that by
eating fewer calories in aspartame sweetened foods consumers
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could expect to reduce their caloric intake while satisfying a
taste for sweetness. In this respect Searle's campaign
followed the tradition established with the earliest cyclamate
publicity that contended that sugar substitutes were an
effective aid to dieters. The claim has never been supported
with scientific data, but it continues to be an essential part
of the advertising of artificial sweeteners in order to appeal
to the millions of dieting consumers.
Aspartame's current high price relative to saccharin may
be temporary. A study of the product life-cycle in grocery
manufacturing noted the price of a product in its introductory
stage will be higher initially because the output rates are
relatively low, profit margins on sales tend to be relatively
high, and technological problems in production are not fully
rastered. 3 1 Part of aspartame's $80 tc $90 per pound price
can be attributed to the cost of product development and to
the expense associated with securing approval frcE the FDA and
similar regulatory agencies in other countries. 3 2  Increases
in production and technological improvements are likely to be
particularly salient in the future. Searle began
construction of an aspartame plant expected to be in use by
1985. Other companies are exploring less expensive methods for
synthesizing the amino acids used in apartame's production. 3 3
Sherwin-Uilliams and the manufacturers of saccharin
sweetened foods suggested that aspartame's sales would
actually increase their own sales because a new sweetener was
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expected to expand the overall sweetener market and many
products use a corbination of saaccharin and aspartame. Their
predictions proved accurate. Searle's marketing research has
found that only half of the users of Equal were switching from
Sweet 'n Low, the rest had changed from sugar. In one product
survey Equal was estimated to have enlarged the artificial
sweetener market by 27 percent.
3 4
Although NlutraSweet and Equal quickly proved to be
popular with consumers, Searle still had considerable
incentive to pursue soft drink approval for aspartame. The
soft drink firms continued to be the biggest commercial buyers
of artificial sweeteners. Searle had every reason to be
optimistic that aspartame in soft drinks would be well
received by consumers. The NutraSweet and Equal campaigns had
stressed aspartane's good taste. The long standing
disadvantage with saccharin had always been the aftertaste
that prevented sore consumers from accepting diet soft drinks.
In addition, sales of sugar sweetened drinks had grown
slowly since the beginning of the 1980s. Diet drinks, already
the fastest growing segment of the market, were expected to
accelerate in sales during the rest of the decade. By 1983
diet drinks represented over $4 billion of the $25 billion a
year American soft drink market. The consumers born after
World 1War II are the most frequent users of artificially
sweetened products. As they near middle aCe and become even
more diet conscious, their consumption is expected to increase
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further. 3 5
The Canadian experience with aspartame in soft drinks set
a promising example for Searle. Since the introduction of
sodas flavored with 100 percent NutraSweet in 1981, diet drink
sales have tripled in Canada and now constitute about 15
percent of the market there. 36 Shortly after receiving
permission to sell aspartame in dry form, Searle applied for
its use in soft drinks. The FDA granted the approval in the
summer of 1983. 3 7
Although the market appeared favorable, the difference in
price between saccharin and aspartame proved to be more of a
barrier to acceptance of NutraSweet by soft drink bottlers
than it had been for food companies or consumers. The cost of
sweetening 24 twelve ounce cans of soda with 100 percent
aspartame was estimated at $1.04. In comparison, sugar and
saccharin would only cost 55 cents and 3 cents respectively.38
The reaction of the soft drink industry tc aspartame's
approval was markedly restrained. With the exception of 7UP,
the major companies initially expressed reservations. In the
week following the FDA's approval, Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper
announced that they were uncertain about their plans to use
the sweetener; Pepsi voiced concerns about aspartame's
relatively short shelf-life. 3 9
The firzis, especially Coca-Cola, made a great deal
publicly out of their hesitation, attributing it to their
worry about the health effects of aspartamre. In an
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interesting twist of reasoning, the soft drink industry
attempted to present itself as the voice of caution regarding
the use of aspartame and the FDA as acting intemperately. A
representative from one of the major cola companies in an
apparent reference to cyclamate and saccharin warned the FDA,
"Make sure you know what you're doing before you saddle us
with this one." The National Soft Drink Association appealed
to the FDA to delay approval of aspartame in soft drinks until
the stability difficulties were resolved.40
The fear that aspartame might prove to be a health threat
was probably not the complete reason for the lukewarm embrace
by the soft drink companies. Some accounts of the NSDA appeal
to delay aspartame's approval indicated that it was undertaken
on behalf of Coca-Cola and Pepsi in order to allow the the two
companies to continue their negotiations for more favorable
terms with Searle for purchasing aspartame. In addition,
shortly before aspartaLe was approved, both firms had invested
heavily in promoting caffeine-free versions of their leading
cola brands. A FDA delay on aspartame would have enabled them
to better absorb these expenditures before launching the new
NutraSweet flavored brands.41
The approval drew objections from other sources as well.
Dr. Richard Wurtman, the MIT professor who had presented
testimony at the board of inquiry hearings, expressed
reservations about the use of aspartawe in combination with
carbohydrates. Wurtlan's concerns focused on behavior changes
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that might occur if large amounts of aspartame were ingested,
as with the unrestricted use of diet soft drinks. 4 2
The Center for Science in the Public Interest also urged
the FDA to "proceed cautiously" in view of Wurtman's findings.
The involvement of the consumer advocacy organization
apparently was prompted by a public relations firm
representing Sherwin-Williams. The head of the firm had
forwarded Wurtman's reservations to CSPI and to various
journalists because of concerns that saccharin sales would be
hurt if new problems developed with diet soft drinks. 3
Despite their public hesitation, less than a month after
the FDA granted beverage permission, Coca-Cola signed an
agreement with Searle to become the first soft drink company
to use aspartame. The new formulation was based on an
aspartame-saccharin combination. Although Coca-Cola refused
to indicate the amounts of each sweetener, it has been
estimated that aspartame replaces about 25 percent of the
saccharin in Diet Coke. If Coca-Cola used 100 percent
aspartame, bottlers would pay $4.58 a gallon for the syrup
concentrate. The aspartame would cost Coca-Cola $2.67, and the
company's profit would be $1.66 on each gallon. However, using
the considerably cheaper saccharin in combination with
aspartame, Coca-Cola's profit would be about $2.32.44
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The public interest movement and artificial sweeteners
Consumer advocacy organizations and their representatives
were involved in each artificial sweetener controversy, but
their participation was a central feature of the aspartame
dispute. Even though aspartame was eventually approved, the
objections of Olney and Turner forced a careful examination of
what was considered the "pivotal" research on the sweetener's
safety. 4 5 Aspartame's first approval in 1974 had followed only
a 15 month period in which the agency ostensibly reviewed the
"voluminous amounts of data" submitted in Searle's petition.46
The board of inquiry, convened only as a result of Olney
and Turner's objections, concentrated attention on the several
key points that were under dispute. Although the board was
overruled, the reservations of the three scientists about
aspartame's safety became part of the public record.
Ironically, because of Olney and Turner, the FDA and Searle
were able to make the claim that aspartame was one of the most
thoroughly tested substances in the food supply.
Consumer advocates are frequently criticized for being
opportunistic and short-sighted. Yet those prominently
involved with artificial sweeteners have been recommending
restrictions on their use since the cyclamate ban. For
example, James Turner's interest in food additives and the FDA
began with his association with Palph Nader during the 1960s.
John Olney's research on the effects of additives on the brain
also dates fror prior to the cyclamate ban.
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The aspartame case provides sore insight into the
relative weight of participants in the regulatory process.
Although their involvement may occasionally be influential, as
happened with aspartame, the effectiveness of consumer
advocates is often limited to temporary disruptions of a
product's marketing. The resources of the public interest
organization are no match for those of industry. The lack of
finances has not always been a major handicap when the
political environment has been sympathetic to consumer
concerns, but the public interest organization is much more
dependent upon the political mood in the country for its
successes than is business. As Michael Pertshuk has pointed
out, "for consumer entrepreneurial politics to succeed in the
1960s, consumer goals had to harmonize with public attitudes
and the political environment."'4 9 An unsympathetic or
indifferent public can undermine the impact of the consul.er
advocate.
According to Pertshuk, underlying the popularity of
deregulation efforts in the 1980s and the waning of the
consuuer movement is the endurance of the favored position
business occupies in the United States. 50 Eeginning in the
1970s, industry mobilized in response to the attacks from
consumer advocates, sponsoring scientific studies to counter
harmful claims, mounting public relations campaigns, and
creanizing into political action conrittees. In the area of
food safety, the impact of the consumer advocate has been
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curtailed by aggressive business activities that have
preempted some of the debate.
Industry sponsored organizations such as the American
Council on Science and Health (ACSH) and the Inte- ;tional
Life Sciences Institute (ILS Lave promoted science favorable
to the food industry's views. These groups have actively
sought publicity for their opinions often in the popular .edia
and through their own publications. ILSI, for exaiple, has
sponsored scientific conferences to exariine the data on sodiur
and caffeine. 5 1 Prominent scientists are frequent
participants in forums held by ACSH and ILSI. They also
participate in the organizations as members of the board or
through involvement on various committees. Dr. Richard
Wurtman, for example, is a trustee on the ILSI board.
Conclusio
The health problems associated with cyclamate and
saccharin helped drive a search for alternative sweeteners.
After saccharin becaLse the only noncaloric sweetener available
in the United States, there was some indication that growth in
the diet segment of soft drink sales would be even stronger if
a better tasting sweetener was available. This analysis has
apparently been correct as the overall market for low calorie
sweeteners has expanded since aspartame was introduced in
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1981.52
The cyclamate and saccharin cases illustrated the
difficulties associated with restricting consumer products
that have been in wide use for many years. The conflict over
the safety of cyclamate and saccharin occurred at a different
point in the policy process than did the debate about
aspartame's safety. The older sweeteners had been approved by
the FDA for expanded uses long after both were available in
the food supply. When the FDA banned cyclamate and later
attempted to restrict saccharin, the agency received
considerable attention from a variety of interest groups and
the public.
By contrast, aspartame was a new product and the
objections about its safety occurred before it reached the
market. The FDA's decisions to delay approval received little
public or interest group scrutiny. The challenges from John
Olney and James Turner were channeled through the regulatory
process and not debated in a larger forurn. As the saccharin
case demonstrated, controlling the scope of a conflict can be
influential in determining the outcore. The use of the public
board of inquiry helped to maintain the privacy of the
aspartame debate, confining it to scientific grounds.
Consumer interest in an additive before it is on the
.arket is usually inconsequential. In the aspartare case,
however, there was a latent demand for a better tasting
sweetener that Searle Lright have exploited in an effort to
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accelerate the regulatory process. For example, the company
could have conducted taste tests for consumers and food
reporters, enlisted the aid of the diabetes associations, or
worked with the Calorie Control Council to drum up interest in
aspartame. Sufficiently mobilized, these interest groups
might have pressured the FDA for a quicker and favorable
ruling. Despite the extended length of the regulatory
process, Searle made no attempt to enlarge the conflict by
attracting other groups.
There were marketing disadvantages to enlisting the
public's help. When aspartame was launched, because of the
lack of publicity, there was little indication that the
sweetener had been the subject of any health concerns. host
coverage of aspartame's introduction mentioned that the
sweetener could adversely affect persons with phenylketonuria
and pointed out that a cautionary label was required. The
stories generally failed to mention, however, the more serious
concern, that aspartar:.e was alleged to cause brain tumors. 5 3
There was also little incentive for Searle to make an
effort to enlist public participation during the regulatory
process because drawing attention to aspartame might have
generated interest group opposition to its approval. James Q.
Wilson has used the term "interest-group politics" to
characterize a situation in which a policy proposal benefits a
relatively small group at the expense of another. 5 4 Eecause
both the costs and the benefits are narrowly concentrated in
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such a situation, the groups have incentive to organize in
support or opposition to the policy. A rcajor campaign to
acquaint consumers with aspartame might have caused the sugar
industry to work vigorously against the approval. As recently
as 1983 the British government quietly approved the use of
three new sugar substitutes, hoping to avoid provoking the
sugar lobby in that country. 5 5
In the United States the sugar industry was preoccupied
with sagging sales. The periodic health controversies over
sugar substitutes have temporarily helped sugar's prices, but
the benefit was short-lived. 5 6 Artificial sweeteners were not
perceived to be a direct cause of the decline even though ever
since cyclamate their competition has been unwelcome. 5 7 The
competition from corn sweeteners and the gradual decline in
the consumption of cane and beet sugar that have severely
affected the sugar industry have accelerated in recent
years. 5 8  Industrial sugar users have increasingly turned to
corn sweeteners as their cost has become cheaper and less
volatile than sugar's. As a result, the use of corn
sweeteners has grown about 30 percent per year for the past
ten years. A major setback for the sugar industry occurred
when the large soft drink companies announced plans to use
50-75 percent formulations of high fructose corn syrup to
replace the sugar in their beverages. While corn sweeteners
now hold a 38 percent share of the total sweetener rmarket in
the United States, that share is expected to increase to 50
19 4
percent by 1985. 5 9
The sugar industry has also been increasingly preoccupied
with defending sugar's safety as a food. In the last decade
consumer advocacy groups have targeted sugar as a serious
health problem. In a survey conducted in October 1978, 28
percent of those polled considered sugar a very serious health
threat. Fifty percent rated it as a somewhat serious threat.
In contrast, only half as many, 14 percent, gave saccharin a
very serious rating, with 42 percent rating the artificial
sweetener as a somewhat serious threat. 6 0
The aspartame experience underscores a dilemma that has
been at the heart of each artificial sweetener controversy.
There is no fixed concept of the public interest. In the
absence of an absolute safety standard, the acceptability of a
food substance can be determined by political factors if
sufficient motivation exists for interest group involvement.
In each artificial sweetener case the prevailing view of what
was best for the public was shaped by participants in the
regulatory process. With aspartame there was no urgency to
introduce another sweetener because saccharin was still
available. The objections raised by Olney and Turner, based
on compelling but not incontrovertible scientific arguments,
were taken seriously by the FDA which had reason to be
cautious based on its unhappy experiences with previous sugar
substitutes.
In each case, the public interest became an element of
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the regulatory process to be "captured" by the various groups
involved. Olney and Turner's most serious objection was still
considered sufficiently compelling for the PBOI to reconnend
that approval be delayed. But their view of what was best for
the public proved less influential than the belief by the FDA
commissioner that the benefits of a new sweetener outweighed
the uncertain evidence of potential harm.
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CHAPTER VI
INTENT AND OUTCOME: THE SHAPING OF REGULATORY POLICY
Various theories exist to explain why regulatory policy
evolves as it does. Some political scientists explain the
disjuncture between intent and outcome as the result of the
"capture" of the federal agency by the regulated industry.
The regulatory agency acts almost as a manager of the industry
because of the comfortable arrangement developed over a long
period of association.1 Or the industry, the agency, and the
relevant congressional committee provide mutual benefits
through a cooperative relationship. 2
For other theorists unintended outcomes often result fron
the bargaining among interest groups and are a healthy sign in
democratic societies. 3 A more recent analysis finds that the
array of costs and benefits associated with a proposed policy
will indicate the intensity of the dispute and will provide a
reasonably accurate prediction of who will benefit.4 The
"original intent" model argues that regulation benefits
industry because it was designed specifically to do so. 5 Or
because business has more resources to pay attention to the
development of regulation, its influence on the outcome will
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be especially significant. 6
This study of the regulation of artificial sweeteners has
focused on the actions of the participants involved to explain
the policy outcomes. The strategies developed by the
government and by the companies to fulfill their own
organizational goals were especially significant. For the FDA
these goals were to ensure the safety of any sweetener on the
market and enhance its own reputation as a scientific
organization and as the guardian of the nation's health. For
the manufacturers the goal was to ensure the marketing of
their sweeteners free from health challenges and the threat of
government restrictions.
The law, science, and artificial sweeteners
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1958 furnished the
legal framework for the FDA's actions in each case. The law's
specifications regarding safe additives did not change from
cyclamate to aspartame, but the FDA's interpretation of what
constituted "reasonable" proof of safety did. In its
cyclamate decision, the FDA cited the general safety
requirements of the Act. The burden of proof was on the
manufacturer to demonstrate that cyclamate use would not be
harmful. The agency ruled that "cyclamate has not been shown
not to cause cancer" and "it has not been shown not to cause
heritable genetic damage." 7
When aspartame was approved in 1981, however, the FDA
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again based its decision on the general safety requirements,
but gave its manufacturer greater discretion in proving
safety. With aspartame safe was defined as "a reasonable
certainty in the minds of competent scientists that the food
additive will not be harmful under its proposed uses." The
FDA ruled that the manufacturer had met the burden of proof. 8
The aspartame regulation was particularly interesting given
that the "competent scientists" chosen by the FDA to review
aspartame had recommended its delay rather than its approval.
Even when the scientific evidence was solid, as with
saccharin, the law had minor impact on the eventual status of
the sweetener. Although the question of cancer had been
raised in all three cases, the Delaney clause, a subsection of
the 1958 Act specifically prohibiting carcinogens, was only
invoked by the FDA with saccharin. Instead of providing
support for the FDA's decision, the clause became a red
herring in the debate that ensued. Publicity that questioned
the usefulness of the clause as a realistic guideline helped
to obscure the issue of whether saccharin was a safe food
additive. When Congress decided to suspend the saccharin ban,
the Delaney clause was rendered ineffectual.
The impact of the science was also diminished at least
twice with artificial sweeteners by the predisposition of the
FDA stemming from past decisions. Because the agency was on
record in support of a particular position, additional
scientific evidence was not persuasive in changing the FDA's
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attitudes toward cyclamate or aspartame. After the FDA banned
cyclamate, the additional data submitted by the manufacturer,
in the absence of other pressures, was unsuccesful at inducing
a reversal of the decision. By contrast, aspartame had
initially been approved by the agency, and the Bureau of Foods
maintained its support of the sweetener over the years the
case was under review. When favorable data was submitted
after the board of inquiry recommended that aspartame's
marketing be delayed, the additional information was used to
overrule the board.
If the FDA's decisions have not ended the disputes over
artificial sweeteners, they have helped to shape the
parameters of subsequent scientific debate. The continuing
arguments over cyclamate's safety have focused on the issues
raised by the agency during the ban. Saccharin studies have
been directed principally at an examination of the sweetener
as a cause of bladder cancer, the major health issue addressed
by the FDA. Much of the debate about aspartame since it has
been on the market has been about possible ill effects caused
by the sweetener's degeneration in the soft drink solution,
the central issue raised during the approval process for
aspartame's use in liquids.
Protecting the public's health. zovernment strategies
Because the law and the science were deficient as policy
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guidelines, the FDA was subject to considerable pressure from
groups on both sides of the artificial sweetener debates. In
addition, as a result of the public's commitment to diet soft
drinks and other sugarless foods interest in an artificial
sweetener was intense. Of the thousands of food additives on
the market, only a few have generated public attention; the
regulation of most is of concern only to the manufacturer and
to the food industry.
The regulatory history of each sweetener reveals that
protection of the public's health was an important factor in
the FDA's decision-making. When cyclamate was banned the
public was intensely concerned about carcinogens in the food
supply. Although the ban was prompted in part by agitation
from the sugar industry and from consumer advocates, the FDA
was very much aware of the widespread fear of cancer. FDA
officials have generally placed great emphasis on the agency's
reputation as the guardian of the nation's health. This ethos
was at work during the cyclamate decision. The agency moved
hastily with cyclamate in order to avoid potential criticism
that it was neglectful in protecting the public.
The FDA's concern for the health of the public was
most apparent with saccharin. The FDA proceeded more
cautiously than it had with cyclamate and the scientific
findings on which the agency based its proposed ban were far
more conclusive than they had been in the earlier ban.
Unfortunately for the agency, the saccharin decision was not
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judged on scientific grounds but instead on the wisdom of
removing the only artificial sweetener still available.
Rather than being perceived as acting in the public interest,
the FDA's action was viewed as ill-conceived and largely
unnecessary. Although saccharin was almost certainly a
carcinogen, the lack of a substitute overrode the health
concerns.
When aspartame was under consideration, saccharin reduced
the urgency for the FDA to approve a new sugar substitute.
Because the debate over the saccharin decision had been so
intense, the FDA had reason to exercise caution in responding
to the concerns about aspartame. With saccharin still in use,
the agency could investigate the charges without pressure fror
the public or from the diet industry, except aspartame's
manufacturer, G.D. Searle.
The FDA's commitrent to aspartame has never wavered, at
least publicly, despite the issues raised about its safety
during the approval process and after the sweetener was
marketed in soft drinks. As with cyclamate, there is little
incentive for the FDA now to acknowledge any misjudgment
especially because the evidence against aspartame is
controversial. In addition, the status of saccharin is
unresolved. The repeated extension of the saccharin
moratorium is an unwieldy device that has failed to bring
further clarity to the problem. Subsequent research, even
that sponsored by the diet industry, has tended to corroborate
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the finding that saccharin is a carcinogen, vindicating the
FDA. Having aspartame remain unchallenged on the market may
mean that the FDA will finally be able to enforce the
saccharin ban it proposed years ago.
Influencing regulation: corporate strategies
Without the transformation in their marketing that
occurred after World War II, it is doubtful that artificial
sweeteners would have emerged as major regulatory issues.
Before the war saccharin was consumed principally by
diabetics. During the 1950s, however, millions of Americans,
newly conscious of their weight, began to use sugar
substitutes on a regular basis, in part because of the
introduction of the better tasting cyclamate. But in the main
the change in consumption patterns occurred because the
purpose of low calorie foods was redefined. Cyclamate's
manufacturer, Abbott Laboratories, and other companies
sponsored advertisements that appealed to dieters, contending
that their products were effective for losing weight. These
early campaigns permanently dispelled the images that
associated artificial sweeteners with illness, and instead
linked them with slimness and beauty, themes that would be
echoed in all future marketing efforts.
Cyclamate's popularity drew the attention of the sugar
industry with consequences for the regulatory process.
Through a trade group, the Sugar Association, the industry
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attempted to discredit cyclamate. In widely distributed
advertisements the Association questioned cyclamate's efficacy
as a weight reducing aid, unfavorably contrasted it with sugar
as a source of energy, and cast doubt on its safety as a food
additive. The strategy apparently inflicted little damage to
cyclamate's sales; consumption, especially in soft drinks,
increased steadily until the ban in 1969. The advertisements,
however, acquainted the public with concerns that previously
were of interest only to scientists and the FDA. The Sugar
Association also sponsored research on cyclamate's allegedly
ill effects that, coupled with its publicity campaign,
increased the pressure on the FDA to take action on cyclamate.
Food companies sometimes use quality standards
established by the government in advertising their products.
Similarily, the manufacturers of competitive sweeteners and
the soft drink companies attempted to exploit adverse
regulatory decisions for their marketing value. In 1969 diet
soft drinks were labeled "cyclamate-free." More recently,
products containing aspartame were promoted as
"saccharin-free" and "natural" to distinguish them from the
health problems attributed to artificial sweeteners.
One apparent lesson from Abbott's failure to reverse the
FDA decision was that it demonstrated to the manufacturer of
saccharin the vulnerability of a defense that rested on a
narrow definition of the issue. Rather than fighting the
proposed saccharin ban through the FDA appeal process,
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Sherwin-Williams attempted to have the decision repealed by
expanding the issues under debate to attract the support of as
wide an audience as possible. With the cooperation of the
soft drink industry, the bottlers were organized through the
National Soft Drink Association, and the diabetes associations
recruited their members. The public was mobilized through the
Calorie Control Council. The appeals to halt the ban were
made directly to Congress, bypassing the FDA.
The Calorie Control Council sponsored advertisements that
summarized complicated scientific data in several phrases in
daily newspapers across the country. In addition to providing
selective information and lowering the cost of obtaining it,
the publicity campaign demonstrated the efficacy of using
political symbols that are deeply meaningful in the American
culture. The Council portrayed the saccharin ban as an
example of government intrusion into a private decision and an
infringement of personal freedom.
In contrast to the issue expansion approach taken by
Sherwin-Williams with saccharin, Searle's response to the
aspartame challenge was to contain the conflict. Searle did
not attempt to draw the public's attention to the FDA's
tardiness in allowing another artificial sweetener on the
market. Instead, the company pursued aspartame's approval
quietly, sponsoring additional research on the points of
contention about the sweetener's safety. The health questions
raised by the public interest advocates were addressed in the
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regulatory process, not aired where they might linger to mar
the public's response to the new sweetener.
Aspartame has been sold under two different names, Equal,
the tabletop product for consumers, and NutraSweet, in bulk
form for industrial users. The division may have implications
for future regulatoru decisions. One lesson demonstrated by
the cyclamate and saccharin experiences was that the tabletop
and soft drink markets could be segmented into separately
defensible units. The FDA initially allowed cyclamate's
continued use as an over-the-counter drug, and later was
willing to consider proposals to permit saccharin in siriilar
form. Much of the debate over aspartame has developed over
its use in soft drinks. Should the controversy result in
regulatory action, it is is likely that the manufacturer,
Searle, would at least be able to protect the tabletop market
because the amounts of aspartame consumed are substantially
less than in soft drinks. The different names might also make
it possible for Searle to disassociate Equal from any health
hazards attributed to NutraSweet.
Sherwin-Williams and Searle undoubtedly benefited from
artificial sweetener controversies that preceded their own
experiences. A major factor in an organization's survival or
decline is the process of organizational learning. Miles has
defined organizational learning as: "effective adaptation to
the new circumstances that require the acquisition or creation
of knowledge about cause and effect, about relative strengths
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and weaknesses and about the feasibility and viability of
options for adaptation." 9 There is insufficient information
to conclude that the responses of Sherwin-Williams and Searle
to the challenges to their particular sweeteners are exanples
of organizational learning. Whether the companies actually
"adapted", that is, permanently incorporated in their
corporate culture their responses to the artificial sweetener
crises, is beyond the scope of this study. Both certainly
benefited from previous example and appeared, in devising
their own strategies, to have avoided the mistakes of their
predecessor(s).
Saccharin and aspartame could be unique situations in the
companies' histories. Sherwin-Williams usually faces
challenges of kinds other than the alleged health threat of a
food additive. The company's problems are more likely to
involve foreign competition in chemicals or inroads from
domestic rivals into retail paint sales. 10 Although the
quality of Searle's research has been questioned in the past,
challenges to the safety of a substance are also not a typical
problem. More often, the company has been concerned with
competition for market share with its pharmaceutical products
or the lack of breakthroughs in its research efforts.
Nevertheless, there is an indication that lessons from
the artificial sweetener cases and other controversies have
been beneficial to the food industry. Until 1969 food and
beverage firms relied on the manufacturers of an additive to
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ensure its safety. 1 1 The cyclamate and saccharin bans
demonstrated the potential vulnerability of all companies to
scientific controversy. Since cyclamate there has been
increased emphasis in the industry on safety testing, often
through joint research efforts designed to anticipate
problems. The companies have also demonstrated greater
political acumen, establishing corporate affairs departments,
working with consumer groups, and paying closer attention to
media coverage. 12
The competitive advertising practices adopted by various
firms helped maintain the public visibility of the artificial
sweeteners issues, which at least in the case of cyclamate,
contributed to regulatory action. All the manufacturers
supplied alternative scientific explanations for negative
findings about each sweetener. When those explanations gained
credibility, as occurred with saccharin and aspartame, they
helped ensure the sweetener's use.
The beneficiaries of artificial sweeteners policy
The intent of artificial sweetener regulation, as defined
by the FDA's mandate, was to protect the public from a health
hazard. Competitive marketing practices, subjective
interpretations of the science, and the availability of a
substitute were key factors shaping artificial sweeteners
policy. But they are also useful in assessing whether there is
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a lack of fit between intent and regulatory outcome when the
three cases are considered together.
The artificial sweetener cases suggest that the decisions
made by the Food and Drug Administration did not protect the
interests of the manufacturers.
outcome was often troublesome,
Sherwin-Williams, and Searle.
saccharin is still in use only
FDA in 1977; and although aspar
uses, the FDA took seven years
permission. The manufacturers
the timing of challenges to the
substance's marketing can occur
history of all three sweeteners
an established part of the food
In addition to having no c
Instead, the regulatory
if not detrimental, for Abbott,
Cyclamate remains banned;
because Congress overruled the
tame is approved for all food
to grant the initial marketing
could not control the source or
ir products. A threat to a
at any time, and as the
reveals, even well after it is
supply.
ontrol over the factors that
placed their products on the government's agenda, it would
appear that the manufacturers of cyclamate, saccharin, and
aspartame had no influence over the FDA's response to the
challenges. Cyclamate had been under review for months, but
the FDA decided virtually over a weekend to ban the sweetener.
The decision to remove saccharin from the market, although
again it had been under study for even longer than cyclamate,
actually took place almost overnight. The FDA responded
almost immediately to the charges against aspartame by
rescinding its earlier marketing approval.
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The principal beneficiary of artificial sweeteners
regulation has probably been the soft drink companies.
Since sugarfree sodas were introduced in the mid-fifties, diet
soft drink growth has averaged eight percent annually. 13 The
"baby-boom generation", the major consumers of diet drinks,
are expected to provide the basis for continued growth. Soft
drink analysts project that as these consumers age, they will
become increasingly diet conscious.1
If the regulatory policy in each case did not immediately
favor the interests of Coca-Cola, Pepsi, 7UP, and other
producers of sugarless drinks, the policy that evolved did.
At no point in the history of cyclamate, saccharin, or
aspartame were the soft drink firms left without an artificial
sweetener. When cyclamate was banned, Coca-Cola and Pepsi had
reformulated versions of their diet brands available within
two weeks. When aspartame was approved for soft drink use,
most of the major companies were ready with
aspartane-sweetened formulas. The most serious threat, the
saccharin ban, was rapidly neutralized.
When helpful to their own interests, the soft drink
companies supported the efforts of the artificial sweetener
manufacturers to protect cyclamate, saccharin, or aspartame.
When it was not beneficial for the preservation of their diet
markets, the soft drink companies disassociated themselves
from the controversy. From cyclamate to aspartame, the soft
drink firms became increasingly sophisticated about shielding
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their own investment in artificial sweeteners without becoming
bogged down in the disputes over a particular sugar
substitute. Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and the others maintained a
very low public profile, using their trade associations to
protest the FDA's decisions and never appearing on the front
lines of the battles. Instead, they distanced themselves from
the regulatory procedures that surrounded each sweetener,
leaving those to the manufacturer.
It is debatable whether the public's health has been
protected in the artificial sweetener cases, although this is
the intent of food additive regulation. By neglecting to
consider the implications of a cyclamate ban for future
artificial sweetener use, the agency contributed to the
impotency of its saccharin decision seven years later. One
conclusion that can certainly be drawn from the scientific
literature is that, between cyclamate and saccharin, cyclamate
poses the least health hazard, yet saccharin continues in
widespread use.
From the Canadian experience, it is also apparent that
regulations that would have restricted the sale of artificial
sweeteners to tabletop form or as over-the-counter drugs, were
alternatives that might have protected children or the
uninformed public while preserving the access to saccharin of
diabetics or those knowledgeable about the risk. Whether or
not these approaches were optimal depends on one's
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interpretation of the extent of the hazard posed by saccharin
consumption. Clearly, any option that would have drastically
limited the forms of artificial sweeteener consumption were
viewed as unacceptable by the soft drink companies whose
sugarless markets would have been eliminated.
For those in the public who believe, incorrectly but
adamantly, that artificial sweeteners are effective in weight
reduction, the regulatory outcome has been to their benefit.
The concerns of diabetics who viewed artificial sweeteners as
a lifestyle issue, were respected. But for the millions of
consumers, including many from the two groups above, who are
unaware of possible adverse health effects, it is arguable
whether the regulation of artificial sweeteners has served to
protect their interests.
Further implications
The manufacturers of cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame
adopted marketing scientific, and political strategies to
protect their products, often having a decisive effect on the
regulatory outcomes. This aspect of the artificial sweeteners
controversy has parallels in other cases of threatened
consumer products.
The adaptation of the tobacco industry to nearly
unanimous agreement about the hazards of cigarette smoking is
an obvious example. The tobacco companies have protected
their economic health through diversification strategies.
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They have blunted the damage of adverse publicity by agreei
, ar ing labels on cigarette packages an•l remi ovai
<igarette advertising from television. The warning labels
offer important protection against lawsuits should a claimant
argue that cigarette smoking caused his lung cancer or
emphysema. Once the advertisements for cigarettes ceased to
run on television, so did many of the public service
announcements that warned against smoking and that were
affecting sales. 1 5
The consumption of foods with a high sodium content or
with a high level of saturated fats has been linked to
hypertension and heart disease respectively. The publicity
about these issues and the heightened concern by government
prompted the producers of these foods to develop alternative
products. Low-fat milk, polyunsaturated vegetable oils, and
margarine were vigorously advertised as healthful alternatives
to certain long-standing staples of the American diet.
Low-sodium versions of many foods and beverages are also now
widely available and routinely advertised as beneficial. The
development of substitutes in these cases also served to
mitigate the pressure on government to act in response to
negative evidence. 16
These cases also illustrate that although science may not
have a major impact on the regulatory outcome, it can be
highly influential in producer behavior. Unlike artificial
sweeteners they demonstrate that negative science can also
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affect consumer behavior. Although cigarette sales have
increased since the Surgeon General warned in 1964 that
smoking was dangerous, the portion of the adult population who
smokes has declined. Consumers have also changed their eating
habits in response to the attention given to the links between
serious disease and the consumption of foods with high sodium
or saturated fat content.
Nor is science always incidental to the regulatory
outcome. Although Proctor and Gamble voluntarily recalled its
Rely tampon during the toxic shock scare of 1980, it did so
under threat of a mandatory federal recall. It was in light
of this possibility that the company accepted the FDA's
suggestion to undertake a recall of Rely. Proctor and Gamble
conducted the largest publicity campaign ever to retrieve Rely
from store shelves and to refund consumers.
17
The artificial sweetener cases reveal several important
constraints on what government can actually accomplish in the
area of consumer protection, regardless of regulatory intent.
First, as the current availability of saccharin attests, there
are limits set by the public. When a substitute is
unavailable for a popular, but unsafe product, the government
probably will find it virtually impossible to enforce a ban.
Cigarettes and alcohol continue to be sold despite the health
dangers associated with each and the vigorous opposition of
some well-organized interest groups. There are no substitutes
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for either product, and they are used regularly by millions of
Americans. Similarily with saccharin, because no other
sweetener was available to the millions of Americans who
consumed diet soft drinks and other sugarless products, the
FDA's proposed ban was highly unpopular, resulting in a
congressional decision to delay its implementation.
Second, when the perceived benefits of a product or a
course of action outweigh the perceived costs (regardless of
the actual benefits or costs) the government will be hampered
in restricting a product. The potential risk from artificial
sweetener consumption is generally perceived to be slight and
long-term; the odds are in the consumer's favor. Because the
belief is so firmly entrenched that artificial sweeteners are
effective in losing weight, their value was perceived to be
greater than the risk of developing bladder cancer sometime in
the future.
Third, government action in the area of consumer
protection is limited by the lack of consensus on what
constitutes an acceptable risk. There are individuals for
whom the perils of skydiving or deep sea exploration are
acceptable and others for whom such activities would be
considered too dangerous to attempt. Individuals calculate
risk consciously in the contemplation of deliberative
activities, or more often, unconsiously in hundreds of mundane
situations: entering an automobile, crossing the street, or
eating processed foods.
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For the government agency, however, risk assessment must
be viewed as an intentional act, particularly if the process
is called upon to later defend a decision. Ultimately,
deciding what will be considered acceptable risk, from a
sweetener or other consumer product, is a political
determination that assesses what degree of jeopardy to the
public's health will be worth the benefits. Government has
been given the responsibility in part because it would be
impossible for the individual to calculate the risks and
benefits of the myriad consumer products on the market. The
task for the federal agency is complicated by the lack of a
single public standard of acceptable risk. Baruch Fischhoff,
Sarah Lichtenstein, and Paul Slovic found that "...there is no
single all-purpose number that expresses "acceptable risk" for
a society. Values and uncertainties are an integral part of
every acceptable-risk problem." 18
The artificial sweetener cases also reveal that health and
safety regulations designed to protect consumers may fall
short of this goal because of strategies adopted by government
agencies or by companies to protect their own interests. With
artificial sweeteners these strategies were not always
successful in achieving the ends desired by the FDA or by the
manufacturers of cyclamate, saccharin, and aspartame. But
their efforts did affect the regulatory process and
consequently, the current state of artificial sweeteners
policy. The FDA attempted to fulfill its responsibility of
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ensuring the safety of the food supply while maintaining its
political credibility and scientific reputation; the two goals
were not always compatible. The manufacturers attempted to
keep their products on the market, efforts that were sometimes
at odds with the FDA and not always in the best interests of
the public's health.
This study and others make clear that the regulation of
consumer products is an uncertain process for all involved.
The political environment changes, the science is ambiguous,
and the existence of a substitute for a product all complicate
the process for the FDA. As the artificial sweetener cases
demonstrate the relationship between the safety of a product
and its regulatory status cannot be assumed. Nor can the
public take for granted that its health will be protected.
The manufacturer cannot assume that by following established
procedures and relying on the science the desired outcome will
result.
The federal government began regulating the safety of the
food supply at the beginning of the twentieth century. That
its efforts have achieved some measure of success is evidenced
by a vast system of food production virtually free from
obvious dangers - bacterial infections, toxic effects,
botulism, etc. Today, however, the problems have changed.
The principal challenge for the government now is protection
of the American consumer from potential hazards - regulating
the use of substances where the risk is ambiguous or long
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term. Controlling blatant abuses and violations has given way
to monitoring more subtle dangers. The artificial sweetener
cases suggest that, as the problems have grown more complex,
so too have the strategies to influence the policy outcome
adopted by various participants in the regulatory process.
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